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tradition
ND WITH THY SPIRIT." I FEEL BEITER WHEN I
hear those words. When I worship in an
unfamiliar church and the congregation
around me responds to the salutation, "The Lord
be with you," with the old familiar phrase, the language of the old prayer book puts me at ease and
makes me feel at home. When instead I hear the
newer formulation, "And also with you," I become
concerned. It is a small change, but enough to raise
my guard. If they changed that, what else might
they have messed with?
It's silly. I know that. I can't even remember
when this change happened, but I'm still not completely comfortable with it. I admit that my distaste
for the new response is not legitimate, because it is
not theologically informed. While I'm sure that gallons of ink have been spilled in theological journals
over the respective merits of "And with thy spirit"
and "And also with you,'' I lack the virtue necessary
to familiarize myself with this undoubtedly fascinating literature. My preference comes down to
this: I am an incorrigible traditionalist, and I just
don't like the new response. Those who know me
will confirm that I handle change poorly. (Did you
know that they added a color other than green to
the twenty dollar bill? What next?!)
Of course, there is more to tradition than the
irrational preferences of your obstreperous editor.
Our traditions contain the wisdom of the ages and
are not to be taken lightly. Although the modem
mind is proud of its escape from superstitious tradition (and modem Christians are proud of their
escape from inhibiting traditions), it is not possible
to jettison all tradition and start afresh. Traditions
sometimes represent only the values of ages gone
by, but, as C. S. Lewis wrote in The Abolition of Man,
"[M]any of those who 'debunk' traditional or (as
they would say) 'sentimental' values have in the
background values of their own which they believe
to be immune from the debunking process." An
attempt to reform or reject traditions is little more

A
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than an act of raw will, unless it is itself rooted in
the same tradition it claims to amend. Is it "better"
to respond, "And also with you"? Perhaps this
formulation better expresses the communal nature
of the church's worship; however, the notion of
communal worship itself comes to us through
Christian tradition. If the change is done for the
right reasons, then we have not rejected tradition
but instead reaffirmed one aspect of it.
The Cresset is pleased to publish four addresses
from the Lilly Fellows Program National
Conference, held on 29 September-2 October,
2005 at College of the Holy Cross. The conference
theme, "Keeping the Faith: Four Religious
Perspectives on the Creation of Tradition,'' is
addressed by distinguished scholars representing
four distinct religious traditions. We learn from
these essays that tradition is central to a faith's
identity and sense of community, but also that it
cannot be a static or rigid thing. Although traditions must have stability, in many ways the process
through which they change is as important as the
content of the tradition itself.
This issue on tradition presents an appropriate
moment to inaugurate a new column, one in which
we hope to promote discussion of a religious tradition well known to many readers of The Cresset. In
the first issue of Being Lutheran, David Weber asks
if Lutheranism has become "the church of the transition"-a stopping place on the road between
evangelicalism and Catholicism. In this and future
columns, we will consider what remains distinctive
about Lutheranism. What in Lutheranism's traditions remains both true and vibrant for presentday believers? And how can Lutheran traditions be
rearticulated in a manner sensitive to the needs of
the present without being sacrificed to the fads of
present? We hope this column will be a welcome
new tradition for The Cresset's faithful readers. 'f-JPO

creating an authentic faith
traditions and traditiot?alism in Judaism
Alan }.Avery-Peck
HE STUDY OF RELIGION IN COLLEGES AND UNI-

T

versities aims to give students a comprehensive understanding of the social,
cultural, theological, and intellectual processes
through which people make sense of the world
around them. In this context, examination of a
diversity of religions is exceptionally important.
Through the study of people who are different
from us, we gain deeper insight into the nature of
humanity-and of ourselves-than study of our
own tradition alone can provide. This is because
our evaluation of the other reveals something
more significant than the obvious fact that different groups have distinctive philosophies and
theologies. More important than this, study of the
other reveals the extent to which the questions different peoples ask and the challenges they face are
largely shared. Through the example of the other,
therefore, we come to recognize the ways in which
our own religious ideologies and practices are the
results of choices, the products of our ancestors'
and our own choosing of one path among a range
of possible approaches to constructing a meaningful reality. Recognizing that one religion made one
choice and ours took a different path is the beginning of the critical evaluation of our faith. This
evaluation must begin in the recognition that our
faith is not a simple given and did not have to
develop exactly as it did. All religions are, rather,
the products of human choices, made in response
to the social, intellectual, and political environments in which people live from age to age. Our
ability to see that is heightened by our study of
diverse religions, a study that highlights the range
of paths that have worked and continue to work
for the peoples around us.
The following treatment of tradition in
Judaism means to do more than provide some
information about what Jews do and believe. The
point, rather, is to facilitate reflection on and to
deepen understanding of many different tradi-

tions. Surely your own community has needed to
apply its core theology in a variety of different
and perhaps radically changing historical
circumstances. How has it done that? How has it
discerned legitimate from inappropriate change?
How has it maintained a sense of continuity with
the past even as it has proposed beliefs and
practices that respond to the needs of the present? Judaism has survived over thousands of
years in radically disparate historical settings. It
therefore provides a striking example of how
such questions might be answered. These comments about Judaism are intended to raise your
consciousness to the evolving history of your
own religion and to that religion's potential theological and spiritual evolution.
the nature of a traditional religion
The term tradition signifies the theological
and ritual content of a religion: the beliefs, doctrines, cultural values, moral standards, and especially the particular behaviors through which
individuals and communities express their
commitment to an inherited way of life. By tradition, we may refer to everything from theological
and ethical premises, to language, modes of dress,
and choices of cuisine. Most important is that,
insofar as these elements of communal life are
transmitted from generation to generation, the
term tradition signifies not only the content of a
religious culture but also the process through
which that culture is passed down from age to age.
The designation of religious beliefs and practices
as tradition implies that religious culture preserves a past way of life, transmitting that inherited worldview and set of social and cultural
norms from antiquity to contemporary times (see
Yagod 1972, col. 1308; on this topic in general, see
Avery-Peck 2000, 1458-1465).
True to this definition, Judaism associates the
term tradition with its concept of Torah. The word

Torah, which might be translated "divine instruction" or "revelation," refers in Judaism to the code
of law and practice that Jews understand God to
have revealed to Moses at Mt. Sinai, as described
in the biblical book of Exodus. Moses ascended
Mt. Sinai, met face to face with God, and was
instructed regarding all aspects of the proper
belief and the correct lifestyle that would comprise
the religious civilization that carne to be known as
Judaism. As the Bible's own mandate required and
as later forms of Judaism insist, this revelation
subsequently was transmitted-whether in writing, by word of mouth, or through example-from
generation to generation. The sources of Judaism
from antiquity and to modem times accordingly
describe Judaism as a "traditional" religion. These
sources comprehend the rituals, lifestyles, and
theological underpinnings of Judaism to conform
to a transmitted system of law and practice.
And yet it is here that a critical evaluation of
the content of Judaism must be introduced. At
stake is the question of what it actually means to
assert that a religion such as Judaism is "traditional." How can a religion that has so evidently
evolved be called a tradition at all? The concept of
religion as tradition sees the religious individual
always as standing "in a long process of thought,
with the sole task of refining and defending
received truth" (Neusner 2003, 1920). This concept
of religion and tradition would understand all
Jewish thought and practice from Sinai and to the
present to be nothing more than an articulation of
the content of God's original revelation. And yet,
as is clear even to casual observers, Judaism,
whether in antiquity or in its contemporary manifestations, is hardly a simple reiteration of the religious thought and social practices introduced in
Scripture. It is, rather, a product of the evolving
thought and shifting structures of ritual through
which Jews have responded to the problems,
issues, and questions of each particular age. That,
of course, is the opposite of what a strict concept of
tradition demands.
To speak meaningfully of tradition in the
context of Judaism, we must delve below the
obvious fact of Judaism's focus on the concept of
Torah. At issue is how we explain the manner in
which, in Judaism, inherited practices or ideas
actually have been used within successive histor617 The Cresset Easter I 2006

ical periods. How have the details of tradition
been manipulated to create a sense of continuity,
and hence of authenticity, within the diverse settings in which they have been placed? How has a
sense of traditionality survived within what are
creative and often independent systems of Judaic
belief and practice?
An examination of one of the central shifts in
Judaism-the shift from the beliefs and practices
described in the Hebrew scriptures to the postbiblical, Rabbinic religion that has defined
Judaism from the first centuries CE into our own
day-will help us answer that question. The larger
point of this historical survey is to show that our
usual idea of religion as tradition is not useful in
helping us understand the historical experiences
of the Jews. We see that we can neither speak of a
single monolithic religion, Judaism, nor attempt to
characterize Judaism overall either as traditional
or not traditional. Judaism has survived and survives because of its adherents' willingness over the
years to respond to the diverse circumstances in
which they have found themselves. They have
done this sometimes by foregoing the inherited
system within which ancient traditions made
sense, by forsaking the demands of tradition
altogether. But in other circumstances, they have
found strength by focusing intently upon
inherited patterns of thought and behavior, that is,
by being traditional. Traditionality is not a fixed
component of Judaism but one potential response
to the changing historical circumstances in which
Jews over the ages have found themselves. Fully to
comprehend this idea and to understand the ways
in which tradition has functioned, or failed to
function, in Judaism, we begin at the beginning of
the story, with the biblical system and its distinctive perspective on and attitude toward tradition.

the biblical system
Scripture's story of Egyptian bondage, the
Exodus from Egypt, and the events of Sinai is at
the heart of the biblical system. It is an appropriate
place to start because the Exodus theme is mentioned in Scripture approximately 120 times, more
than any other historical event or theological
concept. While Scripture clearly encompasses
other-even contrary-ideas, this is incontestable
evidence of the Exodus's centrality in the religion

of Israel. Most important for our purposes is the
explanations, situated now within a theology that
focused not on the "rhythm of nature and the life of
extent to which, in Scripture, the victory over
Egypt established God's sole and absolute power
the soil" (Sarna) but on the path of redemption that
led from Egypt, to Sinai, to the Promised Land.
over history. As a result, history was to be recognized in general as an arena of divine activity.
Scripture, rather than a reflection on and affirmaWhat people experienced was a sign of the divine
tion of the past spoke to a present age in a new and
distinctive voice, creating a system that centuries
will, and so was endowed with theological meaning. Ancillary to this point is that the Exodus narafter the Exodus explained who its readers were as
rative, with its miracle working God, sets out the
Israelites, how they got to where they were, and
idea that, "knowledge of God's qualities and of his
what they could expect should they adhere to the
demands on Israel can be acquired only insofar as
laws set out in their holy book.
God takes the initiative in revealing them" (Sarna
What is important as we tum to the Rabbinic
period accordingly is not simply whether or not
1992, 698-99). What God wants us to know about
him, God tells or shows us directly.
the Rabbis continued to insist upon Jews' adherBy focusing on these points, - - - - - - - - - - - - - ence to biblical law. This, without
Even as the Rabbis
Scripture
established
what
doubt, they did. At issue, rather, is
unequivocally was to become a maintained the practices of how they understood this law,
traditional religion. In that relibiblical Judaism, they, like how they imagined the law was
gion, all personal and communal
to be determined, their perception
Scripture's authors before of the source of its hold upon the
practices replicated that which
was passed on from generation to
people, and their definition of its
them, placed those
generation, authenticated by their
purpose within the life of the
traditions within a newly
ultimate source in the divine.l In
community. If these perceptions
imagined systemic
the biblical picture, knowledge of
remained the same as in
and faith in God did not result structure, a structure quite Scripture, we can argue that we
from theological or philosophical
are dealing with a traditional reliforeign
to
anything
that
had
speculation, and this means that
gion. But if they did not, then, no
existed
previously.
humans were not empowered
matter what traditional actions or
either to discover new aspects of
rituals were retained, the evolved
the reality of God or to create new modes of servreligious system as a whole cannot be deemed
ing God. Rather, knowledge of God and the
traditional. When we move forward from the
proper modes of worshipping God and living in
Scriptural period to that of the Rabbis of the first
the community created by God were revealed in
centuries CE, we see in fact that, even as the Rabbis
full at Sinai. All future religious activity was to
maintained the practices of biblical Judaism, they,
demarcate the religious individual as standing
like Scripture's authors before them, placed those
always "in a long process of thought, with the sole
traditions within a newly imagined systemic structask of refining and defending received truth"
ture, a structure quite foreign to anything that had
(Neusner 2003, 1920).
existed previously. Rabbinic Judaism, responding
It bears noting here that even as Scripture
to historical realities quite different from those
established a religion insisting on the exacting
anticipated by Scripture is anything but a tradimaintenance of tradition, it did not itself emerge
tional religion.
out of a commensurate commitment to tradition at
all. Scripture's authors and editors, of course, prethe Rabbinic period
served a host of inherited practices. But they legitiScripture encouraged the Jews' adherence to
mated those antecedent norms by placing them in
the traditions of their nation by insisting that
a new theological context, in an explanatory framefollowing the words of Torah would assure
work distinctive to their own view of the world
national sovereignty and security. The problem
and their own societal needs. Thus the old agriculwas that the Israelites' actual experiences in histure holidays, for instance, were given totally new
tory did not conform to what the biblical authors

had promised. The united monarchy created
under David was short lived, and the separate
northern kingdom that emerged at the end of
David's son Solomon's reign soon had succumbed
to Assyrian domination. In 586 BCE,
Nebuchadnezzar of Babylonia conquered the
remaining southern kingdom and destroyed
Solomon's Temple, the enduring symbol of God's
presence within the nation. Surely, the ensuing
exile of the Jews, understood as God's punishment
for the nation's sinfulness, was followed some fifty
years later by permission to return and the
rebuilding of the Jerusalem Temple under the
Persian leader Cyrus. These paired events of exile
and return undeniably supported the biblical view
of God's power in history and of the inextricable
relationship between apostasy and punishment,
atonement and reward. But the roughly five
hundred-year period between the rebuilding of
the Temple under Cyrus and the destruction of
this Temple in the course of a Jewish revolt against
Rome in 66-73 CE, made it increasingly difficult
for Jews to accept without modification the inherited biblical theory. The physical dispersion of the
Jewish nation and the people's governance,
whether in the Promised Land or elsewhere, by
foreign rulers meant that Scripture's explanation
of the need to follow inherited practices ceased to
make sense. The emergence in this period of
diverse Judaisms-new worldviews and ways of
life that competed for individual Jew's loyaltywas natural in a period when the inherited system
decreasingly explained the circumstances of the
dispersed Jewish nation.
But it was primarily the Second Temple
period's end point, the destruction of the Jerusalem
Temple in the war with Rome in 70 CE, followed in
133-135 CE by a failed revolt under a Jewish messianic general called Bar Kokhba, that made it clear
that diaspora, foreign domination, and the growing irrelevance of the Temple-cult would become
permanent aspects of the Jewish condition. The
beginning of the Second Temple period had taught
Jews to live as Jews far from their national homeland. The end of this period made firm the message
to which many had begun to respond even while
the Temple stood: Jews now would need to worship God and practice Judaism without the priestly
service and with no expectation of an immediate
819 The Cresset Easter I 2006

return of Israelite sovereignty over the land of
Israel-no more prophecy, no more miracles, no
more God-driven military victories.
These facts, not surprisingly, stand at the
foundation of the new and central form of Judaism
of this period. Rabbinic Judaism arises at the end
of the Second Temple period and, in the subsequent five hundred years, becomes the dominant
mode of Judaism practiced by all Jews. This
Judaism faced squarely the challenge presented by
the reality of Jewish existence in the post-biblical
period, a reality depicted forcefully by those
events of the first centuries CE that led Jews to
evaluate carefully who they were and what they
believed. To summarize:
1. Rabbinic Judaism was conceived in the
period following the war with Rome that,
in the first century, led to the destruction
of the Jerusalem Temple.
2. The Rabbinic program for Judaism was
shaped in the immediate aftermath of the
devastating Bar Kokhba Revolt of the second century, which left as many as half a
million Jews dead and which resulted in
Jerusalem's being turned into a Roman
colony, with a Temple of Jupiter
Capitolinus erected on the Temple Mount.
3. Rabbinic Judaism achieved its classical
formulation and gained control over the
Jewish nation as a whole in the fourth
through sixth centuries, the period of the
firm establishment of Christianity as the
official religion of the Roman world.
The destruction of the Temple, the failed Bar
Kokhba revolt, and the ascent of Christianity
potentially meant the end of the Jews' perception
of their destiny as a great and holy nation-the
chosen people. The Temple's destruction meant
that, as in the period of the Babylonian exile, the
cult ceased operation. But this time, the failure of
the Bar Kokhba revolt meant that any expectation
of the rebuilding of the Temple or of the return to
the way things had been was unrealistic. And the
success of Christianity, which claimed to embody
a new covenant, meant that even the notions of
Israel's chosenness and unique relationship to
God were subject to significant challenge.

refocused biblical ideology, creating a mode of
In these ways, both the political and theological contexts in which Judaism's inherited pracJudaic identity and practice appropriate to the distices had made sense were altered dramatically.
tinctive circumstances of its own age. Like the bibThe Temple, for the Jews the visible sign of God's
lical religion it replaced, Rabbinic Judaism, is not
presence and dominion, was gone. The cult,
really a traditional religion at all. Rather than
focusing on and working to preserve what is histhrough which the people had acknowledged
God's lordship and appealed to his mercies, had
torically authentic, it presents a new systemic conceased. The land of Israel was now under foreign
text for the conduct of Jewish life. Let us look at the
details of how this was accomplished.
rule, with little hope for its return to Jewish sovereignty. As a result of these events, the nation lost
the Rabbinic program
the symbols of its power, the sign of its place
within the family of nations, and the physical repIn line with the contradictory needs of an
evolving Judaism, under Rabbinic leadership
resentation of its stature before God. Clearly, in
the face of such historical develJudaism continued to be shaped
Rabbinic Judaism
by the model of the Temple-cult.
opments, people had good reason
to question their continuing
Jews fervently prayed for the
succeeded not because
covenantal relationship with the
rebuilding of the Temple, the
of its continuity with
one who had created the world
reestablishment of animal sacrithe past but because it
and who controlled all history.2
fice, and renewed Israelite sovereignty, to be achieved, as the
While little evidence survives
completely refocused
to describe how the Jewish people
Bible had promised, through
biblical ideology} creating God's personal intervention in
as a whole responded to this
a mode of Judaic identity history. But in the Rabbis' day,
question, it is clear that the nation
faced contradictory needs. On the
seemed
these
occurrences
and practice appropriate
one hand, the tradition would
increasingly distant and unlikely.
to the distinctive
hold. The memory of the Temple
And so the return to the way
circumstances
of
its
and nationhood could not easily
things had been was no longer
be erased. Any new direction
viewed,
as in Scripture, as an
own age.
would need to reflect the inherexpectation of our history but,
ited attitudes, practices, and institutions that repinstead, was depicted increasingly as a signifier of
resented the heart of biblical religion. On the other
the advent of a messianic age. These were events
hand, now the tradition would seem somehow
that would occur only at the end of time and that,
deficient. The devastating wars caused by the
contrary to what the biblical thinking had sugbelief that God would fight on behalf of his people
gested, could not be instigated by the Israelites'
meant that new theologies and new leaderships
own actions, for instance, through a military rebelthat followed quite different paths were most
lion such as had taken place under Bar Kokhba.
likely to succeed (Freyne 1980, 122-123; AveryThe people, even as they prayed for Israelite sovPeck 1992(a), 409-431). In the context of our disereignty and the rebuilding of the Temple, thus
cussion of the meaning and power of tradition,
were to imagine these events as part of the culmithis point is central, for it suggests the extent to
nation of history, quite distinct from the reality of
which a new historical reality demanded a new
their everyday life and not immediately affected
formulation of Judaic belief and practice. We do
by their fulfillment of quotidian religious and
not fully comprehend Judaism if we reflect only
communal obligations.
upon the traditions and rituals Rabbinic masters
This means that Rabbinic ideology entirely
insisted the people continue to follow. At issue,
refocused the people's concerns and rethought the
rather, are the reasons for and purposes of those
purposes of their traditional practices. Judaic life
practices within a newly created Rabbinic system.
no longer focused on the events of political hisRabbinic Judaism succeeded not because of its
tory, which are, after all, far beyond the juriscontinuity with the past but because it completely
diction of the individual. People came to be

concerned only with events within the life and
control of each person and family. What came to
matter were the everyday details of life, the recurring actions that, day-in and day-out, define who
we are and demarcate what is truly important to
us. How do we relate to family and community?
By what ethic do we carry out our business dealings? How do we acknowledge our debt to God
not only or primarily for the events of past history
or the awaited future but for the food we eat and
for the wonders of the universe evidenced in the
daily rising and setting of the sun?
In this way, the Rabbis created what would in
fact be a religion of traditions. This Judaism
demanded that each Jew authentically maintain
the communal practices and norms handed on
from the past, through the long years of diaspora
life, remaining true to the original revelation at
Sinai. And yet, in order to accomplish this, the
Rabbis also completely reworked the ideology that
stood behind Scripture's insistence on observance
of Torah. No more were the people to see an immediate relationship between conformity to tradition
and God's saving of the people. The point and
purpose of Torah-tradition was to create a social
and ethical environment in which the people
would prepare for the salvation that would come at
some future time, in some undisclosed manner,
God's methods and ways-contrary to the central
theme of the Bible-being inscrutable.
This shift, in tum, entailed the invention of
many practices that stand today at the heart of all
so-called traditional modes of Judaism. The
people, as Scripture had indicated, were to live as
a nation of priests. With the demise of the Templecult, this came to mean that common people, nonpriests, would eat their food as though it were a
sacrifice on the Temple's altar and would see in
their personal daily prayers and in their shared
deeds of loving kindness a replacement for the
sacrifices no longer offered. So the detailed Jewish
traditions of ritual cleanliness, along with a host of
synagogue and home rituals, while associated
with practices found in Scripture, derive from the
post-biblical world in which these customs helped
create the close-knit community that Scripture, for
its part, imagined as emerging from a monarchical
governance and priestly leadership. The Rabbis
thus sowed the seeds of a Judaism that, in the
10 Ill The Cresset Easter I 2006

following 1500 years, would be increasingly
steeped in and dedicated to the preservation of
tradition. But they did not accomplish this simply
or primarily by focusing on and preserving the
traditions they had inherited. They did it by systematically rethinking the content and nature of
Judaism. They created a religion of traditions. But,
from the perspective of Scripture, theirs was not a
traditional religion.
sources of knowledge in Rabbinic Judaism
This point is made clear when we examine the
theologies through which the Rabbis legitimated
the dramatic changes they made in biblical ideology. How, we ask, did they claim to articulate an
authentic vision of God's will even as they offered
approaches to Judaic thinking and practice foreign
to the norms expressed in Scripture? While this is a
question that all religious reformers must answer,
the issue was particularly pressing for the Rabbis,
given inherited Judaism's insistence on the role of
God as the sole arbiter of required practice.
The Rabbis, of course, were not the first leaders of innovative movements within Judaism who
had to answer this question. But, interestingly,
prior Judaic innovators represented, for instance,
in the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphal literatures as well as in the Dead Sea Scrolls, had
answered the question in a quite traditional manner. They had taken up Scripture's own language
and literary styles, indeed used the names of
those to whom, in Scripture, God had spoken
directly. In this way, they claimed to speak with
the authority of the revelation recorded in
Scripture. Prior iterations of the biblical system
had asserted their legitimacy by claiming to stand
in direct succession to, or, more accurately, simply
to be a part of, the biblical system.
Rejecting such traditionalism, the Rabbis took
a different tack. Expressing their own sense of
crafting something new and different, they used
new languages-middle-Hebrew and Aramaicand new literary forms, dialectical discussions of
law rather than historical narrative and apodictic
commandments. More important, rather than
claiming to record God's words, with their obviously authoritative stature, the Rabbis focused on
and recorded their own perspectives and legal
opinions, in their own names. Just as, in its

theology, Rabbinic Judaism stands outside the
context of prior Israelite tradition, so the Rabbis'
literary forms express the extent to which they
were doing something new and independent. The
dramatic nature of this shift is clear when we
examine a passage of the Babylonian Talmud, the
document that, by the sixth century CE formalized
the Rabbinic program. Even before we begin our
discussion, several points deserve attention.
First, in this passage, the Rabbis argue about a
familiar issue from Scripture's priestly code, concerning the susceptibility to ritual uncleanness of a
certain kind of oven. While the details of the issue
need not detain us, we should remain conscious of
the fact that such uncleanness once mattered only
in the setting of Temple ritual. Yet the discussion
before us takes place some sixty years after the
Temple's destruction and the cessation of the cult.
Second, in ancient Judaism, the Temple-priests
were the authorities on Judaic law and the arbiters
of all issues of ritual practice. But in the passage
before us, Rabbis-non-priests - assert their right
to debate and establish cultic law.
Third, by the second century CE when this
discussion takes place, there had been over one
thousand years of Temple history, during which
rules of ritual cleanness would have been established and known to the priests. But the Rabbis
before us debate the issue without reference to any
inherited norms and with no interest in turning to
priests or anyone else who might, through tradition, know the answer to their question. So even as
the Rabbis claim to articulate a divinely sanctioned law, they clearly are working entirely outside the scope of inherited norms of tradition. The
Rabbinic radicalism is even more apparent as we
turn to the specific content of our passage
(Babylonian Talmud Baba Mesia 59b):
A. On that day [in the context of the
debate over the susceptibility to uncleanness of a certain type of oven], R. Eliezer
brought forward all of the arguments in
the world, but they [that is, the other
Rabbis] did not accept them from him.
B. Said he to them, "If the law agrees
with me, let this carob-tree prove it!" The
carob-tree was torn a hundred cubits
out of its place.

C. They said to him, "No proof can be
brought from a carob-tree."
D. He said to them, "If the law agrees
with me, let the stream of water prove it!"
The stream of water flowed backward.
E. Again they said to him, "No proof can
be brought from a stream of water."
F. Again he said to them, "If the law
agrees with me, let the walls of this house
of study prove it!" The walls tilted, about
to fall.
G. R. Joshua rebuked the walls, saying,
"When disciples of sages are engaged
in a legal dispute, what role do you
walls play?"
H. Hence, they did not fall, in honor of
R. Joshua; but nor did they resume the
upright, in honor of R. Eliezer.
I. Again [Eliezer] said to them, "If the
law agrees with me let it be proved from
heaven!" An echo came forth [from
heaven] and said, "Why do you dispute
with R. Eliezer? For in all matters, the law
agrees with him!"
J. But R. Joshua arose and exclaimed
[citing Deuteronomy 30:12], "It [the law] is
not in heaven!"
K. [Later] R. Nathan met Elijah [the
prophet] and asked him, "What did the
holy one, blessed be he, do at that time?"
L. [Elijah] replied, "He laughed, saying,
'My sons have defeated me! My sons have
defeated me!"'

The Hebrew Bible, we recall, asserts that God's
demands on Israel are known only because God
takes the initiative in revealing them. Strikingly,
the Rabbis here reject this concept, denying that
overt revelatory acts of God, illustrated in this text
by God's attempt to intervene in the activities of
the study house, have any place at all in establishing tradition. Instead, this story asserts, the law is
determined only by a vote of the majority of
sages, who establish proper conduct based upon
their wisdom and knowledge. In making their
decisions, they are to give no heed to supernatural interference. Human beings, not God, thus
have the capacity to determine the content of
Torah. More important in exercising this capacity,

the sages even bind God to their decision. They,
lated for memorization and transmitted orally by
and not God, are the ultimate arbiters of what
successive generations of sages, from God to Moses,
Judaism demands.
to Joshua, to "elders," to the biblical prophets, and
At issue is the nature of the "defeat" about
so on, ultimately into the hands of the Rabbis themwhich God in the end will laugh. Surely, God
selves (Mishnah Abot l:lff.).
chuckles over the unexpected result of his own
In the Rabbinic theory, the Written and Oral
success as a parent. God has created and nurtured
Torahs are part of a single, uniform revelation and
children, imbuing them with such a sense of
are, accordingly, of equal authority and imporresponsibility and intellectual cunning that they
tance. This means that when a second-century,
insist on living in a world of their own making. In
fifth-century, or even a contemporary rabbi
their original setting in the book of Deuteronomy,
responds to a question from his own day, his, or in
God's words, "It is not in heaven," mean only that
our times, her, judgment does not comprise simply
people cannot deny that they know the law and
an analysis-an interpretation-of the Written
are able to follow it. Now these words come back
Torah found in Scripture. Rather, though expressed
to haunt God. If the Torah is on - - - - - - - - - - - - - in his own words and responding
Central to Rabbinic faith
to a question or issue raised in his
earth and not in heaven, if it is in
the people's mouth and heart,
is the individual'S coming own time, it is part and parcel of
then God may interfere no
the divine revelation of Torah to
to find God through
longer in its interpretation. The
Moses at Sinai. The rabbi's thinking
law is among the sages. They are contact with the compelling in every respect has the same
empowered to engage in
authority as the written revelation
divine word, through
reasoned debate and then to
contained in Scripture. This means
knowledge
of
and
adherence
vote. They thereby take over the
that, in the hands of the Rabbis, trarole of God in revealing Torah.
ditions of practice are not only
to the Torah revealed
But there is an even more
transmitted but also created and
through acts of human
significant way in which God's
legitimated as sanctioned by, even
children have defeated him, a
intellectuation and debate. demanded by, God.
way that also has direct implicaThe point of this observation
tions for our comprehension of tradition in
must be clearly stated. It is not that extra-biblical
Judaism. This is in the fact that God, as much as
traditions regarding ritual practice and the meanthe people, is bound by the rules of Torah. God,
ing of Scripture did not exist in pre-Rabbinic antiquity. Certainly the communal and religious life of
just like the people, must accept and follow the
logically decided view of the sages on earth. That
the Jews depended upon traditions of how specific
which they deem holy and right becomes, in a cosbiblical precepts would be followed. So the point is
mic sense, even in God's mind, holy and right. The
not that, prior to the Rabbis, Jews did not transmit
extra-biblical "traditions" from age to age. It is,
human mind and intellect come to determine the
content of God's mind and intellect.3 Human
rather, that the Rabbis did not simply take up and
beings define the ultimate reality in the world and
preserve those traditions, as would be anticipated
hence shape the content and substance of Judaism.
in the case of any traditional religion. Nor did they
The Rabbis legitimated their authority to speak
try to legitimate what they consciously made up as
in the name of God by reconceptualizing the very
part of the inherited set of norms. Rather, the
concept of revelation. They understood that, at
Rabbis developed an entirely new and, from the
perspective of Scripture, unanticipated stance
Sinai, God had revealed to Moses more than the
toward the very nature of revelation and the legitimaterial that came to be included in the written
Scripture, the content of which had been transmating of tradition (Avery-Peck 1992(b), 34-37).
mitted in writing and made accessible to all of the
The biblical system, we recall, cherishes God's brilliant acts in history, the signs and miracles that
people of Israel. In addition to this, the Rabbis
show the people God's power and dictate God's
asserted, God had revealed to Moses a second corpus of law, a body of knowledge that was formuwill. Living in a period in which such signs are elu12 113 The Cresset Easter I 2006

sive and in which historical circumstances no
longer seem to reflect God's will, the Rabbis
rejected the old approach, not simply as obviously
flawed but as an inappropriate path to piety.
The Rabbis rejected the coercion implicit in a
theology that understands God to force belief and
conformity to his will through displays of power.
Central to Rabbinic faith, instead, is the individual's coming to find God through contact with
the compelling divine word, through knowledge
of and adherence to the Torah revealed through
acts of human intellectualizing and debate. In an
odd way, exactly by placing the power to define
tradition in human hands, the Rabbis made the
powerful point that, despite the way the events of
history made things seem, God still exists, still
rules over the people, and still can be depended
upon to bring redemption. It is only for these
reasons that Torah still matters at all, still must be
explicated, still must be followed . But in the
Rabbinic system, the God who had been understood to make and destroy nations is pictured
instead as responding to everyday Jews who
engage in the study of, and therefore the creation
of, revelation. In essence, Rabbinic Judaism makes
possible life in the variety of cultural, social, economic, and political contexts in which Jews have
lived for the past two thousand years by saying
that, at heart, the Jews themselves have the power
not simply to interpret but to reveal God's will.
The invisible God is present in the mind and intellect of each Jew. And in following the practices
they themselves uncover, they assure continuity
with traditions of Judaism going back to Sinai.

the concept of tradition in the evolution of
Rabbinic Judaism
Notably, it is exactly this systemically distinctive and theologically innovative program for
Judaism that created the Jewish culture that would
survive in the diasporic circumstances of the subsequent 1500 years. The Rabbinic system facilitated
this survival through two related processes. On the
one hand, the Rabbinic conception of revelation
meant that Rabbinic leaders could initiate and
legitimate the practical changes that would allow
Jews over time to accommodate to the varied
cultures in which they lived (Marcus 2004). At the
same time, the Rabbinic system's establishment of

a Judaism based more in law and practice than in
theological debate meant the creation of an exceedingly distinctive Judaic culture. Under Rabbinic
leadership, Jews became increasingly dedicated to
the preservation of traditional communal norms.
Distinctive diet, dress, language, and a host of
cultural and ritual behaviors represented to Jews
both their adherence to the divine will and their
differences from the outside, non-Jewish world, a
world that, in all events, for much of pre-modem
history, had little tolerance for them.
Indeed, within the setting of Rabbinic Judaism,
the very concept of tradition took on a meaning
that, in Scripture, it could not have. This was the
idea that a practice could become authoritative not
because it was demanded directly by God but
because of its having been legitimated through its
acceptance by the community. "Tradition"- in the
sense of a required practice of Judaism-came to
encompass both that which derives directly from
Torah and from customs, folkways, and other practices that were created and accepted as mandatory
by the people.4 Rabbinic Judaism, while increasingly a religion of tradition, thus remained pliable
and susceptible to developments and adaptations
that would allow it to shape and be shaped by the
real life circumstances of its adherents.
For those who see as central to a structured
religious community the consistent application of
a unitary and unchanging divine law, this attitude
of Judaism certainly appears odd. Along with
sanctioning sometimes dramatic changes in
practice, it establishes a system in which diverse
communities can develop quite distinctive ritual
and cultural norms, each arguing on the basis of
Rabbinic law the validity of its own particular
approach. What then demarcates authentic statements of Jewish belief and practice, and what
legitimates one direction of development while
precluding as inauthentic a different one?
There are two answers to this question. The
uninteresting answer is that during the medieval
period, the relative openness of Judaism to
diverse rituals and practices threatened a
communal crisis. As the centers of Jewish life
spread throughout Europe, local customs became
more and more divergent, portending the danger
of schism. This problem led to the emergence
among the Rabbinic class of a critical program of

tracing the origins and reasons for individual cusseen as a threat to Jewish unity. Rather, sometimes
toms and, on this basis, establishing some unifordramatic differences in responses even to important issues were an important aspect of the survival
mity of practice (Greenstone, 397; Avery-Peck
2000, 1464-1465). While hardly eradicating the
of a people that was, despite these divergences,
united by a single, fundamental shared value:
differences between local customs of nearby
dedication to the ideal of Torah and to the role of
communities, let alone of communities around
the world, this codification established a method
the human intellect in advancing an ongoing chain
of evaluating specific practices so as to determine
of study from the time of Scripture to the present.
what was and was not acceptable.s
tradition, traditionalism, and modernity
But there is a more interesting, and I think
In the end, the best way to convey this point
more accurate, answer to the question of what
is to illustrate the distinction between forms of
establishes legitimate thought and practice within
Judaism that are traditional-focusing on past
Rabbinic Judaism. This answer emerges from the
theologies-versus those that are systemic and
recognition that, at its foundation, the Rabbinic
non-traditional- developing innovative and
conception of revelation itself takes into account
internally cogent ways of thinkthe potential for divergent interBased on the Rabbinic
ing about the tradition in
pretations and practices and so
tolerates the existence of diamettheory that revelation is a response to contemporary needs.
Oddly, the former, traditional,
rically opposed views claiming
product
of
human
debate
approach is exemplified when we
to represent the divine will. Thus
the Talmud comprehends the and discovery, that different look at some of the most radical
differing legal perspectives of
Rabbis and communities manifestations of Orthodox
Judaism today. In the SoHo area
disputing authorities all as repreached
different
answers
of Manhattan, for example, now
resenting "the words of the
exists
an orthodox place of worliving God," and it even imagon important questions of
ship referred to by those who
ines, in one example, that Rabbis
practice
and
theology
was
designed it as a "boutique synawho engaged in a bitter dispute
over the nature of the dietary for the most part not seen as gogue." Its goal is to bring a contemporary singles-club style to
requirement in all events ate at
a threat to Jewish unity.
classical Jewish practice. "You
each other's table. Be this as it
might have to RSVP. There might be a roped line.
may, what seems beyond dispute is that the very
It will totally be a scene. But it's all Kosher,"
circumstance of Jewish communities from
Rabbi Dovi Scheiner, its orthodox founder, is
Talmudic times and on, living as minorities
quoted as explaining (Liebman 2005, 17). As draamong other religions and lacking a central
matically as Rabbi Scheiner's institution diverges
structure of authority, would both lend itself to
from the expected character of a synagogue, its
and be strengthened by the diversity of
proponents have no desire to challenge the
approaches and the acceptance of differences and
inherited tradition or the specifics of traditional
change that the Rabbinic system promoted.
practice. There is here no rethinking or reevaluaAt stake within Rabbinism was not so much
tion of inherited theologies, only a focus upon
the specifics of practice but the fact that individuand an attempt to maintain the inherited
als accepted the larger structure of the system for
traditions within the community of today.
determining law. Living under and accepting what
An even more radical example is the recent
has been termed the "yoke of the law" meant much
emergence of orthodox prayer groups that
more than the specifics of how a community
require the separation of the sexes-a prime sigdefined that law. Based on the Rabbinic theory that
nifier of Orthodox traditionalism-but that allow
revelation is a product of human debate and diswomen to act as prayer leaders for certain parts
covery, that different Rabbis and communities
of the worship service-something heretofore
reached different answers on important questions
unheard of within Orthodoxy (Sege 2005, C1, C8).
of practice and theology was for the most part not
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Striking is that this practice has emerged exactly
among the groups of young Jews most dedicated
to the preservation of the system of Rabbinic legislation. Their approach, that is to say, is limited to
and legitimated by what contemporary Rabbinic
authorities find to be acceptable under Torahlaw. We find dramatic changes in ritual practice
emerging as a clear response to the cultural
norms of the contemporary West. At the same
time and most important within Orthodoxy,
these shifts in practice are overlaid on the retention of the theory of revelation, the preservation
of the concept of Rabbinic authority, and the
strict adherence to trajectories of practice allowable within the structure of the inherited tradition. These may, therefore, be deemed traditional
modes of Judaism.
But as with the emergence of Rabbinism two
thousand years ago, there are alternatives. The fact
that, alongside the preservation of traditionalism,
modernity has engendered a dramatically contrary
response clarifies my larger point. Rabbinism's
rejection of the traditionalism of its age occurred in
a period when large segments of the Jewish
community had good reason to find the inherited
Israelite faith unworkable. Similarly, dramatically
changed social, political, and economic circumstances in the late eighteenth century and beyond
made Rabbinic Judaism unsuitable to the goals and
worldviews of vast numbers of Jews in the nascent
modem period. These Jews no longer saw themselves as different from the peoples around them
and could not find meaning in a religious system
that demarcated them as different. Jews who
wished to participate fully in the non-Jewish cultures suddenly welcoming them could not accept
the received tradition's claims about the character
of revelation, the nature of the relationship
between the people of Israel and God, and about
the ultimate disposition of history. Even where
these Jews continued to follow some practices of
traditional Judaism, their reasons for selecting the
retained practices marked them as outside of the
traditional religion. Within early Reform, a
practice's legitimacy was decided not by its place
within Rabbinic ideology but by whether or not the
modem mind found the practice edifying. This
central hallmark of Reform yielded a Judaism that
is systemically distinctive, designed to solve the

theological and cultural problems of a new period
in the life of the Jewish people without regard for
inherited religious ideologies.
Rabbi Alfred Gottschalk, Chancellor Emeritus
of the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of
Religion, the seminary that ordains Reform Rabbis,
states simply what he believes determines authentic Jewish practice (Gottschalk 2000, 236): "[A]
Jewish religious experience or practice is authentic
by virtue of its 'living center' and because of the
fact that it expressed itself in accord with the
genuine need of the time." Judaism, in this view, is
the religion Jews create to meet their contemporary
needs, not to conform to ancient ones. Recognizing
the distance between this view and the traditional
Rabbinic one, Gottschalk continues:
Orthodox Judaism rejects this or any similar view. It asserts that these [contemporary] expressions of Judaism are not genuine, that somehow they are merely
"copies" of the environment, issues
merely of time and place, and not in consonance with the vast matrix of Torah
handed down from Moses and
Sinai. .. (236)
But it is exactly the view that Gottschalk challenges and rejects, which upholds the immutability of two thousand years of Rabbinic Torahteaching, that has, since the first centuries, defined
Rabbinic Judaism as a traditional religion,
however innovative that Judaism was in its own
period of formation.
The point for us is not to judge who is correct,
the Orthodox or the Reform, in their setting out of
visions for contemporary Judaism. The point,
rather, is to recognize that traditionalism cannot
be defined simply by the practices a community of
Jews chooses to follow or reject. At stake, rather,
are the modes of thought and theological contexts
within which individual rituals or encompassing
sets of communal practices are given meaning and
importance. The issue is not just what a religious
community does but why its members do it-the
system of thinking within which behavior has
meaning and makes sense. Jews, we have seen,
have had the capacity over long periods of time to
adhere to monolithic and relatively unchanging
systems of practice and belief. Perhaps more

interesting is that, in periods of dramatic social,
political, economic, and intellectual change, they
have shown an equal capacity for creating systemically new and innovative approaches to comprehending their relationship not just with their traditions but with God. It is as much this capacity for
systemic change as the dedication of generations
of Jews to an unchanging set of traditions and
beliefs that has vouchsafed Judaism's survival
from antiquity to today. ;
Alan J. Avery-Peck is Kraft-Hiatt Professor in Judaic
Studies and chair of the Department of Religious
Studies at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester,
Massachusetts.
Notes
1. Referring to Exodus 20:5-6 and 34:6-7, where God
describes himself as compassionate and gracious, yet
visiting the sins of the parents on the children, Sarna
puts things as follows: ''These descriptions are presented
as God's self-revelation, not as the product of speculation or experience. The same idea that, to know God,

pass judgment only in cases in which the rule to be followed already has been explicitly stated. These judges
have no independent legislative or even broadly interpretative function. To deal with any new circumstance,
they must come to Moses, who presumably will
inquire directly of God regarding the law. In general,
when confronted with legal issues, e.g., in the case of
the daughters of Zalaphehad, Moses brings the question to God. The Rabbis, by contrast, comprehend the
product of their own thinking to be coincident with
what is in God's mind.
4. See Shulhan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, 376, 4, Isserles'
gloss. The new theory of tradition is recognized in
Rabbinic authorities' reading of the directive of Proverbs
22:28- "Remove not the ancient landmark which your
fathers have set" -to refer to the inherited customs of the
Jewish people, which were to be accepted and followed
like all other dictates of the Torah.
5. Note that, despite this codification of customary
practices, a basic and consequential division remains,
between Jews who adhere to Spanish and Portuguese
ritual (Sephardim) and those who follow the German
and Polish practices (Ashkenazim). Differences are

man must depend on God's self-disclosure is implicit in

found in aspects of ritual, cultural, and communal life.

Moses' request, 'Let me know your ways' (Exodus 33:13),

Yet there is no sense that one group's practice is more

and it is inherent in the obligations of the covenant set

correct, let alone that these two groups in any regard
adhere to "different" religions.

forth in the Decalogue, which is portrayed as being the
content of a great national theophany. It governs Israel's
understanding of the law. All the legislative complexes
of the Pentateuch are formulated as a series of divine
commands to Israel, albeit mediated by Moses."
2. This issue was phrased succinctly and emotionally shortly after the destruction of the Second Temple.
The author of IV Ezra asked (3:32-34, 6:59): "Have the
deeds of Babylon been better than those of Zion? Has
any other nation known You besides Zion? ... If the
world has indeed been created for our sakes, why do we
not enter into possession of our world? How long shall
this endure?"
IV Ezra's question directly challenges inherited biblical beliefs about the way in which God carries out his
will through the control of history. The Jews had known
God and followed the path of Torah, and yet they had
been dispossessed by nations who had not known God
at all. How could this be?
3. Note the significant difference between this
approach and that suggested by Scripture. At Exodus
18:13-27, when Moses sets up of a system of judges, he
explicitly tells the appointed leaders that they may
16117 The Cresset Easter I 2006
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LIKE YOUR VOICE ON A LONG-DISTANCE CALL
Like when stuffing slips from a cushion
that's grown threadbare
my grandmother's soul found a frayed edge
that permitted passage orientation shifting
from one life to another
Like a radio tuned to a different frequency
or a dog's floppy ear twitching
with sounds beyond our range
her mouth fell open eyes brightening
comprehending something we didn't
Like a pathway in her mind for her soul
to return upon my grandfather opened the hymnal
of their lives pouring tea & snatches of song
for her tongue to trace back as steam rose
& disappeared somewhere near the ceiling
Like your voice on a long-distance call
or a child crying out in a dream
my grandmother's soul went
walking some distant shore past present
or what was then yet to come

D. S. Martin

faithfulness to tradition
a Roman Catholic perspective
john E. Thiel

F

OR MODERNS, THE QUESTION OF WHAT IT MEANS

to be faithful to a religious tradition is a
good example of question-begging.
Answering the question of faithfulness presupposes that one knows what the tradition is to
which one might be faithful. But in modernity, in
the West at least and perhaps even globally by
now, religious traditions have become precarious
things, contested spaces where the issue of faithfulness has been subsumed by the ambiguity of
traditions themselves. The traditional notion of
tradition itself has become questionable in light
of our heightened awareness of the historicity of
traditions and their often surprising pluralism.
Historical investigation of religious traditions
through time and culture reveals the remarkable
changes they have undergone in belief, doctrine,
and practice, the living constituents of a tradition.
This same historical sensibility grasps easily the
synchronic implications of this diachronic fact.
Any religious tradition broadly construed by a
singular name is, in any present moment, actually
a remarkable variety of smaller communities that
possess clearly distinguishable beliefs and practices, however much they might share a family
resemblance. For those intellectually aware of the
problem that historicity poses for tradition, and
for many more who emotionally feel its effects,
being faithful to a religious tradition has become
as difficult as saying what that same religious
tradition is.
My own Roman Catholic Christian tradition
is a very good example of this twin problem of
identifying and being faithful to tradition. One
could argue for several reasons that it is the very
best example of this problem. The Catholic tradition faced a powerful assault from the great
Protestant Reformers in the early modern period.
That attack, promulgated in the name of Christian
truth, produced a rich history of Catholic reflection on what tradition is and how its authority
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functions in the life of the religious community.
Furthermore, the Roman Catholic tradition has
adjudicated the modern problem of traditional
identity by managing to hold together many
styles of Roman Catholic belief and practice.
These styles of faith and practice have not formally splintered into separate congregations, each
with its own understanding of traditional identity, as has modern Judaism. Because Catholic
Christianity has had to defend its claims for tradition against these vibrant criticisms and places
such a high premium on unity, it is a confession in
which the problem of tradition and traditional
faithfulness is especially highlighted.
This essay will begin by considering the classical understanding of Catholic tradition and proceed by presenting the development of a modern
Catholic theology of tradition. It will conclude by
considering how central the issue of faithfulness is
to the identity of tradition itself.

a classical understanding of Catholic tradition
The word "tradition" derives from the Latin
"traditio," which, in verbal form, means "to hand
on." The New Testament Greek word "paradosis"
conveys this event of handing on the faith, written testimony of which we find as early as Paul's
First Letter to the Corinthians in the middle of the
first century: "For I handed on to you as of first
importance what I in turn had received: that
Christ died for our sins in accordance with the
scriptures and that he was buried, and that he
was raised on the third day in accordance with
the scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas,
then to the twelve" (1 Corinthians 15:3-5). In this
first mention of tradition in Christian writing,
Paul understands the handing on of the faith to
be an interpretation of Jewish scriptures, an interpretation that had been passed on to him orally
by the earliest believers and that he, in turn, was
now shaping into scriptural form in his epistle.

From the time of Paul until the present moment,
tradition has been imagined both as a content, the
"good news" of salvation, and as a process by
which that content is transmitted to the next generation of believers. The content of tradition
materialized slowly in sacred persons, sacraments, relics, and places, but especially in the
writings accorded a place in the New Testament
canon as the inspired word of God. The process
of tradition unfolded in the events of believing,
practicing, and witnessing.
Both of these notions of tradition- as content
and as process-took more determinate shape in
the early Christian practice of clarifying the faith
in doctrine. Fundamental disagreements among
early Christians about the divinity and humanity
of Jesus Christ were settled by ecumenical councils, meetings of bishops in which a majority vote
defined the Church's orthodox faith. These councils expressed their orthodoxy in creeds, and later
councils expressed their orthodoxy in teachings or
condemnations of positions judged to be contrary
to the belief of the Church. Thus, conciliar doctrine
presented the content of tradition in normative
sentences that had powerful implications for belief
and practice as well. While Christianity closed its
biblical canon rather early in its history, by the
tum of the third century, conciliar teachings contracted canonical closure even more, functioning
as a "canon within a canon" that set tighter limits
for the faithful interpretation of God's revelation
in scripture. Paradoxically though, the process of
creating tradition through interpreting the canon
supplemented the biblical narrative with language, concepts, and, eventually in later Catholic
history, with substantive beliefs that did not
appear explicitly in the New Testament (see
Tavard 1959). Emerging Catholic sensibilities
ascribed authority to this process by claiming that
the Holy Spirit inspired the work and teaching of
ecumenical councils (Congar 1960, 157-59).
The clarity of the conciliar definition enabled
later generations to accord traditional authority to
Christian writers whom they judged to represent
the orthodoxy of the settled doctrinal tradition.
These Christian writers, like Augustine, John
Damascene, and Thomas Aquinas, were viewed as
possessing a corporate authority, as though they
spoke with a single voice on all matters of tradi-

tional faith. God was the author of divine revelation in scripture and tradition, and the authorities
of the tradition mimicked God's inspired voice in
their collective authorship. The Platonic cast of
Christian theology assumed that all these authorial
voices were unchanging and one, for so was God's
truth. Thus, diversity and novelty were seen as the
marks of heresy. The rising authority of the bishop
of Rome beginning in the late fourth century led to
the increasing addition of papal writings to the
harmonious chorus of authorities, and the development of the Catholic belief in papal infallibility
from the thirteenth century on increased the register of the papal voice in this chorus, even when it
spoke in a fallible way, sotto voce.
It was this homogeneous understanding of
tradition that the great Reformers of the sixteenth
century challenged as human invention, and so as
sinful corruption. Whereas medieval Catholic
sensibilities saw an inspired unity in a single Holy
Writ that comprised both biblical scriptures and
ecclesial scriptures whose sacred truth informed
every belief and practice, the Reformers distinguished disjunctively between biblical writings
and church writings, understanding the former as
the inspired gospel and the latter as its betrayal.
Expressing this judgment succinctly, Luther's slogan "Sola scriptura" not only advocates the singular authority of the Bible but also decries Catholic
claims for the authority of tradition. In the
polemical rhetoric of the sixteenth-century
debates, both sides identified Catholic claims for
the authority of tradition with the authority of the
Pope, and for that very reason, the Catholics
embraced these claims as true and the Protestants
rejected them as false.
In the wake of the Reformation, Catholic belief
in the authority of tradition has been shaped by the
force of this Protestant attack In its decree on
divine revelation, the Council of Trent (1545-1563)
took pains to rebut the Protestant scripture principle. According to the Council Fathers, the "truth
and rule" of Christ "are contained in written books
and in unwritten traditions which were received
by the apostles from the mouth of Christ himself,
or else have come down to us, handed on as it were
from the apostles themselves at the inspiration of
the holy Spirit ... " The decree goes on to equate the
authority of tradition with the authority of the Old

and New Testaments, insisting that the same "feeldeveloping tradition
ing of piety and reverence" accorded to the biblical
In telling the story of the classical Catholic
writings be shown toward "traditions concerning
understanding of tradition, this essay has
both faith and conduct, as either directly spoken by
stressed the consistency in teaching from Trent to
Vatican II and has suggested that, understood
Christ or dictated by the holy Spirit, which have
been preserved in unbroken sequence in the
historically, that consistency derives from a
catholic Church" (Tanner 1990, 663).
Catholic desire to defend and define its belief in
After Trent, Catholic theologians typically
tradition in the setting of post-Reformation
polemics. A more complete version of the story,
articulated the conciliar heritage by speaking of
God's revelation in "Scripture and Tradition," a
however, would need to consider another dimenconjunctive formulation that at once reflected the
sion of conflict that has brought us to our present
historical moment: the Enlightenment attack on
medieval conception of a homogeneous Scriptura
sacra, while yet placing in relief the distinctiveness
the authority of tradition itself.
of the authority of tradition. This
Modernity broke decisively
classical conception of Catholic
The new understanding of onto the world stage in the eightradition was re-affirmed and
teenth century in the intellectual,
tradition saw time
clarified at the Second Vatican
political, and cultural movement
as the realm of new
Council (1963-1965) in its
of the Enlightenment. The main
occasions for appreciating goal of the Enlightenment's
"Dogmatic Constitution on
Divine Revelation" (Dei verbum).
attack on tradition was to underthe meaning of God's
The Council Fathers rejected an
mine the authority of feudal culrevelation, and tradition as
earlier draft of this document
ture. But to the degree that the
the developing encounter authority of feudal culture was
that portrayed scripture and tradition as two sources of revelabound up with the authority
between Gods Spirit
tion. This "two sources" concepof the Christian churches,
and
the
community
of
Enlightenment thinkers launched
tualization had appeared in diffaith in history.
a devastating assault on the
ferent forms since the time of
Trent as an effective way of
Christian belief in divine revelaasserting the power of the magisterium, the coltion, whether by scripture alone or by scripture
and tradition. The rise of a Newtonian worldview
lective teaching authority of the Catholic bishops,
most visibly expressed in the authority of the
did much to discredit the miracles that filled the
Pope. Instead, Vatican II taught that "[s]acred
pages of the Bible and that were, lest we forget,
the surest proof of Christianity's truth. HistoricalTradition and sacred Scripture" flow "from the
critical investigation of the biblical text and
same divine well-spring, [and] come together in
church history demonstrated that the sacred page
some fashion to form one thing ... " As much as
Vatican II insisted on the mutual co-inherence of
and sacred time could be parsed in utterly secular
scripture and tradition as divine revelation, it
ways that fractured the unified resonance of
refused to acknowledge that tradition is circumGod's inspired voice. Incisive Enlightenment critics of traditional Christianity-whether Locke,
scribed by the content of scripture. Tradition, Dei
Hume, Jefferson, or Kant-all assumed that the
verbum taught, "transmits in its entirety the Word
truths of human existence were naturally
of God." And yet, the document continues, "the
inscribed in reason, and that the traditional
Church does not draw her certainty about all
Christian modes of revelation were, at best, obsorevealed truths from the holy Scriptures alone"
lete metaphors for the timeless truth of reason
(Dei verbum, 755, no. 9). The Council affirmed the
that humanity gradually would outgrow. Since
long-standing Catholic belief in the charismatic
power of the magisterium as the sole authentic
reason alone could discover and, in some explanations, construct truth autonomously, history was
interpreter of the Word of God, itself testimony to
judged to be superfluous and so dispensable as a
how the process of tradition most visibly and
realm in which God revealed the meaning of life.
authoritatively unfolds in the life of the Church.
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In the early nineteenth century, Catholic theologians like Johann Sebastian Drey and Johann
Adam Mohler responded to the challenge of the
Enlightenment critique by rethinking the nature of
tradition. They found a valuable resource in the
burgeoning intellectual and artistic movement of
Romanticism.
Disenchanted
with
the
Enlightenment's glorification of critical reason and
its banishment of providence from history,
Romantic thinkers instead turned to the faculty of
imagination to fathom the temporal unfolding of
supernatural truth within the dynamism of natural
events. Catholic theologians embraced this worldview and its rhetoric by portraying the act of faith
as the imaginative discernment of the Holy Spirit's
unfolding presence to time and circumstance.
Countering the Enlightenment understanding of a
history devoid of sacred meaning, Catholic theologians now reclaimed history as the realm of a
developing tradition. This is not to say, of course,
that Catholic thinkers gave up the age-old
Christian belief that God's revelation was given
once and for all in the apostolic age. Very much like
a classical understanding of tradition, the new idea
assumed the essential timelessness of divine truth.
Unlike the classical understanding of tradition,
though, the new idea did not see time as a mirror
dimly reflecting the timelessness of God and revelation's truth, and did not see tradition as the
sequential repetition of the unchanging deposit of
faith. Instead, the new understanding of tradition
saw time as the realm of new occasions for appreciating the meaning of God's revelation, and tradition as the developing encounter between God's
Spirit and the community of faith in history.
Thus was born the very modem notion of the
development of doctrine, a principle that has
become an axiom of modem theology. Catholic
theologians have explained the notion of developing tradition in any number of ways. Drey proposed a dialectical model that imagined tradition
not simply as the orthodox past but as an ongoing,
fruitful exchange between the fixed authority of
the past and the relevance of the Church's present
moment. Mohler offered a decidedly organic
model that conceived tradition as a life form animated by the Holy Spirit and growing in time.
John Henry Newman's An Essay on the Development
of Doctrine (1845) chose a noetic metaphor that

compared the movement of tradition to the clarification of an idea over time. (For a detailed presentation of these models of tradition, see Thiel 2000,
57-76.) Catholic theology in the late twentieth century has favored a reception model that understands tradition as a process in which the entire
Church gradually believes and practices new
understandings of divine revelation in history. This
reception model has been encouraged by the teaching of Vatican II that the "whole body of the faithful" possesses a supernatural sense of the faith
"aroused and sustained by the Spirit of truth" that
guarantees that all the faithful "cannot err in matters of belief." This teaching on the corporate infallibility of the faithful is an interesting complement
to Vatican l's definition of papal infallibility, and
clearly reflects the Romantic assumptions that
attend the modem conception of tradition.
ambiguous authority
Change is the great problem that all traditions have had to face in modernity. This observation is especially true of a traditional religion like
Christianity, which bore the brunt of
Enlightenment criticism and which, following its
Platonic assumptions, regards change as inimical
to truth. Any tradition purports to be a meaningful continuity that resists the corrosive effects of
change. Roman Catholic Christianity understands its tradition to be a sacred continuity
imbued with the authority of divine revelation
and assured in its truth by the changeless God.
Those beliefs make change a threat that any
Catholic understanding of tradition will need to
negotiate in some way.
Christianity did not have to face the problem
of change prior to the Enlightenment. In Medieval
Catholic understanding, tradition eclipsed any
notion of change or difference, or defined it as the
heretical other. The chorus of traditional authorities in all times sang in perfect harmony with
God's inspired voice, even though, as the twelfthcentury maverick Peter Abelard had the audacity
to demonstrate, they did not. As much as the
Reformation shook the previous hegemony of
Catholic culture, the Tridentine response to the
Protestant clamor for change and to the fact of
Christian difference was excommunication. This
point is made to emphasize again that the

Enlightenment changed all this. The compelling
goes "development." The very use of the word
results of historical criticism applied to scripture
"development" draws the threat of anomie change
and tradition, the rise of new and quickly canoniunder the purposeful auspices of divine provical forms of knowledge in the natural and social
dence. From a fundamentalist perspective, "develsciences, the irresistibility of democratic revoluopment" cannot rescue "change" from its irreligious and capricious wanderings though history.
tions, and the growing power of market capitalism
all worked together to make modem change undeBut even those inclined toward the way of rapniably threatening to traditional religions, and
prochement must admit that the adoption of
perhaps especially to Roman Catholic Christianity.
"change" as "development" involves the acceptance of new ideas about the workings of tradition
Capitulation aside, there are two responses that
traditional religions have made to the modem
that are as unnerving as they are exciting. Three
problem of change: fundamentalism and
such new ideas attend a modem Catholic theology
rapprochement. Fundamentalism is a modem
of tradition. All disturb traditional sensibilities
phenomenon that responds to
k
d
since they suggest that authority
Kier egaar was right when
the Enlightenment valorization
of the highest order is ambiguous.
of profane time by simply deny- he described the life of faith All three point us toward the issue

----------------------

ing the integrity of modem stanas repetition. But modern of faithfulness to tradition in our
dards of knowledge. Much in the
closing reflections.
assumptions also ascribe to
post-Enlightenment history of
The first idea is the authority
Roman Catholicism can be idenfaith an ability to see new accorded to the supernatural sense
tified with this fundamentalist manifestations of the Spirit of the faith shared by all believers
response, such as Catholicism's
in the teaching of Vatican II, menthat are more than just
early, ultramontanistic regard for
tioned earlier. The sense of the
liberal political philosophy; its
occasions of grace but
faith apprehends infallible truth
conduct in the Modernist controburgeoning moments in the when it is attuned to God's presversy; the narrowness of its Neoence in history. But as an experiunfolding of a truly sacred ence, and a corporate experience at
Scholastic philosophy, taught as
a template for all forms of knowtime that one day will be that, the sense of the faith is thorledge in Catholic colleges and
oughly temporal and often rather
remembered as the
universities throughout the first
amorphous, qualities that make
time-honored past.
half of the twentieth century; and
the discernment of tradition on the
part of the whole Church a most debatable practhe attraction of many kinds of reactionary
tice. Even though the Council teaches that the
Catholicism today whose deep suspicion of the
modem world does not preclude their extensive
sense of the faith is properly guided by the magisuse of the internet and media to communicate
teriurn, such guidance is far from assurance when
there is significant disagreement in the Church
their message (witness Cardinal Schonborn's
recent enlisting of a conservative public relations
about the Spirit's truth.
That there may be such disagreement brings
firm to place his article on evolution on the Opme to the second idea. The very notion of a develEd page of The N ew York Times!) . Fundamentalism
oping truth in the experience of the faithful valis on the rise in all traditional religions because
orizes newness in tradition, a very untraditional
its nostalgia for a premodern understanding of
idea. When Catholic communities throughout the
fixed, unchanging authority is comforting to
world recite the Nicene Creed at Sunday mass,
many in a quickly-changing, ambiguous world.
they together affirm the past about which there is
Rapprochement, on the other hand, moves in the
a settled consensus of belief. Once one concedes
opposite direction. It tries to think the thoughts of
the development of tradition, the door is open to
traditional authority and change together, affirmthe ambiguous authority of the present in which
ing the truth of each in their mutual relationship.
believers, in good faith, sometimes make new
An excellent example of the way of rapprochement is the modem notion that doctrine underclaims for the Spirit's infallible truth. Historical22 123 The Cresset Easter I 2006

critical investigation supports the value of traditional novelty, since the history of doctrine clearly
shows that nearly every claim of tradition
appeared de novo at a certain moment in time, and
then, as a minority view, developed authority and
consensus over time. The third and final idea is the
way that a developing tradition makes room for
creativity in the experience of faith as an act of discerning traditional truth. Kierkegaard was right,
of course, when he described the life of faith as
repetition. But modem assumptions also ascribe to
faith an ability to see new manifestations of the
Spirit that are more than just occasions of grace
but burgeoning moments in the unfolding of a
truly sacred time that one day will be remembered
as the time-honored past. We could describe this
endowment of faith as a kind of creativity, a talent
on the part of believers to apprehend God's truth
in history, in the "signs of the times." We would do
well to see this creative dimension of faith as a
supernatural gift, as a communal power at work in
the sense of the faith that all believers share. We
would also do well, though, to understand the
sense of the faith as a capacity for discernment at
work in individual believers, effective whenever
they authentically apprehend the Spirit in history,
whether in the past or the present. This is not to
say that the authority of the present moment can
ever be recognized as fully as the authority of the
past. Novel claims by definition have never before
appeared and yet, as claims for tradition, they
clamor for recognition as the age-old faith of the
Church. Their witness seems anomalous and their
authority profoundly ambiguous.
It should be no surprise, then, that the exercise
of traditional creativity stirs debate and even conflict in the Church. Whether the novel claim for
tradition is that women should be ordained to
priestly ministry or that the Church's continuous
practice of restricting priestly ordination to males
is divine revelation and for that reason unchangeable, the newness of the claim likely will engender
disagreement that seems to threaten the unity of
the Church. Deep disagreement exposes the fact
that many in the Church have not discerned the
Spirit truthfully, and it is upsetting to the selfcritical among us to think that we could be wrong
about matters of such importance. Much worse is
the more common view of the arrogant among us

who think that the ambiguous authority of the
present moment evaporates before our utter certainty about what counts as tradition.
The ambiguous authority of creative faith can
be seen very clearly in the modem struggles
between the magisterium and Catholic theologians. The creative ability of faith to discern and
express the presence of the Spirit might be conceived as a kind of individual authorship of tradition, which any believer might exercise but which
theologians exercise as a matter of vocation. This
authorship, of course, possesses only authority
when its discernment is truthful. And yet, as we
have seen, claims for such truthfulness are
ambiguous whenever they make claims for the
novel. Innovating authorship stands at odds with
the ancient understanding of collective, staid
authorship that continues to be practiced on most
occasions by the magisterium. That the magisterium has come to function in the modem period
as a living authorial voice of tradition in its ordinary teaching increases the prospect for conflict
with theological authors, as has proved to be the
case (see Thiel1991).
As these three examples of ambiguous authority show, the very idea of a developing tradition
accounts for much of the anxiety in the Church
today. The church and our church-related institutions struggle to keep our traditions alive, knowing that so many other church-related institutions
of higher education have gone the way of secularity. On the one hand, development is the only realistic way for a tradition to remain vibrant. On the
other hand, development can lead to tradition's
loss. Faithfulness is a task that must negotiate the
Scylla of fundamentalism and the Charybdis of
secular capitulation.

faithful to tradition
What does it mean, then, for a Roman Catholic
to be faithful to tradition? And what implications
might our answer have for the broader issue of
being faithful to any of our traditions?
Fundamentalist yearnings may be understandable in uncertain times, but they hope for something unreal. A tradition is not an unchanging continuity, in time but not of it in some magical way.
Time is one of the most wonderful dimensions of
God's creation, and to regard it with Platonist eyes

is unworthy of any religion in the tradition of
the developing conception, this continuity is latent
Abraham. Traditions, like all things created, are
in every moment and gradually appears historithoroughly temporal and therein lies their created
cally. But in both instances, continuity is visible or
goodness. If we remember that the issue of faithfullatent in all moments running from the past into
ness is bound up with the reality of tradition, then
the future. As we look more closely at this
faithfulness too must be temporal through and
prospective optics, we realize that human beings
through. It is in faith's temporality that we can
cannot "see" in this way. No human gaze can penbegin to answer our concluding questions.
etrate the future . The idealized observer in this
One might think that the matter of faithfulprospective optics is God. And while the eternal
ness to tradition would be adjudicated by first
God may be able to see traditional continuity in
determining the content of tradition and then prothis way, believers cannot.
fessing its truth, but in reality the
A retrospective understandOn
the
one
hand,
relationship between faithfuling of tradition offers a realistic
ness and tradition is exactly the
account
of how believers actually
development is the only
other way around. A tradition is realistic way for a tradition shape lines of meaningful contian act of faith that a community
nuity. The continuity of tradition
to
remain
vibrant.
On
the
of believers affirms together.
is an act of faith in which believThat communal act of faith, howtogether affirm their meaningers
other hand, development
ever, is enmeshed in time. It is
ful relationship to the faith of past
can lead to tradition's loss. believers. Past believers, of
always made in a present
Faithfulness is a task that course, did exactly the same. They
moment that passes quickly into
another and that into another
must negotiate the Scylla affirmed tradition in their own
again. Each of these acts of faith
day by retrospectively configuroffundamentalism and the ing lines of continuity to the faith
makes tradition by affirming a
Charybdis of secular
particular pattern of sacred conof previous generations, who did
tinuity. Even though a tradition
the same again. Most of these retcapitulation.
can be conceived chronologirospective acts of faith in any
cally, from past to present, its sacred continuity is
present moment repeat the claims of the previous
actually affirmed in faith retrospectively, looking
present moment, which accounts for the continuous stability that we expect a tradition to be. Even
backward into the past. Believers in every present
this repetition, though, develops in ever-renewed
moment profess tradition from where they stand,
acts of faith in passing time. Through repeated
claiming a Spirit-filled continuity aligned from
acts of faith of claiming the continuity of tradition,
their own standpoint back to the earliest Christian
the tradition grows or develops in time. This
faith. In other words, traditional continuity is a
means that what we call the "continuity" of tradibelief about the present's relationship to the past,
and only indirectly then about the past's relationtion and what we call the "development" of tradition are exactly the same thing. The continuity of
ship to the present.
tradition is not alien to development, as was
This image of retrospection contrasts sharply
thought under classical assumptions. Nor is the
with the typical way that both the classical and
continuity of tradition an essential content manideveloping conceptions of tradition imagine
festing itself in historical developments but from
sacred continuity. As different as they are in other
which it remains distinguishable, as has been
respects, both the classical and developing concepthought under modern, Romantic assumptions.
tions view tradition prospectively. They imagine
Rather, the continuity of tradition is claimed in a
an idealized observer standing in the apostolic age
and gazing forward into the future, seeing the
communal act of faith that is utterly temporal and
so develops in every passing moment as the tradisame content of divine truth defining traditional
tion-shaping act of faith is made again and again.
continuity in all times. In the classical conception,
Tradition, we might say, continuously develops
this continuity is complete from the beginning and
(see Thiel1999; 2000, 84-85).
faithfully handed on to each next generation. In
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Religious Freedom" (Dignitatis humanae) that freeNow at first glance, this might seem to be the
dom of religious belief is a sacred right revealed
assertion of the worst kind of relativism. How
by God, and so a truth entrenched in the apostolic
could traditional continuity be real or trusted or
deposit of faith, even though this teaching was
truthful if it were indistinguishable from developneither believed nor practiced in the Church until
ment? This question and these concerns evince
shortly before it was retrospectively claimed as
how easily we can forget that a tradition is an act
tradition by the Council fathers.
of faith and that all the practices attending that act
These examples of novel claims also demonare being made and remade in time. The tradistrate how retrospection can undo the belief of
tional continuity that faith ever affirms is as real as
the past by making new claims for continuity.
a tradition can be, and anyone who troubles about
Occasionally, a present-day generation practices
the staying power of such acts of faith need only
development by refusing to
consider the history of any culA retrospective
believe in long-standing claims
ture. Once we think of continuity
for tradition which previous
as being remade in every understanding of tradition
generations regarded as central to
moment as believers realign
offers
a
realistic
account
the faith. Arius was genuinely
their relationship to the past, we
of how believers actually surprised that he taught heresy
begin to appreciate the openness
of
tradition
to
novelty.
shape lines of meaningful and, in the midst of the Arian controversy, it was he who had
Retrospective claims for tradicontinuity.
The
continuity
chronological history on his side.
tional continuity reaffirm nearly
of tradition is an act of
Nevertheless, affirming the high
all of the sacred past. But any
Christology of Nicea entailed the
present act of faith may also disfaith in which believers
rejection of subordinationism, the
cern the presence of the Spirit in
together
affirm
their
typical belief of the early cennew ways that lay claim to tradituries. The teaching on religious
tion. And if such a discernment
meaningful relationship
freedom repudiated continuous
is perceived as truthful by growto the faith of
beliefs and practices laden with
ing numbers of the faithful, then,
past believers.
the violence of inquisition. Other
sooner or later, the faith of the
Catholic examples of lapsed continuity are the
whole Church may weave the once novel claim
into the lines of age-old continuity where, now as
Church's teaching that lending money at interest
the deposit of faith, it may be professed as tradiis sinful, that slavery is permissible (see Noonan
1993), and the post-Tridentine doctrine that
tion.
Protestant believers are outside the true Church
Let us consider a couple of examples.
of Christ, a teaching reaffirmed by Pius XII and
Historical studies show that Christologies of the
early Christian centuries were typically subordinareversed just a few years later by Vatican II.
tionist, holding that the Son of God was inferior in
Amidst all this talk about the shifting vagaries
of development, it might seem as if this essay
divinity to God the Father. In the middle of the
third century, literary evidence appears of a new
amounts to a deconstruction of traditional continuity, rather than an argument for its defense. The
belief that the Christ is fully divine. By the early
fourth century, the novel belief in the undiminargument did try to deconstruct a fundamentalist
ished divinity of the Son of God had grown conunderstanding of tradition. The challenge for any
siderably and to the point that this novel retrospecadequate conception of tradition lies in showing
how continuity can abide in development in a way
tive claim for the continuity of tradition clashed
with the chronologically older claim for subordithat is intellectually defensible and in a way that
nationism. The Arian controversy was adjudicated
can be justified by the facts of history. This essay
over time by the Church's common affirmation of
has proposed that the continuity and the developthe new claim as the age-old faith of the Church.
ment of tradition are the same thing and that their
A second example is more recent. The Second
common identity derives from the ongoing acts of
Vatican Council taught in its "Declaration on
faith in which they are professed. Perhaps an

analogy can demonstrate this developing notion of
continuity more dearly. We might think of traditional continuity as the kind of sense that any
reader of a novel makes of its plot at any particular
point along the way. In this analogy we will presume a skillful and trustworthy author, who, of
course, represents God, the divine author of tradition. The author will not betray the integrity of the
plot at any point in its unfolding. The reader will
encounter new insights and real surprises as the
plot of the novel unfolds, for without these features
there would be no story. Yet these insights, surprises, and developments will be aligned in a
meaningful way with what has already preceded
in the plot. The reader's understanding of the
continuity of the plot will be made and remade in
each passing present moment. Like all analogies,
though, this one reaches its limit. A novel's continuity eventually reaches closure in time as the
reader turns the last page. The tradition's narrative
continuity never ends in time, for the book of tradition cannot be dosed on this side of the eschaton.
Catholic belief understands all the acts of faith
in which tradition continuously develops to be
discernments of the presence of God to time and
place. Baptism endows all believers with a
charism for tradition-affirming and traditionseeking faith, and in Catholic belief the Holy Spirit
has endowed the magisterium, all the bishops
teaching together under the primacy of the Pope,
with an extraordinary charism in guiding the
Church in the course of tradition. As all believers
exercise these charisms, they must face the temptation of thinking that their discernment of the
Spirit is true in principle, as though real authority
transcends ambiguity. Authority remains ambiguous precisely because tradition makes claims
about the immanent mystery of God. The false
desire for unambiguous authority is stirred by our
natural impatience. All in the Church can easily
forget that closure to tradition happens only as
this world passes away and, for that reason, the
faith that makes tradition is properly humble and
as open to the new as it is loyal to the old.
Faithfulness is exciting because through it
traditions are continuously made. Tradition is a
function of faithfulness. The act of faith both
affirms what a tradition has been and imagines
what a tradition might be in order to fulfill what it
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already is. Faithfulness is not simply passive
reception. It is also a constructive activity.
Teaching this lesson to our students is important,
for it shows them their own responsibility to the
past and to the present in making their tradition
truly their own. A valuable dimension of that lesson is that discussion, disagreement, and argument are always legitimately present at the cusp of
the tradition, in the unfolding present moment
(Tanner 1997, 151-55). Even though Western
Christian history is rife with discussion, disagreement, and argument about the faith, something in
the Christian mentality is scandalized by such
practices, thinking perhaps that the Church most
resembles the heavenly kingdom when it is peacefully silent. In this regard, we Christians have
much to learn from our Jewish brothers and sisters
who have valued argument, even at times with
God, in the search for truthful tradition. For all we
know, silence may be the most appropriate disposition before the Beatific Vision. But for the Church
in history, believing, discerning, and even arguing
are the activities of faithfulness that bring tradition to life and nurture it into the future. f
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LATE ELEGY
for Charles Alaimo

April is the kindest month.
Pale star and lilac fire.
Month of my coming.
Death always walking beside me.
Month of his going
into the soft soaked ground.
No poems for you, my father.
I was always too afraid.
Your quick fury, your dark days,
lonely writhing on the bare floor
seized by the hectic in your brain.
It gripped me, too, held me fast and long.
Now I am no longer afraid.
In Lenten love I fast and long
for your forgotten face, those lost days,
search my heart and sift my brain,
old photos piled along the bare floor,
hoping to find you quick again, my father.
Beyond the glass birds pair, becoming
one, each clutch of eggs fresh fire.
April comes, first birth month.
Life always walking beside me,
gripping my arm in my steady going
while I tread again this kind returning ground.

Angela O'Donnell

liberating reformed tradition:
the challenge of Christian vocation in a twenty-first century world
Margaret Bendroth

A

SK A REFORMED PERSON TO TALK ABOUT TRA-

dition, and their first response probably
will be a blank stare. As a cradle Calvinist,
I was taught that tradition was basically an addon. Tradition was that endless adiaphora of
scholastic speculation and papal pronouncements
that the medieval Church had piled onto the simple honest truths of the Bible. We, the true heirs of
John Calvin and his iconoclastic followers in
Geneva, Scotland, the Netherlands, and
Massachusetts Bay, preferred our religion straight
up and unadorned, dispensed directly from the
word of God itself.
Reformed worship, architecture, and spirituality became notoriously spare and plain. I am often
asked at the Congregational Library for an old
"order of worship" or "communion service" so
that present-day heirs of the Puritans can put on
an historically-accurate Sunday program. But of
course, these were people who constitutionally
despised set forms and written rules. They left
behind a lot of paper, but not much of the kind
that my callers are looking for. Within the
Reformed churches more generally, anything that
smacked of ritual or, even worse, a rule imposed
by some external authority became anathema.
Church sanctuaries avoided all representations of
God, the communion elements grew smaller and
smaller, and the Bible on that large central pulpit
loomed ever larger.
But of course, most sensible Reformed
Christians recognize that they do indeed have a
"tradition." There is no such thing as a faith based
on the Bible only. All Protestants recognize the
Bible as their central authority, but they also realize that it always comes within an interpretive
framework. Especially in those churches that originated in the Calvinist wing of the Protestant
Reformation- the Dutch, German, and Hungarian
Reformed, the New England Congregationalists,
the Scotch Covenanters, and Presbyterians of
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many hues and stripes-the "tradition" really
means the Christian story as it has been summarized and systematized in a variety of creeds, confessions, and catechisms.
These avowedly human documents were
never meant to replace the Scriptures and were not
regarded as "inspired" in any particular way, but
they were certainly central to the way the faith was
passed down from one generation to the next.
Scholars and churchmen endured the laborious
process of grinding out confessions and creeds in
order to enable ordinary church people to understand the Bible's essential teachings. The Fifty-Two
Lord's days of the Heidelberg Catechism created
an ordered framework for weekly proclamation of
the Word in the context of corporate worship. The
many shorter catechisms written by Calvinist
reformers offered a trustworthy rubric for parents
to teach the faith to their children at home
(Ozment 1983, 132-77).
Though not all branches of the Reformed
family share the same enthusiasm for standardized formats , these documents have long
provided them with a readily definable intellectual framework. Being Reformed, however various emphases are defined, means dealing at some
level with the catechetical structure of the faith.
As a former Calvinette, graduate of a Christian
elementary school, and non-voluntary participant in many a Sunday afternoon study of the
Heidelberg Catechism, I easily can attest to the
Reformed affinity for didacticism. Now an adult
Congregationalist, in a faith community
historically aversive to proscribed creeds of any
kind, I catch only fleeting glimpses of the
Calvinist certainties I once (partially) memorized.
But in either case, confessions and catechisms
present Reformed tradition as a definable and
relatively stable body of content, in most
respects shared with the larger body of Christ
across time and space. They are meant to provide

both a specific identification and a series of
ecumenical touchstones.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given this somewhat
austere approach to tradition, Reformed churches
have a well-earned reputation for traditionalism,
an aversion to change for change's sake alone.
Some of this conservatism is simply built into their
theological DNA. Anyone familiar with Calvinist
doctrine certainly knows something of its
famously taut intellectual structure: the so-called
"five points of Calvinism," the tripartite questions
and answers of the Heidelberg Catechism, the
measured paragraphs of the Westminster
Confession, and the solemn affirmations of the
Canons of Dordt. These are not documents that
invite nitpicking by amateurs. Large and weighty
doctrines like "total depravity" and "divine sovereignty" do not stand alone for critical inspection
but fit together like interlocking pieces in an arch.
If you are going to have a God who is completely
sovereign over all of creation, you logically have to
take some form of election and irresistible grace as
well. God cannot be all knowing and all powerful
while a sinner sits around and ponders his
options. In theory at least, there is no such thing as
a "cafeteria Calvinist."
But as is true of many other Protestant bodies-and most religions everywhere-Reformed
writers also recognize that tradition is more than
just static doctrine contained by ink and paper. It
also describes a long, complex, and continually
evolving conversation about those seventeenthcentury confessions and catechisms. It is the work
of a church both reformed and reforming, to use
the famous phrase. In a fundamental sense, tradition is both a noun and a verb, defining not just a
body of doctrine, but the ongoing work of
Christian people dead, alive, and yet to be born.
Tradition thus requires a living, breathing community of people who recognize it as genuine revelation. Imagine, says theologian John Leith, that
a holocaust of some sort had wiped out all traces
of the Christian community, and then that someone walked through the ruins and found the Bible
in a sealed box. The chances of that Bible alone
giving rise to a new Christian community would
be, in Leith's words, "very small or nonexistent"
(Leith 1977, 17-19). Tradition, in other words, has
a social history. It is not simply a common body of

information that people inherit, but a common
ground from which they can ask each other interesting questions.
Of course, that social history of Reformed
tradition is not necessarily a pretty story. For all
their famed iconoclasm, Calvin's heirs have not
been shy about imagining what their tradition
might look like in earthly form. In the early
decades of the Reformation, Calvin's achievement
was to take the spare, existential piety of Luther
and frame it into an aggressive social program.
Philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff has described
"original Calvinism" as "a passionate desire to
reshape the social world so that it no longer would
be alienated from God" (Wolterstorff 1983, 21).
Those basic principles of Calvinist theology, that
the world was fallen but God remained sovereign,
and that believers were to be God's agents of creation renewal, spurred some fantastic new visions
of cities on a hill. They propelled people across
oceans and continents, and launched a continuous
stream of armies of soldiers, missionaries, and
merchants (see, for example, Benedict 2002).

P

ERHAPS NOT SURPRISINGLY, NOT EVERYONE WAS

thrilled with the project. Soaringly spiritual
and
powerfully earthbound, early
Reformed thought demanded that the world be
remade, and that theology take institutional form,
as it did for good or ill, periodically wreaking
havoc on the unjust or unwary. Wolterstorff aptly
described "that most insufferable of all human
beings, the triumphalist Calvinist, the one who
believes that the revolution instituting the holy
commonwealth has already occurred and that his
or her task is now simply to keep it in place"
(Wolterstorff 1983, 21).
In some quarters, therefore, references to
Reformed "tradition" carry a powerfully negative
subtext. As George Marsden writes, the "greatest
fault" of American Reformed communities has
been a tendency toward "elitism," assuming that
"Reformed people have been endowed with superior theological, spiritual, or moral merit by God
himself" (Marsden 1985, 11). In worst cases, the
Reformed social program becomes an instrument
of oppression. South African critic John de Gruchy
writes of the "fundamental ambiguity in the
Reformed tradition, its evangelical and transfor-

mative witness on the one hand, and its dominatularly updated inventory of personal wrongdoing
ing imperialism on the other" (de Grunchy 1991,
is not technically possible, as the problem is far
19). Though there is no direct link between
more extensive than any single person could enuCalvinism and apartheid, a mythic reading of the
merate. Total depravity is a doctrine of width
Dutch Reformed community in South Africa as
more than depth, more comprehensive than
God's chosen people was a bad idea with an obvisimply cumulative.
ous social consequence.
Reformed confessionalism also means that
The Reformed story offers an opportunity to
the believer's public affirmation of faith is techniname some of the starker issues about traditioncally enough for admittance to membership-or
both the intellectual creativity it generates and the
at least that it is more fundamentally important
tendency toward coercion. Being faithful to tradithan an emotional experience of conversion.
tion in a Reformed setting cer- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Certainly, over the years this
tainly has an ambiguous subtext.
Signing your name to a
notion has been eroded, espeOn the one hand, tradition is a
moving theological target, a series
of confessions constantly being

seventeenth-century
confession is not primarily
a statement of one's

cially as Reformed thought has
commingled with American
evangelical piety ("ideal types"

redefined by a community of
simply do not exist). But within a
believers. It draws off an expanstrict Reformed understanding,
individual beliefs.
Rather, signing your name to a
sive view of Christian vocation in
:J'
a world over which God is
it is a signal of
seventeenth-century confession,
involved at every level. What
as I did upon becoming a faculty
membership
in
a
larger
could be more inviting to a scholar
member of Calvin College, is not
and an educator? Yet Reformed
Christian community,
primarily a statement of one's
tradition also has a strong didactic
a statement of
individual beliefs. Rather, it is a
signal of membership in a larger
undertow, in which truth becomes
final loyalty.
Christian community, a statea series of propositions that can be
memorized and taught. It has
ment of final loyalty.
been mediated all too often by an inward-facing
Moreover, Reformed communities recognize
that confessions are always subject to revision and
community with a tendency to identify itself as
God's specially chosen people. What could be
reinterpretation, that they have "only a provisional,
temporary,
relative
authority"
more daunting to honest intellectual searching?
Yet it is just these built-in forms of resistance
(Presbyterian Church (USA) 1992, 25). They are, as
to modernity and simultaneous embrace of modwe have seen, "talking points" for further discussion, not orthodoxy frozen for all future time.
em culture that make Reformed institutions such
Thus Calvin College's book of signatures includes
interesting-and often frustrating-places to
work. What follows, then, is an attempt to describe
a few points of exception, particularly those of facsome of that ambiguity, acknowledging ways in
ulty who did not wish to go on record as despising
which tradition operates both to liberate and to
the errors of the Anabaptists, as the Belgic
Confession would have them do.
confine, and then some thoughts about the pecuIn a practical sense, this means that Reformed
liar opportunities and challenges that modernity
presents within a Reformed context.
thinkers can enjoy a fairly broad intellectual freedom. Once you have affirmed the standard outlines of the faith, your loyalty should be forever
freedom in tradition
above suspicion. In a best-case scenario, a teacher
Here is one good thing right off the bat: the
in
a publicly-identified Reformed institution does
Reformed dynamic is not, in its essential sense,
not need to provide a spiritual x-ray of any heartmoralistic. Reformed theology speaks less of
felt emotion. Behavioral standards are not
"sins" as individual acts of transgression and
more of "sin," Augustine's great existential cateinsignificant, but they are not primary. So it is not
beyond the pale to ask uncomfortable questionsgory of human alienation from God. Thus, a reg30 131 The Cresset Easter I 2006

questions that might not even occur to a scoffing
unbeliever-and to expect an honest discussion.
Theoretically at least, Reformed confessionalism
creates ample ground for an articulate and free
"loyal opposition."
This implied permission for critical questions
also grows out of the Reformed emphasis on
God's sovereignty over creation. Abraham
Kuyper, the turn-of-the-century Dutch Prime
Minister and patron saint of what is commonly
known as neo-Calvinism, once famously declared
the need for Christians to claim "every inch" of
creation for God (Kuyper 1998, 488). In practical
terms, this meant that no subject area, however
mundane, was off the table for intellectual exploration. Kuyper believed that all ideas were interrelated, and at bottom, a function of one's particular world and life view. In his view, there were no
strictly secular or religious areas of study. Though
no postmodernist, he understood truth as perspectival- all statements of "fact" were traceable to a
particular set of theological commitments. Taking
Calvin's capacious idea of Christian vocation to
the next level, Kuyper laid a foundation for complex, long-term intellectual work, proceeding not
by theoretical mile-long leaps, but by a leisurely,
painstaking march of tiny inches.
Calvin and Kuyper's idea of Christian transformation meant that it was necessary to take the
created order seriously. The world was important
because it emphatically belonged to God, who
eagerly awaited the searching exploration of busy,
curious people. It was far more than a mere backdrop to the ultimate drama of salvation. Indeed,
Reformed theology requires attentiveness to context. The complex interplay of divine will and
human agency raises all kinds of good questions
about the "constructedness" of our earthly reality,
and the true proportions of our role in the world.
History, as James Bratt has described it, is a kind of
rising, densely-woven double-helix in which it
might be possible to tease out what is "Christian"
but wrong to extract it entirely (Bratt 1998, 166).
In Reformed communities, this implied
respect for the details of God's creation lies behind
some formidable skills in institution-building.
Examples abound, from Calvin's Geneva to the
ordered villages of Massachusetts Bay, from
Harvard and Yale to the myriad of smaller denom-

inational colleges and institutes established across
the United States in the nineteenth century. There
are some concrete theological reasons behind their
famous passion for doing "all things decently and
in order"-reallive things matter. But this means
more in scholarly terms than just having the xerox
machines run on time. Respect for institutions, for
something bigger and more important than ourselves, is not historically strong in American
Protestantism and certainly not within the individualistic milieu of American culture. At its best,
the Reformed propensity toward building schools
and churches is an acknowledgement that the
work of other people is as important, maybe even
more important, than the work of a single person.
And again, at its best, this implicit awareness has
generated resistance to the individualism of modern life, the tendency to see our lives as endless
projects of self-creation.
Thus in this sense, Reformed tradition has
often been a platform for creative, useful thinking,
offering a rich vocabulary of common references
and providing a powerful solvent to the acids of
modernity. A Christian scholar can walk pretty far
out on an intellectual limb because that branch is
firmly connected to a strong supporting treetrunk
and held down by deep roots, tested by winds
from every direction. Historian Jaroslav Pelikan
puts this idea into a musical metaphor, arguing
that tradition provides the "perennial themes and
key metaphors" for creative expression. As every
musician knows, it is the discipline of repeated
practice that lifts us beyond the "banality and trivialization" of a "total immersion in the here and
now." Tradition, in other words, allows us to be
genuinely innovative without being merely unintelligible (Pelikan 1984, 78).
freedom from tradition
But of course, the real question is, what does
tradition look like in my 8:00 AM freshman history class? What happens when these dynamic,
exciting ideas meet the mind of a sleepy, restless
eighteen-year old-in my experience some of the
most intellectually conservative people in the
world? Can one of those fortunate few, raised by
attentive parents, nurtured by a theologicallyliterate congregation, and often educated within
a Christian school system, ask authentic,

interesting questions? Ancient Greeks, African
tribesmen, Asiatic nomads, and all of those people across time and space who knew nothing of
Abraham Kuyper's world and life view-what
could they possibly mean to a kid from
Hudsonville, Michigan, far too early on a dark
and cold winter morning?
I worry sometimes that the very cogency of
the Reformed world and life view obscures rather
than illuminates the outside world. Even the specific literary forms used to organize Reformed
teaching subtly discourage open-ended questioning. Every existential question posed by the
Heidelberg Catechism-why are we here and
what is our purpose?- has at most a paragraph of
response. The compact, simple format itself suggests there are no other answers to be found .
Indeed, even that famed intellectualism of
Reformed communities can retard the kind of
painful questioning that moves tradition forward.
The more smoothly and comprehensively the system works, the easier it becomes to engage in selfreferential conversations with people who know
your vocabulary, and who will not, in the end,
raise any questions that the two of you cannot
answer. Specifically Christian scholarship all too
easily becomes a game for insiders, not a path into
any seriously dark night of the soul.
And, finally, that very embeddedness of
Reformed thinking and its attention toward context can suggest that "what is" is "what we have
made," and thus it is "what should be." We lose
important critical distance between, say,
American middle-class values and the demands
of Holy Writ. Or, in an even worse case, divine
providence is secularized into manifest destiny.
God's will becomes a blanket justification for an
aggressive nationalistic program. These are certainly not uniquely Reformed sins, but, I would
argue, a peculiar set of theologically-driven
Reformed temptations.
liberating reformed tradition
So how can we be faithful within and to a
Reformed tradition-or any other for that
matter-under the rising barometric pressure of
modernity? Is it necessary to batten down the
hatches, hammer down those creeds and confessions, and hope for the sunrise? Or should we
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simply give in to that long slow trickle of
relativism that promises eventually to overwhelm us all?
That dualism is, of course, impossible and
unnecessary. There is no authentic position "outside" of modern culture. We cannot reject it any
more than we can reject light or air. And why
would we? Modernity has taught Christians
important lessons about human rights and tolerance, reminding them that the Bible does not condone slavery or require the subjection of women.
As Mark Schwehn and Dorothy Bass have commented, paraphrasing Alfred North Whitehead, it
is necessary to "seek [the] Enlightenment and then
distrust it" (Schwehn and Bass 1995, 295).
Nor is relativism really the problem. For many
religious communities, and perhaps especially
Reformed people, the real challenge of modern
culture is its fragmentation. It is now technologically possible to select all of one's news, entertainment, political debates, even food choices and
never have to encounter an opposing point of
view-computers, cell phones, and cable television allow us to live quite comfortably in selfconstructed little bubbles. The consequences for
religious bodies are considerable. Especially in
groups with a strong "chosen people" ideology, the
issue is not so much maintaining a stable body of
doctrine, but resisting the drift toward sectarianism.
One of the great moments in Dutch-American
cinema is the scene in Paul Schrader's underrated
film "Hard Core," in which Michigan onion farmer
Jake VanDorn tries to explain the five points of
Calvinism to a Las Vegas prostitute. The two are
sitting together in the airport, both in search of
Jake's daughter, who has gone missing from a
Young Calvinist Convention (yes, there once were
such things) on the West Coast. It is a difficult conversation. To a self-proclaimed "Venusian,"
Calvinism looks downright bizarre. Even Jake has
to admit that the "TULIP" acronym makes a bit
more sense on his front porch in Hudsonville than
it does in the Las Vegas airport. Needless to say, he
does not win her to the Reformed world and life
view (Mouw 2004).
A tradition that is truly worth perpetuating
should propel us energetically into the world, but
not like the Calvinist crusaders of old. It is no
longer possible to imagine "the world" as neutral

territory waiting to be claimed and reconfigured
by God's providentially chosen people. Over the
last four centuries, people in the West have
slowly begun to understand that the entire planet
is already inhabited by other people. Our new
pluralistic awareness demands new ways of
establishing righteous communities that are not
simply walled off to keep out the unelect, but full
of light and air.
The image that appeals most to me in this
respect is the ethnic neighborhood, especially as it
emerged among tum-of-the-century immigrants to
the United States. For all the negative stereotypes,
those were vital, culturally porous places, where
newcomers quickly learned "the ropes" of
American culture, but not at the cost of their original identity. At the end of the day, you could always
go home and talk about what was really important
in a familiar language that allowed you to express
your deepest thoughts and feelings. Religious people today have a similar opportunity to learn to
think in two languages-not just their particular
tongue of Zion, but also the idiom of our surrounding culture. Most of us probably always will carry a
particular accent from the old country, but that is
no reason why we cannot try to speak in ways that
others can understand and find compelling.
In this respect, the pluralism of modem culture is a gift, offering meaningful, invigorating
conversation partners to even the closest-knit
covenanted communities. Since my Calvinette
days, I've learned a lot from sojourns among evangelicals, mainliners, Baptists, Episcopalians,
Catholics, and charismatics. From each one, I
learned something new and important about my
Christian identity. But I spent some of my best
times among Mennonites, and I am convinced that
there is something special that happens when
Calvinists and Anabaptists start talking to each
other-when those who have so long considered
themselves to be the "custodians" of American culture meet up with people who have long viewed
that culture with theological suspicion. Indeed, as
Richard Mouw suggests, much of the historic
antipathy between the two is based on similarity,
not difference. He argues that Anabaptist theology
is really a "radicalization" of the Calvinist social
vision (Mouw 2001, 22). And in fact, Reformed
communities need to be reminded that sometimes

"what is" should not be. They need to listen to the
Anabaptist critique of American capitalism and
accept the dare to be prophetic, maybe even
unpopular. Anabaptists can learn a lot from
Reformed people too, and in conversation these
two traditions have much in common with which
they can explore the paradoxes of being both "in
and not of" the modem world.
But not all conversation partners need be religious. Our pluralistic world both demands and
facilitates a deeper appreciation for the old and
often unappreciated Reformed doctrine of common grace, the idea that God bestows favors not
only onto a chosen people, but blesses the world
through any means that God so chooses. This has
been a controversial notion among Reformed
folks. How do you reconcile the doctrines of total
depravity and common grace? Is it really "grace"?
Is it special revelation? But stated carefully, common grace does not simply baptize the standing
order. It asks us to see and appreciate God's work
in unlikely places, that is, outside the immediate
control of God's chosen people-handicapped
bathrooms, government programs to fight AIDS
and malaria in third world countries, even a wellcrafted, thoughtful television program. Common
grace insists that Reformed people see themselves
as emphatically human and in authentic solidarity
with all the other inhabitants of planet earth.
There are many ways to measure the value of
tradition, but in the end, it simply has to make a
difference in the world. It has to have a transformative ethical impact on the people who hold it,
and it has to make the world a better place. Thus
Reformed tradition does not exist just to make
Reformed people happier and more smugly aware
of their distinctiveness.
It can, and probably should, make them a little
bit weird. During the 1950s, a decade devoted to
Protestant healthy-mindedness, Martin Luther
King once commented that the American ideal of
being happy and well-adjusted was terribly overrated. We should never "adjust ourselves," he said,
to a fallen, unjust world. "I call upon you to be
maladjusted," King declared in one of his most
memorable speeches, "for it may be that the salvation of the world lies in the hands of the maladjusted" (King 1958, 36). The imperative of tradition
today is to live gracefully in the world,

maintaining balance with a light touch. That is not
easy for Reformed Christians, who value things
done decently and in good order, and who have
often envisioned Christian vocation as a kind of
godly conquest, but it is hard to imagine a good
alternative. A liberated Reformed tradition should
be, in the end, liberating for all people. f

Margaret Bendroth is Executive Director of the
American Congregational Association.
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tradition and change in Methodism

J

(1703-1791), THE FOUNDER OF THAT
Christian tribe we generally identify as
Methodists or Wesleyans, was a stouthearted
Protestant. Epistemologically he believed in sola
scriptura as embedded in a wider vision of divine
revelation that was generally skeptical of natural
and speculative theology. His ponderings on the
insecurity of natural theology left him at one stage
thoroughly unsettled and close to suicide. It is true
that his ponderings on the veridicality of religious
experience brought him to an aggressive commitment to genuine perception of the divine that was
organized in and around a novel appeal to the
inner witness of the Holy Spirit. Yet even these
ponderings, to be valid, had to be secured by
appeal to scripture. Hence he developed his epistemological ramblings through exegesis of scriptural
texts like Ephesians 2:8, Hebrews 11:1, and most
especially Romans 8:15-17. So Wesley's spiritual
empiricism, while it was foundational in the sense
that it posited a form of perception of the divine
that was direct and noninferential, was also
derived from scripture. Wesley wanted nothing
less than revelatory foundations for his foundations. Every thought, including our thoughts about
thought itself, had to be brought captive to Christ.
Tradition was important, but it was altogether
secondary. By tradition, Wesley meant the nonbiblical tradition of the church developed before
the fourth century (Constantine was the great
Corrupter), a tradition that was recaptured by the
Anglican Reformation. Its role was hermeneutical,
not epistemological. It enabled one to read
scripture better; it was radically subordinate epistemologically to scripture. Reason also was subordinate to revelation. It was conceived not in a
substantial sense but in a functional sense as a
means of inference from data given in revelation
and as a means of testing consistency and coherence. Reason fed off scripture; it had no content
wherewith to challenge it (Miles 1997).
OHN WESLEY

William J. Abraham
Protestantism is, of course, a contested tradition, but Wesley is clearly a Protestant. Yet he is a
Protestant with a difference. For Wesley might
also be described as an Anglican pietist or a
catholic mystic.! For him, the heart of Christianity
was the encounter with and participation in
divine holiness. Thus the material doctrines that
became the driving force of his life were original
sin, repentance, new birth, assurance, justification,
and sanctification. He was constantly in search of
the best way to capture the journey to a merciful,
healing God. He was wedded to no slavish set of
concepts at this point, but he was not diffident
about the heart of the matter. Creation is in ruins
through sin; forgiveness and new life have come
through Christ; and the effects of Christ's healing
work are available now through the work of the
Holy Spirit, who characteristically but not exclusively works through a network of effective
means of grace given to the church. Critical for
Wesley was that every person in sight should
come to experience personally the love and grace
of God. The real enemy then was nominal and
external religion. Forms (works of piety and
mercy) were critical, but in themselves without
the Spirit they were dead and dangerous. It was
life in the Spirit, made possible by the work of
Christ, made available now through grace, and
expressed in a life of holiness that took Wesley's
breath away. He is best described as an evangelist,
a spiritual director, and a Father in God. He was
not and never claimed to be a theologian or a
philosopher (Abraham 2005).
Nor did he really want to start a new church.
In fact, he had very limited abilities in this
domain. He would have been happy to remain a
renewalist, recovering for his day the heart of the
Christian faith, reforming the nation and church,
and spreading scriptural holiness across the land.
His genius as a leader and organizer forced his
hand precisely because he could not bear to leave

those who had come to faith through his movement without the sacramental helps necessary for
effective salvation here and now. So he crossed
the controversial Rubicon for his spiritual children in North America and set them lose to form
a new church. They were, as he put it crisply, at
full liberty to follow scripture and primitive
tradition. They gladly took him at his word, and
at one point took him off the membership lists
when he protested what he saw as unacceptable
developments. Ever since then, those who can
trace some measure of continuity of faith with
Wesley and his early Methodist People have been
divided both formally and informally on how
best to carry on and express his legacy.2 In this,
they have been like every other tribe of
Protestantism that has shown up since the
Reformation. It will take some radical medicine
to cure this disease, a disease for which there is
currently no end in sight.

T

HE CHALLENGES THAT HIT THE HEIRS OF WESLEY

were both internal and extemal.3 There was
initially the challenge of holding to any
serious version of sola scriptura. Sola scriptura was
really constitutive of Methodism as a version of
Protestantism. It was the touchstone of the tradition. The threat from this angle was there from the
beginning. It was dramatically visible in the musings of the Irish theologian, Adam Clarke
(c.1760-1832), who taught himself over twenty
languages, was three times president of the
Conference, and had unquestionable credentials
as a biblical scholar, preacher, and leader. Clarke
denied the eternal generation of the Son from the
Father on biblical grounds. It was not the adjective
that bothered him but the noun. "Generation" signaled origination and dependence, and the Son
could not be divine if this were the case. Tritheism
is clearly lurking in the wings here, but Clarke as
a self-confident biblicist probably never noticed. It
was the first systematic theologian in Methodism,
Richard Watson (1781-1833) (now reviled and
despised), who saw the problem and tried to fix it.
His solution was on the same level as Clarke's: do
better exegesis, systematize the results in a set of
Theological Institutes, and show that Clarke was
wrong. But the problem is now out in the open for
all to see. Sola Scriptura is a kind of blank check
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waiting to be filled in by the latest expert in biblical scholarship.
Methodism has suffered the standard fate of
modem Protestant denominations over the last
two centuries: the experts (even when they share a
common methodology or set of background
beliefs) disagree, so the tradition is constantly tom
asunder internally by disputes about its material
commitments. The arrival of historical investigation of scripture simply inflames the situation.
Historical criticism does not start the fire, because
the fire was there from the beginning. It simply
adds fuel to the fire by providing explosive materials that blow up the whole content of the tradition and, given certain philosophical assumptions,
undermine the very idea of divine revelation on
which the tradition rested.
This problem was brilliantly captured for the
last generation by Van A. Harvey, initially a
Methodist theologian, in his The Historian and the
Believer (New York: Macmillan, 1967). Harvey later
abandoned theology for religious studies. He provided poignant accounts of this transition in essays
published in 1970 and 1981. The final paragraph of
the latter essay is worth quoting at length.
One might say that the unbelieving theologian finds himself in the situation of
Barabbas as described in the novel by Par
Lagervist. Barabbas has his own knowledge, or what he thinks is knowledge, that
Jesus did not arise from the dead on the
first Easter. Barabbas was in the garden
that first Easter morning and saw
absolutely nothing. But he is deeply
moved and attracted by the spirit of the
little band of Christians, a spirit which is
captured in the phrase "love one another."
He also is repelled by what he considers to
be their false and fantastic beliefs .... In
short, what we have in Barabbas is the
doubt of someone who knows, or thinks
he knows, that the Christian claims are
false but who is drawn irresistibly by the
form of life of those who do believe ....
Barabbas, of course, was not a theologian,
that is, someone trained to be an intellectual spokesman for the community of
which he is an outsider. Thus, he could

itself. So when the world went modern, we went
after it in order to persuade it to come to faith. It
is likewise when the culture becomes postmodern. We became and we become all things to all
people that we might win some. Over time, this
leads to worries about whether the faith we profess after a host of readjustments really is the
faith, and we are off again on the merry-go-round
of dispute and division. Conservatives swell forth
The Methodist drive towards holiness and
to challenge what they see as apostate progressives and to reclaim the ancient tradition in the
corporate discipline was highly likely to create
division as well, for these ideals were crucial to the
name of authenticity and faithfulness. Our efforts
tradition. The divisions come with the break from
to fulfill the mandate to save souls have the
Wesley's autocracy, with the problem of slavery,
unhappy consequence of driving us to relentless
change and inescapable alienation. We are a dysand with rival accounts of what to do with
functional family in which every proposed soluWesley's vision of sanctification. So we get African
Methodists, Zionist Methodists, - - - - - - - - - - - - - tion becomes the occasion for
The dilemma of the
estrangement. Teetotalers by proUnion Methodists, Republican
remain silent while forced to walk apart.
The dilemma of the unbelieving theologian is that insofar as he remains silent, he
is not a theologian, for a theologian is, virtually by definition, one who speaks.
Therein lies the paradox. For insofar as he
speaks, he also is not a theologian, because
he does not speak to or for the community.

unbelieving theologian is fession but not in practice, we
Methodists, Reformed Methodists,
Primitive Methodists, Stillwellite
that insofar as he remains simultaneously experience happy
Methodists, Wesleyan Methodists,
drinking bouts and painful hangsilent,
he
is
not
a
theologian,
Free Methodists, and Nazarenes.
overs. Yet, we manage somehow
Even before that, we had splits for a theologian is, virtually to keep up a good face in front of
the neighbors.
between Calvinistic and Arminian
by definition, one who
Methodists. Later the Holiness
One of the cheerful results of
speaks.
Therein
lies
the
Movement within Methodism
this unpleasant state of mind and
paradox. For insofar as he soul is the creation of universities.
helped
give
birth
to
Pentecostalism. Pentecostals in
Indeed, we scarcely could identify
speaks, he also is not a
time showed up inside the tradiwhere we are religiously and epistheologian,
because
he
does
tion repackaged as Charismatics.
temologically without formation in
not speak to or for
In both cases, we had further
a host of disciplines that are central
occasion to divide over the
in the modern university. History,
the community.
legacy. Throughout this history,
sociology, philosophy, and, of
we have a running debate over the relative mercourse, theology (with its plethora of subdisciplines) all are needed to keep the drink flowits of social justice and personal piety, a debate
that now has been reincarnated in complex ways
ing. Intellectual work is both the result and the
in terms of liberation. It is extraordinary that we
cause of attempts to resolve our disputes.
have not formally divided over the debate in and
The initial reasons for the creation of universiaround gay liberation. Clearly the tension
ties by Methodists were, of course, thoroughly
between tradition and change has been volatile
prosaic. Methodists wanted to provide vocational
and divisive.
training for themselves and their neighbors, and
To be sure, all these disputes were shaped and
they were keen to climb a rung or two on the social
flavored by wider developments in the culture.
ladder. They also had a sense from the beginning
North Americac Methodism and its offspring
of the intrinsic value of education, and this dispohave until recently been quintessentially modern.
sition undoubtedly fueled the building of univerMotivated for evangelism and reform, Methodists
sities. However, once created, the schools of
have been determined to get the faith across to
theology in universities and the freestanding semeach new generation and were convinced that we
inaries became sites of both theological revision
could save not just the individual but society
and retrieval. Places like Boston, Drew, Garrett,

Vanderbilt, Southern Methodist, Duke, Emory,
and so on, developed their own ways of coping
with the tension between faithfulness and change.
So the merry-go-round was and is kept in motion
by seminaries and universities that were built and
sustained by Methodists. Those who love the life
of the mind and its place in western culture should
raise a constant toast to religion and theology, to
the disputes they naturally cultivate, and to the
educational institutions that have to be created in
order to address the cognitive dissonance evoked
by such disputes. To be sure, we all know that
theology is banished now from the state universities, and its place in private institutions is precarious. Last year, I had to fight hard (but I trust with
good humor) to hold a university-wide colloquium in my own university on the relation
between robust faith and teaching. The cleverest
opposition came from a brilliant colleague who
presented himself wittily as both Jewish and atheistic. Even in those private institutions that were
originally generated by primal religious identities,
it is a constant challenge to create the continuing
space where the deepest of human questions can
be pursued with real freedom and gusto.

T

HE CRISIS ENGENDERED BY THE INTELLECTUAL

vertigo we rightly and naturally associate
with religious and theological diversity hit
mainstream Methodism in the 1960s. This was a
very exciting time for Methodism. Mainline
Methodists found their champion in the extraordinary efforts of Albert Cook Outler, a leader who
was at one and the same time a historian, theologian, ecumenical leader, brilliant raconteur,
enthusiastic teacher, and ecclesiastical engineer
(Parrott 1999). Through Outler, Methodists discovered tradition and worked mightily to make it into
virtue in the normative landscape of theology. By
Outler's time the conservatives had been packed
off to the backwoods in Kentucky, leaving all the
other options to be brought together in a big-tent
version of Methodism. The vehicle for Outler's
strategy was a wonderful mixture of fresh historical work on Wesley, a badgering espousal of pluralism and diversity, an unmatched rhetorical
commitment to church unity, and above all the
invention of the quadrilateral of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience.
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The quadrilateral basically proposes that we
resolve theological disputes by a judicious appeal
to scripture, tradition, reason, and experience (see
Outler 1991). To put it crudely, mix and stir and the
result will be both faithful and relevant. The quadrilateral was crucial at several levels for Methodists.
It provided the appearance of continuity (and
hence faithfulness) to Wesley; it gave everybody a
place at the table (the contesting parties could latch
onto their favored element); it settled once and for
all the problem of the authority of scripture (even
those who questioned scripture had to use the elements of the quadrilateral, hence it was pragmatically if not transcendentally secure); and it provided a self-confident but actually declining church
with a proper standard of doctrine for all time (or at
least for the next two hundred years, as Outler once
told me in private conversation).
Another way to think of the quadrilateral is to
see it as solving the problem of continuity and
change, of faithfulness and updating, of authenticity and relevance, of past and present. Scripture
and tradition take care of continuity, faithfulness,
authenticity, and the past; reason and experience
take care of change, updating, relevance, and the
present. This formulation is strikingly Methodist,
but it is also at the heart of all progressive and liberal forms of Christianity in the modern period in
the West. The fundamental challenge is formulated in terms of how to be robust enough to be
identified as Christian and yet flexible enough to
meet the challenges thrown up by a changing culture. Overplay the robustness and one falls into
fundamentalism; overplay the flexibility and one
becomes the fleeting expression of the receding
present. The quadrilateral looks like a godsend
when seen from this angle. It is no surprise, therefore, that both conservatives and progressives
have championed it enthusiastically. It was
invented precisely to provide a middle way
between extremes that every sensible person
wanted to avoid. After some initial sniveling and
sneering, it now has become commonplace even in
the homeland of Methodism in England (see
Marsh et al, 2004).
Has then one of the last and least of the tribes
of Protestantism resolved the problem of continuity and change with a handy formula? Have we at
last found a way to fix the challenges of change

that nobody can deny? Should we all become
Methodists, or failing that, pay Methodism the
ultimate compliment by stealing its quadrilateral,
as many are doing? Happily my questions are
entirely rhetorical. The quadrilateral is no solution
to the problems we face; it is a snare and an illusion. The challenge is to find a way below and
behind the question it answers and then to move
on to a better future. We go below the quadrilateral to the epistemological worries that led to its
creation and deal with these comprehensively.
The key to diagnosing this as a bogus solution
to the deep problems we face in the epistemology
of theology is to note the ambiguity of the term
"Methodism." "Methodism" can mean a version of
modern Christianity, or it can mean a very particular school in epistemology. Methodists, as
Roderick Chisholm argued in a seminal essay, are
those who insist that our fundamental epistemological crises can be resolved only when we hit on
the right method (Chisholm 1982, 61-76). The crucial problem, of course, is then to find the right
method; and there is the rub. Methods are at least
as contested and disputed as the particular propositions they are supposed to undergird. One way
to think of the end of modernity is to think of it as
a deep disillusionment about the quest for the
right methodology. Another way is to see it as the
end of epistemology conceived as the search for
the right criteria of rationality, justification, and
knowledge. Post-modernity can be understood
readily as a placeholder for the intellectual
responses engendered by disappointment with
modern forms of epistemology. It is as if we have
fallen into a black hole and do not know our way
around anymore.

I

T IS VERY EASY TO COMFORT OURSELVES AT THIS

point with claims about the inevitability of
historicity, fallibility, perspectives, discourses,
contingency, and the like. It is also very tempting
to make our way forward by presenting our wares
in the language of intellectual virtue and vice. We
must be both faithful and open; we must strike a
balance between authenticity and accommodation. We can even mask our announcements by
disguising them as profound truths about the
human condition itself and then offer the study of
religion as the solution to the riddle of being

human. If we want to launch an intellectual
nuclear strike we can work up a charge of idolatry:
any robust claims to knowledge (most especially
knowledge of God) are self-serving idols.
The crucial point to register in all of this is that
when we fall into these traps we have fallen into
the black hole of epistemology. The only way forward when confronted with black holes in history
or science is to keep on doing history and science;
likewise the only way forward when confronted
with black holes in epistemology is to keep on
doing epistemology. The deep problem with the
quadrilateral is that it is epistemology on the
cheap. It is a slogan made up of abstract entities
that is suitable at best for high school students,
and it inhibits precisely the kind of careful work in
epistemology that is essential. (On the current
state of epistemology, see Moser 2002).
Commitment to the quadrilateral also
destroys Christianity from within by betting the
store once and for all on getting the epistemology
right. The final outcome of this process for
Methodists has been a matter of death by our
own hands. We turned our religion into a theory
of religious knowledge and in the very process
ran the risk of losing friendship with the living
God.4 Commitment to the right epistemology
eclipsed our commitment to God. We can see the
move towards a theory of knowledge in
Methodism at its very inception and across the
years. Methodism began as a hiccup in the history of Protestantism. Almost simultaneously the
well-educated and eccentric Wesley brothers
stumbled upon the reality of God in the spring of
1738. This staggering into the reality of God is (if
anything is) the secret history of Methodism. It
was primal knowledge of God as one's creator,
lord, friend, consoler, lover, preserver, provider,
judge, and savior. This is one reason our elder
brothers and sisters in Protestantism and Roman
Catholicism have found it so difficult to take
Methodism seriously as an intellectual tradition.
We are pietists, mystics, activists, and pragmatists. We always have been half-baked intellectuals in search of a tradition to house a treasure that
is constituted by wonder love and praise. Our
central doctrinal and practical concerns gravitated around participation in the life of God here
and now. Without this participation we are as

good as dead. (This dimension of Methodism is
missed in Richey, Campbell, and Lawrence 2005).
So Methodism was not initially knowledge of
this knowledge of God. It was knowledge and
love of God (and then neighbor) simpliciter. But by
the eighteenth century in the West as a whole, it
was never enough to have primal knowledge; one
also had to have metaknowledge. It was not
enough to be acquitted and justified before God;
one also had to be justified about justification.
Wesley was trapped in this world from the beginning, and he never found liberation from it.
Everything had to be derived from scripture as
lodged in a theory of divine revelation. He was
smitten with a deadly virus that he passed on to
his offspring. They received his epistemology of
theology joyfully as good Protestants. When that
epistemology ran into trouble they invented or
borrowed other theories (Chiles 1965). The climax
of this process was the invention of the quadrilateral, when they fooled themselves into thinking
that they now were fully grown up with an epistemology all of their own that would solve the conflict between traditional commitment and
contemporary credibility.
The upshot of this analysis now can be stated
plainly: the very attempt to name and resolve the
conflict between faithfulness and change,
between authenticity and relevance, is an
epistemological response to the ongoing epistemological crisis of modernity and now postmodernity. Modernity itself is an effort to rid us of
theological anxiety in the wake of endless theological disputes that began with first-order
disputes about God and developed into methodological disputes about how to resolve those disputes. Postmodernity in its various guises is one
more effort to resolve our anxiety by closing off
debate or by making a virtue of our misery. The
whole debate is exhausted and exhausting. Yet
the intellectual dexterity and fecundity on display
is a feast for sore intellectual eyes. Without this
history our culture and our lives would be drastically impoverished. Happily, it will continue after
we are all long dead and buried.
It now looks as if I have dug the grave of my
own tradition and then fallen into it myself. I
have insisted that Methodism as a theological
tradition fell into Methodism as an epistemo40 141 The Cresset Easter I 2006

logical tradition and hence committed suicide. So
what do we do now?
By its own lights, Methodism is nothing without knowledge and friendship with God. In this
respect, it is the carrier of pivotal strands of
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam across the centuries. The core of the tradition is encounter, liberation, inner-illumination, and salvation by the
living God. It is existing in fear and trembling, in
humility and confidence, in the midst of divine
judgment and mercy. I am not here resurrecting
the dead vestiges of liberal Protestantism or
existentialism. These are ultimately artificial and
reductionistic theories that seek to tame and
accommodate a fearful and joyful encounter with
God. This personal knowledge of God as experienced initially within Methodism was not some
generic knowledge of God but knowledge of God
evoked by encounter with Jesus Christ through
the Holy Spirit. It was knowledge tied to the name
of God identified as the Holy Trinity. This is the
very core of Christianity as developed by Wesley
within Methodism. The proof for this, should it be
needed, is to be found in the extraordinary combination of piety and doctrine developed within
Charles Wesley's hymns, a standing monument to
the heartbeat of Methodism.

C

LEARLY ONE WAY TO OPERATE ON THE OTHER

side of such knowledge is to try to cut it
lose from its original moorings in the
tradition of the church. This is the way of liberal
Protestantism. The agenda is to go below the
surface to the experience and then rethematize
and reform the tradition to meet the intellectual
and moral challenges of each new generation.
Many Methodists tried this attractive experiment
over the last hundred years and more. Whatever
the gains of this trial, it has run its course, only
surviving where there are enough traditional
evangelists to bring folk to faith in the first place.
Theological liberalism is essentially a home for
intellectually disillusioned evangelicals and
fundamentalists. Both parents and offspring are
addicted to epistemology. The challenge is to
transcend epistemology and then to let
epistemology fall back naturally into its place in
human existence. This is a radical revolution of
reversal. Confessional and canonical commit-

debate and alienated us from the media of divine
ment are distinguished and separated out from
encounter and manifestation (see Abraham 1998).
epistemological commitment.
The very terms scripture and tradition were recast
The radical reversal begins by insisting
as criteria of justification to show how right we
afresh on robust, concrete media of living faith
were in the face of those who disagreed with us.
incorporated in liturgy, scripture, saints, martyrs,
Theories of authority, of biblical and papal
sacraments, teachers, icons, creed, and the like.
infallibility, are the necessary accoutrements of
Just as we encounter human agents through their
this tragic transposition of the inner life of the
actions mediated through physics and chemistry,
Church. Happily, God has mercy upon us and still
we likewise encounter God in concrete phenommeets us even in the media that we have turned
ena like creation, scripture, prayer, sacrament,
inside-out and upside-down. Speaking humorconscience, singing, fellowship , preaching, and
ously, we can lend God a hand by putting first
holy conversation. If these fail us spiritually, we
things first and reversing this whole way of
are in the dark and nothing can save us. We
thinking and acting.
become empty wine bottles. Tradition is a name
What has all this to do with life in the modem
we give to the networks of materials, persons,
university or with our vision of education? From
and practices that function soteriologically.
the days of Wesley, Methodists have been commitRather than cut back on the moorings, the chalted to living and dying in the world as we find it.
lenge is to retrieve the old ones and invent new
To know this world we need all
ones. The retrievalist half of this
With
the
failure
of
the
the resources that university educhallenge calls for a complete
cation can supply. We are a people
rereading of the early history of ecumenical movement and
who think and let think. We insist
Christianity; the inventive half of
with our collapse into
on being open to truth wherever
this challenge calls for sustained
interest groups, caucuses, we may find it. Hence, if we stay
attention to the despised offspring
of
Methodism
known
as
and renewal movements, with the dialectic between tradiPentecostalism (on the Pentecostal we are now at a point where tion and relevance, we are deciddimension of Methodism, see
edly in favor of relevance. Because
Lyall and Schubert (2005) on the we have to ask again: Who
of our initial minority status and
the sustained (and often violent)
Chinese Methodist, John Sung).
are we? and How do we
opposition of the establishment,
Put the two halves together and
preserve such treasures
we get an agenda for the renewal
our relationship to the great tradias
we
possess?
of the church today.
tion of the church has been relaNotice here that this resists the move to make
tively robust, especially in the early years, but it has
also been conditional. If the tradition and our thetradition into an epistemological category. What is
handed over is a network of materials, practices,
ories about it get in the way of converting and
and persons in a community that dares to say that
redeeming the world, then the default position
God can be encountered and salvation can be
has been to abandon or to change the tradition. In
found here and now. This is offered in faith with
this sense, we have been liberal, progressive, and
lots of promises and testimony but with no episterevisionist. Playing out this default position over
mological guarantees, with no officially canonized
two centuries has left us scrambling anew to
theories of knowledge or proposals about authormake sure we do not lose the first half of the
ity. "Taste and see that the Lord is good," is the
dialectic, namely, the core of the tradition that
motto. In this way of handing over the faith, we
made us what we were. It is that side of the
recapitulate the development of the canonical herconversation that now requires attention. With
itage of the early Church. Deeply revisionist histhe failure of the ecumenical movement and with
torical work is needed at this point to bring out the
our collapse into interest groups, caucuses, and
way in which the materials, practices, and persons
renewal movements, we are now at a point where
we have to ask again: Who are we? and How do
of the Church were transmuted into items of episwe preserve such treasures as we possess? These
temology that then became the site of endless

are the burning issues below the surface that are
being formulated behind closed doors.

T

HE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS FOR UNIVER-

sity education are as follows. First, we need
a deep recovery of nerve in Methodist
theology. We require what Professor John Webster
(1998), in an Anglican context, has called "theological theology," that is, theology that is unapologetic about exploring the nature of God as encountered in the life of faith within the great canonical
heritage of the Church as received within
Methodist. In a way, this is nothing new. It is in an
obvious sense a recovery of "faith seeking understanding." The emphasis falls, however, at this
point in our history on faith, and it is faith both as
living faith in God and faith as the great heritage
of the church as refracted through Methodism.
Without this faith we have nothing to bring to the
table in the exploration between faith and the contemporary world.
Second, given that we want to understand all
of creation in the light of faith, we need every tool
and discipline we can muster to make sure that
we understand all of creation and history as they
really are. This is not to offer blank checks to
every non-theological discipline to fill in with
anything its heart desires. Such non-theological
work has at least two constraints: first, there is the
formal constraint of truth; and second, there is the
material constraint of whatever truth theology
brings to the conversation. This argument
assumes that understanding is linked to truth,
and that theology has truth to offer. It also
assumes that in coming to faith we cross over a
threshold into a new world of divine revelation
that has the potential to illuminate everything.
Third, it is obvious that these are controversial claims that will be resisted in the academy for
a host of reasons. We should expect turmoil and
trouble if we proceed down this road. However,
life in the academy is much the same as we
find it elsewhere: it is more often than not
marked by conflict, competition, power struggles,
cognitive dissonance, turf wars, and strife. Truth
of any sort is a hard-won achievement wrung
from unending dispute and debate. So this proposal is offered as an asset, not as a liability. The
challenge is to make sure that we do not allow
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this empirical reality to displace a wholehearted commitment to intellectual virtue as the
heartbeat of all education.
Fourth, given the secularization of mainline
Protestant colleges and universities, implementing
this kind of proposal will require creativity and
money (see Cuninggim 1994). We need intra-university programs and centers to bring together
persons of all religious faiths (and sympathetic
secularists) so that they can pursue their specialist
inquiries in the light of their deepest convictions
and insights. In this arena, thoroughly robust
forms of faith (including Methodist forms) must
be empowered to find their voice in the wider
arena of scholarship. Thus the narrowness and
intolerance inescapable in university life can be
both exploited and countered for the sake of
inquiry as a whole.
Fifth, and finally, given that in all of this work
epistemological inquiry is inescapable, we need to
ensure that appropriate philosophical expertise is
on hand. The debate about the relation between
tradition and change is in crucial moments an
epistemological debate. It requires careful reflection (both historical and normative), for example,
on the relation between revelation and reason or
between tradition and divine inspiration. This is
not to suggest that philosophy should be some
sort of primary or privileged discipline. My claim
is more modest: epistemological questions
demand and deserve epistemological attention. t

William J. Abraham is Albert Cook Outler Professor
of Wesley Studies at the Perkins School of Theology,
Southern Methodist University.

Notes
1. The term mystic, is, of course, a thoroughly con-

tested designation. Mysticism, as has often been
observed, has been out late at night and has kept some
very bad company. Wesley was well aware of this and
aggressively rejected some of the forms of mysticism
that came his way, especially in the middle of the 1730s.
He was especially uneasy with the love of solitude, the
rejection of means of grace, and aversion to works.
However, he shifted his ground over the years.
Technically Wesley would appear to fall within the cat-

egory of cataphatic mysticism. For an exceptionally
good discussion, see Orcibal1965.
2. Wesley himself gives various summaries of his
legacy in his many treatments of Methodism. See for
example his "On Laying the Foundation of the New
Chapel," "A Short History of Methodism," "The
Character of a Methodist," "The Principles of a
Methodist," "Thoughts upon Methodism," and "A Short
History of the People Called Methodists."
3. Throughout this paper I shall refer to the heirs of
Wesley and Methodism as simply Methodists. There is
no agreed designation but this one has the merit of long
historical precedent despite its absence in North
America in the last generation. It also fits with Wesley's
own clear preference. I shall speak unapologetically for
the version of Methodism I know best.
4. This is not to say that we did not also turn it at
times into a deadening bureaucracy, a middle class club,
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mUSIC
sympathy for you-know-who?

J.D. Buhl

I

T WAS A GOOD SIGN THAT THE FIRST SONG FROM THE

Rolling Stones' new album A Bigger Bang to
cause a stir was one of political content. Under
the headline "Jagger: Song not anti-Bush," an
Associated Press story prior to release quoted
"Sweet Neo-Con":

You call yourself a Christian
I think that you're a hypocrite
You say you are a patriot
I think that you 're a crock of s--t!...
Artless as the attack may be, it is a relief to
encounter Mick the social critic-he of the caustic,
castigating voice-rather than Mick the sexual
predator, even if only for one song.
Such lyrics as these get buried on albums this
size (sixteen tracks, sixty-five minutes). They feel
like an obligatory bit of spleen, expected of a
world figure with an attitude. "It is certainly very
critical of certain policies of the administration,"
Jagger admits, "but so what! Lots of people are
critical." But few are critical the way Jagger can be.
Calling his lyrics "social criticism" is like calling a
slasher flick "cinema of dissent."
There was a time when this lurid voice dominated Rolling Stones albums. It is prevalent on the
band's most political albums, Undercover and Dirty
Work, both made in the 1980s. The videos for songs
like "Too Much Blood" and "Undercover of the
Night" feature bloody images of crime, corruption,
death squads, and torture, with the threat of more
violence in every pumping hip and slashing guitar. Jagger's way with both righteous anger and
bored ambivalence makes sure everyone is implicated. Who killed the Kennedy's? Well after all, it
was you and me.
What many must find offensive about the old
rocker is not his overstated sexuality, but exactly
this sense of entitlement: Jagger the fingerwagging gadfly who lacks Socrates' love of wisdom but sure can dance. Always the observer,
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Jagger exudes a cool that suggests he of all entertainers is above the usual corrupting contradictions-he's got greater contradictions of his own.
"Street Fighting Man" appeared to be a rallying
cry, but, as demonstrated most memorably by his
pitiful attempts at calming his "babies" in the
Altamont crowd (caught on film in Gimme Shelter),
Jagger is in fact the last performer to rally anyone.
When people join up fists-in-the-air at a Stones
concert, it is in celebration of the kick and swagger
of the ne'er do well, not of the ideological thrust
and discipline of the revolutionary.
Still, Jagger continues to try to place the Stones
at the center of the world's concerns. The first Gulf
War brought us "Highwire," a topical single
attached to 1991's Flashpoint. It flopped, but the
song's lamentations over "hot guns and cold, cold
nights" approximate the same mix of futility and
empathy found in Bruce Springsteen's current
"Devils and Dust." In an excellent new blues song
on Bigger Bang, Jagger finds himself where love
and misery are "jammin' side by side." He considers "Goyas and paranoias" in response to a streetcomer preacher:

He says there's trouble
Trouble's a com in '
I can read it like the back of my hand
The most moving moments on any Stones
recording come when Jagger breaches his boundaries of irony and sleaze to join the rest of us in
life's trials, acting like he really cares about the
woman who's leaving him or the spiritual hunger
that gnaws at his soul. While empathy seems
beyond him, Jagger fakes compassion convincingly. You always get the feeling he's trying.
The last time the Stones toured an album of
new material-Bridges to Babylon in 1997-the
ugly political voice was less in evidence. Instead,
the lyrics of religious and personal maturity made
it to the stage and the inevitable live album. "Saint

of Me" found Jagger coming to grips with his
church upbringing, while still defining himself
against it. "Out of Control" was his first truly honest appraisal of his past and present selves.
Jagger then introduced Christian and other
religious themes into his most recent solo album,
Goddess in the Doorway. His duet with Bono on
"Joy" left memorable images of Jesus lighting a
cigarette and casting a wary eye on today's world.
But Jagger hasn't Bono's sincerity, nor does he
command the trust enjoyed by U2's front man.
Bono has said that artists like Jagger are "much
more dangerous men as they get older. They know
their way around the world, and they have more to
say." They are also more inconsistent. With all the
knighting going on, it is easy to see the whole of
British pop as merely a bivouac and never the front
lines of an ongoing movement. And in the
dilemma between life-for-oneself or life-for-others,
Jagger clearly has chosen the former.
A Bigger Bang is an explosive album full of
heartbroken ballads and glistening pledges of
love, but for one brilliant moment the bloodsplasher is back. Only His Ugliness Sir Mick could
sneer "It's liberty for all, democracy's our style,
unless you are against us, then it's prison without
trial." Yes, Green Day could sing it, or someone on
the folk scene, but only the Stones could get such
sentiments heard. In the mounting battle between
the new Christendom and an emerging Christian
left, Mick Jagger would seem an unlikely ally. But
somebody has to say it, and it may as well be
someone with perfect diction and the world's
greatest drummer behind him.
However, this is the stance where Jagger
seems most unaware of his ineffectualness, where
he is often most vulnerable and pitiable. In a
recent interview with British rock magazine Q,
Jagger's partner Keith Richards responded sadly
when reminded of the band's 1960s image, one of
seething non-conformism and sexual menace.
"I know," he said. "But that's when you realize
how tragic governments are. Why are they scared
of four guitar players? Society is so fragile."
Wouldn't it be nice if society in all its
fragility-and governments especially-could still
be given pause by four guitar players? But the
sweet neo-cons in Washington will hardly be

quaking in their Guccis when the Rolling Stones
come to town.
This is because their entrance is being
financed by Ameriquest, the notorious mortgage
company settling suits left and right for exploiting
low-income and elderly borrowers in the name of
the American Dream. According to the San
Francisco Chronicle, Ameriquest's top executive,
Roland Arnall-a billionaire ranked No. 106 in
Forbes magazine's 2004 list of the wealthiest
Americans- has been one of President Bush's top
fundraisers, generating $12 million for his political
efforts during the past four years. Sweet, indeed.
Once again, the band that started corporate sponsorship of rock tours has, rather like the church,
aligned itself with money and power.
And its friends have been turning out in
legion to celebrate the death of rock as anything
beyond spectacle. The Bigger Bang tour began last
year with Arnall donating a few $100,000 opportunities to go "yeah, yeah, yeah, woo!" with neo-con
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in his luxury
box in Boston. As it continues across the States
through March, fans like Kelli of Charlestown,
Indiana, are sure to get their ya-ya's out:
Ameriquest inflated our house appraisal
value so bad that we have no equity and
owe more than it's worth. They lied about
our employment, saying I was a 401k
investor, when in fact I had been at the
same nursing home for 9 years with a
monthly income of $1500. They wrote I
made $6000 a month.
Damages: In debt-settlement program,
considering bankruptcy, being sued by 3
credit card companies, losing the house
that has been in my family since 1962.
Very depressed (complaint filed against
Ameriquest at ConsumerAffairs.com on
18 May, 2005)
Like the tour slogan says, "Anything else is
just a concert." f
J. D. Buhl works at Cody's Books in Berkeley,
California, and serves as adjunct faculty in philosophy,
religion, and ethics at several Bay Area universities.

film
The Passion of the Christ-American Easter
Conrad Ostwa/t

T

WO YEARS AGO ON ASH WEDNESDAY, MEL

Gibson's The Passion of the Christ opened for
American movie audiences to resounding
success. Churches rented movie theaters and
packed the seats like pews on revival night. Many
moviegoers attended not for entertainment but
for a ritualistic remembering of Christ's Passion.
A remarkable film in many respects, Gibson's
movie was variously exalted for bringing the
story of Christ's suffering to film in all its brutal
reality, excoriated for being anti-Semitic, praised
for its faithfulness to the Bible, and critiqued for
taking great liberties with the biblical text. The
theology of the film was debated, and its violence
engendered controversy. By the end of 2004, The
Passion of the Christ was the third highest grossing
film of the year. The Passion of the Christ is an
important film for all the reasons cited above, but
even more so because it brings into sharp focus
the co-dependent relationship between religious
and popular culture in America.
The fact that conservative Christians flocked
to movie houses to view an R-rated film that
looked much like the same Hollywood entertainment that religious groups often critique for excessive violence clues us in to the co-dependency
between religious and popular culture in America.
American popular culture and religious culture
interact in dynamic ways, such that the boundaries between sacred and secular culture become
flexible and permeable. Secular media, like popular film, television, and literature, promote and
contain obvious or implied religious content. For
example, The Passion of the Christ, the television
show Lost, and the Left Behind series of popular,
apocalyptic novels all are popular cultural products that carry explicit religious messages. At the
same time, religious institutions use secular forms
to promote theological messages and worship
practices, using contemporary musical forms,
computer technology, and sophisticated films in
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worship settings offering everything from aerobics classes to child daycare within the walls of
the church (see Ostwalt, Secular Steeples, Trinity,
2003). Gibson's film highlights this contemporary
co-dependency between the sacred and the secular and is worth revisiting two years after its
release to ask what it tells us about our culturenot about theology per se, but about American
myths and beliefs.
In the first place, it is apparent that many
Christians watched and admired the film because
of its seeming veracity and faithfulness to the
biblical Passion story. And in outward form, the
film contains enough of the gospel Passion narratives to be recognizable to most people familiar
with the broad outlines of the story. However, its
plot is unmistakably informed by the ritualistic
Stations of the Cross, a plot structure lost to many
Protestant viewers. And one of Gibson's important sources for the film's focus on suffering was
Sister Anne Emmerich's Dolorous Passion (1833),
not to mention his own traditional Catholic faith.
All of this, in addition to the incredible visual
effects, make this a very rich film. Gibson's film
employs multiple understandings for the sacred
story of Christ's suffering and brings the Passion
into sharp visual focus in a way never before
accomplished in film. Perhaps because our culture is becoming less textual and more visual, the
film virtually supplants the gospel narrative in its
effectiveness. Thus, its graphic and visual nature
make it more real than the text for contemporary
culture. A popular cultural product displaces the
sacred narrative it is meant to depict.
And so it is with much of American popular
culture-films, books, music, and even sporting
events are saturated with religion in America and
create religious messages. The lines between
sacred and secular have become so blurred that
we often cannot distinguish with any critical
sophistication which is which and what is what.

Viewing The Passion of the Christ becomes a ritualistic activity, while some major American
churches cancel Sunday rituals on Christmas Day
in deference to the family. The secular functions
religiously, and the sacred defers to secular
Christmas. Many Americans receive religious
tutelage and moral instruction from popular culture as well as from houses of worship.

I

N THE PASSION OF THE CHRIST, GillSON GIVES US A

look at American Easter. The film captures a
particular emphasis of the Passion narrative,
namely Christ's suffering, and relegates the resurrection to a supporting role. After a long and
intense depiction of Christ's scourging, agonizing
walk to Golgotha, and crucifixion, the film gives us
hardly a glimpse of the resurrection, indeed just
enough to hint at a sequel, perhaps an apocalyptic
sequel of equal violence and graphic suffering. So
while Gibson's film may be an Easter story, it is not
a resurrection story, but rather one of suffering,
"redemptive suffering." Gibson's Christ is not primarily one who conquers death, but rather one
who endures suffering, unwarranted but righteous
suffering in the service of redeeming humankind.
And although this is part of the Christian narrative,
it is magnified to the point of eclipsing any other
aspect of the Easter story. Thus, Gibson's film gives
us a particular kind of Passion play, a passion of
suffering, violence, and bodily mutilation, and in
doing so situates the Christian Passion narrative in
a way that can be acceptable in the context of
American cultural myths and paradigms.
Indeed, the theme of suffering is to be found
everywhere in the movies we watch; from
Shawshank Redemption to Braveheart, many popular
movies have at their heart an exploration or glorification of redemptive suffering. Films with and
without religious overtones reenact the myth of
heroic suffering in which heroes willingly endure
pain and sacrifice for the good of all. This
American myth has informed a work ethic, a war
ethic, a political ethic, a civil religion, and, perhaps,
even cultural racism. Redemption, salvation, and
justice are bought by the sacrifices and suffering of
our heroes, suffering that visual media can bring
to life through special effects and graphics.
Gibson gives us an American Christ in his
Passion (see Stephen Prothero, American Jesus.

Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003). This Christ
boldly and willingly accepts the scourging, the
sadistic torture, the hideous execution. He bears it
courageously and with stoic determination as his
flesh is pulverized from merciless blows from
Roman guards. He endures pain as the boyhood
heroes of my youth endured torture: without fear,
without failure, without breaking, but with dignity
even unto death. By situating the graphic torture of
the Passion narrative at center stage, Gibson has
cast the Christian story to appeal to an American
audience, and his Passion story is ingeniously positioned for contemporary American popular and
religious culture. It plays to popular audiences
because Christ embodies the myth of cultural heroism; it plays to certain religious audiences because
it reinforces visually and with great effectiveness
the suffering of Christ that is central to the Passion
story. In this sense, the graphic nature of the movie
produces a cultural communion for the secular
audience and a visual Eucharist for the faithful.
And in reaching one audience, it speaks to the
other, and the co-dependency continues.
Could this be the real reason why The Passion
of the Christ was embraced by the evangelical community in America while another Passion story,
The Last Temptation of Christ (1988) was rejected
and boycotted by conservative Christians? Martin
Scorsese's film, based on the novel of the same
name by Nikos Kazantzakis, portrays a Christ
whose last temptation is avoiding the cross and
enjoying a normal life of family happiness. While
not giving in to this vision, the Christ of
Kazantzakis is weak in comparison to Gibson's.
He waffles and vacillates rather than pulling himself up off the scourging floor as Gibson's Christ
does, ready for more torture. Gibson's Christ taps
a heroic archetype and embodies the American
mythic hero, while Scorsese gives us a Christ who,
while more human in his misgivings and fears, is
less heroic in his suffering.
The Passion of the Christ demonstrates how culture and religion interact on many different levels.
With it we see a secular medium of entertainment
perform a ritualistic and religious function. And
with Gibson's depiction of Christ, we see a film
present and glorify a cultural Christ, a Jesus tortured and crucified as much by cultural myth as
Roman guards. As an Easter and religious film,

The Passion of the Christ will remain important,
functioning more effectively than any Passion play
or presentation in memory. But it functions in a
certain way, with a certain nod to culture and with
a certain theological slant. And as a result, as a film
highlighting the intersection of cultural and

popular religious belief, The Passion of the Christ
will become a classic. f
Conrad Ostwalt is Chair of the Department of
Religion at Appalachia State University and Professor
of Religion and Culture.

AFTER HERBERT'S "EASTER WINGS"

(jar Pat)
They arc into flight, wingspread of words
tough to wrestle, sinewy muscles
flexing beneath their down.
Two pairs of outstretched arms,
two stanzas rippling off the page,
a catch in the breath: there is no need for more.
So many poems you taught us,
the classroom churning with our unspent
lives. What did we know of passion, loss,
or death? Last March when your letter came,
your signature stood bold as God's writing
on my brow, clear of old silt and snow.
Did you guess how glad you made me?
I might have walked beside you over thin ice,
testing the early spring. We would meet
in New York; we would meet in a foreign city.
It would not be too late.
Instead, you died. Each night, uncurling Dad's
clenched fingers in the home, I press a cup
against his palm and think: "There is no way
to answer you." I comb the words you chose
with care, hearing in their cadence your
remembered voice, wondering if you knew
what was going to happen. Were you hoping
we would write again, both of us easing into
our second wind? The pattern of your hand
still rests across the paper, as if it folds on mine.
Letter by curving letter, a field of bright lilies
under your wing.

Diane G. Scholl
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this day In history
walking the ground

Albert Louis Zambone

A

N AUTHORITATIVE LOCAL HISTORIAN ONCE

made me promise always to walk the
ground, and I have tried to keep the
promise ever since. Whenever I do, I am amazed at
what I can find .
Mrs. Elizabeth Morgan and I were, when she
said this to me, on the site of a nineteenth-century
industrial settlement in the New Jersey Pine
Barrens, an extraordinary wilderness not sixty
miles from Manhattan into which few people
ever knowingly travel. Indeed, there were far
more people living in the Pine Barrens and
exploiting its resources a hundred years ago or a
hundred and fifty years ago than live there now.
Throughout the "Pines," as the natives call the
region, you come upon signs of their presence
like those of a lost civilization. And, indeed,
how many twenty-first century people will be
able to understand artifacts from the curious, hot,
dirty and highly skilled profession of charcoalburner or that of bog-iron founder? Their tools
and procedures are almost as strange and distant
to us as is mummification, and probably not as
well known.
Among local historians there is always the
(highly understandable) urge to do one better
than the next fellow, to elevate the beloved village
into a might-have-been New York, when it is
manifestly not even as lively as a single streetfront of the Lower East Side. Mrs. Morgan was
especially irritated that morning by a friend who
recently had claimed that this site in the Pines had
once been a town of some twelve thousand inhabitants. It was clear simply by looking about that
this narrow peninsula of sandy land in between
two bogs could not possibly have held that many
people. This, said Mrs. Morgan with grim vehemence, was what happened when people wrote
articles based on flawed deductive reasoning
from a few scraps in the archives. "You must
always walk the ground, Albert," she said.

I think of that admonition often. In Oxford,
England, walking allows you to understand what
a medieval city was like simply because of the size
of its walls. You understand the limitations and
rhythms of medieval urban life. There is no division between public and private space, perhaps
simply because there is so little space. All actions
take place in a small arena in which everyone else
is a spectator. Despite the distance of many centuries, one can understand the rhythms of
medieval life because of the limitations of the
space: the short distance to the market from any
single house in Oxford; the shorter distance to any
church; and the easy passage beyond the confining walls to the fields beyond. Nothing can be said
about a medieval town that cannot be better
learned through walking around modem Oxford.
Williamsburg, Virginia, is another place that
explains the past by walking. I often have walked
through it in stifling heat and would rather forget
most of those experiences, but what sticks with me
the most is a visit in December several years ago.
What someone from the twenty-first century
notices most about Williamsburg on a cold winter
night is the profound darkness. Candles and baskets of blazing pine kindling are all very quaint,
but they hardly provide the illumination to which
we have grown accustomed. The Dark Ages did
not end until gas lighting, and probably until
Edison. The senses are, moreover, further bombarded with silence. True, there are not nearly
enough horses or carriages passing by on the
streets. Williamsburg in the eighteenth century
must have had far more. Yet it has none of the
familiar noises of the modem city. It is a profoundly alien place.
As I drive occasionally from Charlottesville,
Virginia, to Williamsburg and back again, I realize that I am not walking but actually driving
ground. In two hours, I travel ISO years of history.
Beginning in Williamsburg on a summer evening,

I start at the Mesopotamia of American
civilization. This is where the English settlers first
arrived and where the British Empire really began;
this is where the First British Empire ended, at
Yorktown; and this is the site of numerous other
events crucial to the history of the United States,
including battles of the Civil War. From this peninsula, I travel temporally forward from Jamestown,
and geographically upwards. At Richmond, I cross
the Fall Line, the head of navigation of the rivers of
the Mid-Atlantic, where the tides pushed upriver
from the Atlantic meet the rocks deposited by the
last glaciers. The soil changes there from the sand
of the coastal plain to the red, rocky clay of the
Piedmont. With the change of soil comes changes
in trees, and with the different soils and plants
comes-believe it or not-a different smell. Within
a few miles, the ground begins to fold into hollows
and hills. Finally, you come over a hill in the center of the Virginia Piedmont, and off in the
distance are the Blue Ridge Mountains, shrouded
in their eternal haze even when backlit by a
peach sunset. In two hours, I have traveled the
paths of decades of settlement.
I cannot say that I have learned anything from
this in a cognitive sense. My lessons from that
drive are not ones of rational thought. They are

emotional or affective. They begin as impressions
in the far reaches of my senses and slowly (if at all)
work upon my thoughts. Yet no amount of reading can replace those faint impressions, nor produce such lasting results. I know something of
Virginia in a deep and personal way. It is now a
sort of acquaintance. Emotional understanding
has shaped my cognitive knowledge.
This seems to me to be a profoundly
Christian way of knowing the past. To walk the
ground means to be embodied in that place. It
means recognizing that you can understand a
place only through your incarnate presence. This
gives dignity to the scholar's body, not just the
scholar's mind. The cognitive deliberations that
come from the scholar actually have a body.
Graduate students and other novice scholars
are often tempted to believe that they are
engaged in a process that will result in the disembodiment and consequent perfection of their
intelligence. Walking the ground is a salutary
exercise against such a twisted conception of creation. It is, I find, a sort of spiritual discipline for
the Christian historian. 'f

Al Zambone lives deep in the heart of Virginia.
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pulpit and pew_
a storm, a power outage, a LULU
an exploration into community

Thomas C. Willadsen
4:00 A.M. THE POWER IS OFF. I CAN'T GET
my sleep apnea machine to work, and it is so
dark because the nightlight is off. It takes a
while for my sleep-addled brain to make the connection that both these appliances are not broken
by coincidence.
I go back to sleep.
It is 5:00 a.m. I am awakened by the sound of
"guy-guys" (my three year old's term for anyone
who wears a helmet while working) speaking on
their walkie-talkies in the backyard.
That I slept through the storm that toppled my
next door neighbor's seventy year old silver maple
tree is a surprise to most people who hear this
story. What can I say? I've got a hearing loss; I'm a
sound sleeper; I have a clear conscience.
Four years ago, our power was knocked out for
three and a half days by the last "storm of the century." This storm wasn't as bad. The guy-guys were
on the scene in about two hours, talking into their
handsets, swearing (especially the one on the utility pole) and trashing the garden that my wife has
worked so hard on in the past few weeks.
It is Sunday morning, and we are off to a bad
start. Mary and David have been up since the
height of the storm, about 2:00a.m. Peter, our older
boy, inherited his dad's imperturbability and has
slept through everything.
At 6:30 a.m. Mary announces we are going to
Perkins for breakfast. Perkins has become our family restaurant of choice this spring, but I suggest
that we go to The American Table instead. It's much
closer to our home, just a few blocks from church.
It's locally-owned and serves the same sorts of
breakfasts that Perkins does for the same price.
About 7:00 a.m., we arrive at the restaurant,
needing coffee and the support of the community.
Cindy is our waitress, and she is perfect. She
guides us to the deals that will feed our boys for
the least amount of money. She keeps my coffee
cup full and even finds my wife some cranberry

I

T IS ABOUT

juice. She heard the storm but didn't know that
anyone had lost power.
I walk the remaining three blocks to church
from the restaurant. There's been no damage
from the storm at church and the power has
stayed on. This is a relief, because I won't have to
reset the church's insecurity system. I have never
been able to do this without accidentally summoning the police.
Elaine and Betty are setting up for coffee hour.
Tomorrow is their mutual birthday. I instruct them
to answer, "None of your damn business!" whenever someone asks them how old they are. Betty, a
new member, pretends to be shocked at this counsel. It prods Elaine to tell me a mildly racy joke
about a couple who pretend to be married. "Get
your own damn blanket!" is the punch line.
As we close the service, everyone sings, "I have
heard you calling in the night..." This line makes me
laugh so hard I stop singing. "God's going to have
to do a lot better than that thunderstorm last night
if He wants to get my attention," I think to myself.
After worship, Marlyn asks how David is. His
earache interrupted yesterday's quilt meeting. "Fill
that boy with enough Tylenol, and he's good to
go!" I respond.
Nick, the adolescent member of my air-band,
tells me that he returned to the library the CD from
last month's performance a few days overdue. I tell
him I can write off the fine as a business expense.
"I knew you'd have an angle, Pastor Tom!"
After worship and coffee hour (it is a strange
array of treats honoring the birthday women at coffee hour: circus peanuts, cheese curds, Jell-o bricks,
nuts, crackers, fruit spread), the congregation gathers to hear about the application for a sabbatical
grant that we will submit in the coming week. I
hope to explore the emerging field of New
Urbanism and its implications for a church like
ours that has chosen to stay downtown. The congregation is enthusiastic. One woman says that we

need to live into our new mission statement:
Ministry from the Heart of Oshkosh, serving with
energy, intelligence, imagination, and love. I've
enjoyed the whole process of dreaming about what
I would do, given three months away from work
and up to $45,000.
On my one-mile walk home from church, I
encounter only one person on the street, a realtor
getting ready for an open house. I wish him luck.
After we survey the damage done by the storm
(none) and the guy-guys (less than we first feared)
and move the downed limbs off the grass, I decide
to clean the gutters. I love cleaning the gutters. I
have the clearest gutters in Winnebago County.
You can't keep me off my extension ladder when
there might be blockage in my gutters. Luckily, the
storm has blown down all the maple seeds, so I
have a legitimate reason to climb my ladder.
As I'm on the ladder the chainsaw symphony
starts. Many people on our block are out cutting
big branches into smaller branches. Brian, the man
who lives across the fence, is one of them. Brian is
a good neighbor. He throws back the balls our sons
hit over the fence. Today, for the first time, we learn
his name, because the storm has brought us out,
working on a common project.
While I've got my ladder out and I'm feeling
community-minded, I walk down the street to the
home for four developmentally-delayed women.
City planners call their residence a LULU, for
"locally undesirable land use," I have to disagree
with this characterization. When my boys and I
walk the three blocks to the park to play ball, if we
encounter anyone on the street, it's one of these
ladies. We always exchange pleasantries. One
afternoon, the lady with the white hair asked if I
could help with the zipper on her sweater. I'm a
dad; it's what I do! Not only did she get her
sweater on properly, but I got to feel like a helpful
good citizen and my sons saw that strangers trust
dad and dad helps strangers.
I walk to the LULU and ring the bell. The
ladies lurk in the living room until the resident
helper answers the door.
"May I clean your gutters?" I ask.
"Uh .. .if you want to ..."
"I do, thanks!"
Frederick Buechner has said that one's vocation is "the place where our deep gladness meets
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the needs of the world." For me, that is at the top of
my extension ladder. For more than a year, I've
noticed the rotting leaves in the valley of the
LULU's roof. I've noticed the leaves and maple
seeds peaking out over the sides of the eavestroughs, and I've considered walking down the
block and offering to clear the gutters. I'm glad I
did. The gutter on the back of the house was
clogged and filled with stagnant water. A quick
application of my metal spoon and a forsythia twig
releases a torrent of water onto the grass. The
ladies are delighted!
After returning home I spot my neighbor two
doors down the other way. We had bonded four
years ago cleaning up after the last big storm. It
was like a snow day in June. He couldn't write his
article because his computer needs electricity, so
we spent the morning hauling branches to the curb
and helping our neighbors do the same. The day
after the storm was the high point of our friendship. We see each other regularly but never take
each other up on invitations to get together.
Don is amazed that I slept through the storm.
"I wannabe you in my next life!"
I'm thinking that's a compliment.

I

T SEEMS THAT EVERY ONE OF 1HESE ENCOUNTERS

says something about community: .the rich,
thick community relationships I have formed
with the members of my congregation; the professional relationship Cindy offered us as she served
our omelets and waffles; the casual, haphazard
relationships that form among neighbors; relationships that are strengthened, even nurtured by
storms and adversity. Thinking about my neighbor
ladies, I can't think of a single "undesirable" thing
about having them live on my block. They're
friendlier than anyone else. They are the only people we see on most of our trips to the park. They
are kind to me and my boys. They accept our help
and don't even really ask for it. They even let me
discover my true vocation.
Ten feet off the ground, up to my wrists in
muck I recognize my place in the community. The
joy I feel in being able to help is their gift to me. t

The Reverend Thomas C. Willadsen pastors First
Presbyterian Church in Oshkosh, Wisconsin.

being lutheran
the church of the transition

David Weber

H

E CONVERTED TO LUTHERANISM?" THIS WAS

my response on learning that a theology
professor (at a non-Lutheran institution) recently had become a Lutheran. I was
incredulous, because I am more accustomed to
people leaving Lutheranism. There are, of course,
the notable examples of Richard John Neuhaus,
Jaraslov Pelikan, and, most recently, the Duke
Divinity School professor, Reinhard Hutter. Closer
to home are the members of my family who were
raised Lutheran, and who now have become very
active in their respective Presbyterian, Baptist,
Episcopalian, and Pentecostal churches. Wanting
to know more, I asked this new Lutheran for an
explanation. His response, in part, goes like this:
"We had been Disciples of Christ ... (but) I was
never really at home (and) we just didn't know
where to go. My wife was raised Catholic, and did
not want, at that time, to return to Rome; I wanted
a church with more tradition, more ritual, more
mystery, but wasn't ready to consider Rome either.
Episcopalianism for a variety of reasons never
much appealed to me... So that left the
Lutherans ... we visited, and it was hard at first,
because it was a bit "colder" than the low church
atmosphere I am used to, and it was like visiting
somebody else's family reunion at times! But the
liturgy is rich, the Sunday school program was
biblical and well organized and well taught, and
the hymns are great; and I love going to the altar
for communion, that was so new to me, it was
good for me to get down on bended knees."
"Way to go!" thought I. Finally someone who
recognizes what is spiritually good about the
liturgy, sacramental focus, music, and tradition of
biblical education in Lutheranism. Returning to
the letter, a bit uplifted, I continued, "But alas, I
must tell you that I looked at joining the Lutheran
church (three years ago) as a stepping stone
toward Rome, and now that I am used to the
liturgy and have overcome some of my low church

biases against formal worship, I think we are starting to move in the Roman direction!!" So this is
what Lutheranism has become in the current
migration between denominations. We are not so
much the church of the Reformation as the church
of the transition. How did this come about?
Maybe this has something to do with our
claiming to be an evangelical-catholic faith. Some
twenty-five years ago, I first heard this description
from the former Valparaiso University theology
professor, Kenneth Korby. He said that Lutherans
were catholic in their confessions and sacramental,
liturgical worship, and evangelical in their emphasis on placing the proclamation of the Gospel over
the preservation of an institution. This made sense
of much of my Lutheran experience. Perhaps in
being evangelical-catholic we actually came to be
situated between the Evangelicals and the
Catholics. This made sense of the criticisms I had
heard from Evangelicals that Lutherans were
indistinguishable from Catholics because Luther
failed to push the logic of the Reformation far
enough. And from the Roman Catholic perspective, I had heard that Lutheranism is Church Lite
(with half as many sacraments) and oblivious to
the importance of the Church's tradition and institutions. So situated, Lutheranism might be a good
preparation for becoming Evangelical or Catholic.
So now I see that I should not have been asking the
question, "Why become Lutheran," but answering
the question, "Why be Lutheran?"
To help me think about this question, I turned
to a new collection of essays, The Gift of Grace: The
Future of Lutheran Theology. These essays were first
given at an international convocation at Aarhus
University, Denmark, to consider why world
Lutheranism is suffering an identity crisis. The
essays suggested various causes of this crisis,
including the shift in academic theology from
German to English speaking universities, a tum
from dogmatics to ethics, and the possibility that

the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification
had muddied the distinctions between Lutherans
and Catholics.
Some of the essays that caught my interest did
not exactly give a rousing affirmation of
Lutheranism. For example, the lead essay by Niels
Henrik Gregersen, a professor of systematic theology at the University of Denmark, argued that we
should not be studying Luther to arrive at solutions to contemporary theological problems. "Not
even the doctrine of justification with all its exclusives (sola gratia, sola fide) should be treated as a
core of Lutheran theology." In his opinion, even
Luther's division between law and gospelalthough a practically useful distinction- has been
elevated to an overarching principle of theological
interpretation that turns into the equivalent of dissection in biology. It might give knowledge about
faith, but only by killing the thing being studied.
Gregersen says that Lutheran theology can
contribute more today by paying attention to the
Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth and postVatican ll Roman Catholic theology rather than by
revisiting Luther's teachings. If being evangelicalcatholic means borrowing from helpful thinkers
and traditions, it is not a bad place to be.
Robert Jenson, perhaps the foremost North
American Lutheran theologian, has focused on
Karl Barth and Roman Catholic thinkers. He
argues that the Lutheran account of grace tends to
suffer from a "Trinitarian deficiency." The central
question for Lutheran theology today is, "How
should we characterize God's grace?" Aiming to
make sure God's grace remains clearly and solely
God's work, Lutherans have developed a standard
formulation of grace as "God gives-the human
being receives." This formulation forgets that
grace is "the shaping energizer and energy of
believers." And forgetting this, Lutheran theology
becomes "experientially empty."
Grace is sometimes understood as God's favor
and, at other times, as God's gift. As favor, grace is
God's initiative in bringing us into a new relationship with the Trinity. As gift, God freely gives
bankrupt sinners the fullness of his life. So far, so
Lutheran. So why the deficiency? Because more
needs to be said than the very real truth that God's
favor and gift has ultimately changed our status.
Talking about our status does not address the very
54 155 The Cresset Easter I 2006

real concern of our present experience of God's
presence. A way of understanding this distinction
between status and experience is in the two ways
we talk about aging. The observation "Every day
we are all growing older" says something that is
true, perhaps important, and utterly dull. The
observation, usually made in the morning when
looking in the mirror, "I'm getting old" probably
expresses a combination of regret and anxiety and
usually is followed with a series of commitments
to eat less and exercise more. When the truth
becomes personal, the prosaic becomes passionate. Jenson points to ways that Lutheran theology
can be more experientially focused.
Jenson grants that justification is a pivotal doctrine, but not the most important thing we can say
about God. The most important thing we can say
is that God is Triune. Overemphasizing justification, Lutherans have failed to pay sufficient attention to the richness of God's grace in creation, in
redemption, and in .. . You might expect the next
word to be "sanctification," but the word that characterizes the work of the Holy Spirit in these
essays is "participation." We live in the time of the
Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the
Son, to live in us so that we might live in- that is
participate in-the fullness of the life of the Trinity.
So why emphasize the term participation?
The concept of "participation" might help
Lutherans reclaim an experientially full theology
and overcome our Trinitarian deficit. If we really
have received God's fullness, in what sense do we
now experience this life as present participants in
God's fullness rather than under the conditions of
bankruptcy and emptiness? The German theologian Hermann Deuser suggests that the hesitant
Lutheran, S0ren Kierkegaard, embodies just such a
participatory theology.
I say hesitant because Kierkegaard is known
for saying that Luther's concept of grace lacked
"ethical seriousness," having little to say to our
concrete decisions and actions. Criticizing the
Danish church he said "it is easier to become a
Christian when one is not a Christian than it is
when one is already born into Christendom."
Kierkegaard, Deuser points out, had an acute
awareness of the dread and despair which fueled
his desire for a theology that was equal to the
"existential conflicts that have to be lived

through." It was fine to have a theology of grace
that confidently declared the truth about our ultimate fulfillment. What he wanted was a theology
of immediacy, where the fullness was experienced while we are in the thick of anxiety and
despair. The difference between an ultimate and
immediate theology is evident in Kierkegaard's
reflection on Abraham. An ultimate theology
impatiently leaps to the happy conclusion where
God surprisingly supplies the substitute sacrifice.
The immediate theology of fullness is equal to the
emptiness and despair that Abraham experienced
on his way to obediently sacrifice Isaac. For
Christians who really experience this same kind
of emptiness, an experientially empty theology of
grace is intolerable.
A theology of participation confidently
expects God's fullness to be equal to our experiences of anxiety and emptiness. It is God who
brought Abraham into the emptiness so he, and
we, would better understand how this fullness
would be manifested, in the fullness of time, when
Christ came for our salvation. There is no better
example of an experientially full theology of participation than Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life Together.
This book, written as the depth of the horrors of
Hitler's Germany were beginning to emerge, confidently claimed that the practice of spending time
alone in prayer and reading Scripture would sustain Christian hope, come what may! Bonhoeffer

commends this time alone, saying, "There is a
wonderful power of clarification, purification, and
concentration upon the essential thing in being
quiet." No matter how muddled with lies, polluted with brutality, and dis-integrated to the
extreme the world would become, Bonhoeffer
knew from experience that embedding the dreadfulness of this experience into the life of the Trinity
would result in the greater fullness of that cleansing and illumination, which finally leads on to the
ultimate integrity.
Has Lutheranism become a transitional tradition? The question is, in a way, unimportant
because its focus is on the institutional survival of
Lutheranism. We need the (re)discovery of an
experientially full theology of grace as performed
by Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer who, for different
reasons, gave little thought to the survival of institutional Lutheranism. They aimed instead to articulate how participation in Trinitarian grace was
sufficient to transition through personal and political anxiety. If Lutherans can recover what
Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer understood as the
beauty and usefulness of a theology of participation, we will be better able to live up to our vocation as the church of the transition. We could do
worse. f
David Weber is Assistant Professor of Theology at
Valparaiso University.

PENTECOST
Speaking by the tongues offlowers,
By the ten-tongued laurel speaking.
Emerson
When lilies finish their singing,
old roses resume the tune,
while blackberries well beyond
flowers now, quietly gather
the juices of their dark fruit.
Like bumble bees sluggish
with morning chill that buzz
among blossoms, the mind
listens for a chorus just
this side of silence.

Christian Knoeller

ethics
death penalty walking
Tobias Winright
ASTER MARKS THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS

E

Christ from death and the tomb. It is God's
vindication of the Innocent One who suffered, died, and was buried three days earlier.
Apparently fearing that the occupying Roman
forces might attempt to quell any perceived
threats to their rule, Caiaphas, the high priest,
demonstrated a bit of consequentialist reasoning:
"[I]t is better .. . to have one man die for the people
than to have the whole nation destroyed" (John
11:50; NRSV). Accordingly, the Roman governor of
Judea, Pontius Pilate, who wished to avoid a riot
and who was led to believe that Jesus was a zealous insurrectionist claiming to be king, ordered
Jesus' execution by crucifixion. Considered one of
the cruelest, most humiliating methods of capital
punishment, crucifixion was reserved for slaves
who were thieves and for rebels who were not
Roman citizens.
Indeed, Jesus was an innocent victim of capital punishment, but Easter does not let those who
executed him on Good Friday have the last word.
This most important of all Christian holy days
affirms that Jesus' life-his deeds and his teachings-offers an alternative way of life that is the
true way that God wills for the world. Indeed,
this new life in Christ is what we celebrate and
thank God for during worship on Sundays
throughout the liturgical year. As the late
Methodist liturgical historian, James F. White,
put it, "Each Sunday testifies to the resurrection.
Every Sunday is a little Easter or rather every
Easter is a yearly great Sunday." Thus, for early
Christians, as seen in the Epistle of Barnabas,
Sunday was regarded as "an eighth day, that is
the beginning of another world ... " The octagonal
baptismal font found in many churches symbolizes the genesis of a new way of life. St. Paul
wrote, "So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new
creation: everything old has passed away; see,
everything has become new!" (2 Corinthians 5:17)
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Unfortunately, a quick glance at the daily
newspaper-with its reports of violent crime, terrorist attacks, preemptive war, and state executions-calls into question this theological claim.
Over two decades ago, I worked for four years as
a corrections officer. During this time, I wrestled
with this discrepancy between the ways of the old
and the new creations. As one of the youngest officers assigned to the large maximum security jail, I
often found myself witnessing human nature at its
worst. Indeed, there were occasions when I had to
dive for cover from hurled excrement, or when I
had to defend myself (or others) against attack and
possible harm. I have been spit at, yelled at, verbally abused, bruised, and punched. I recall thinking to myself while talking to some alleged murderers who were especially hostile that this person
probably would not hesitate to kill me right now if
given the chance. But during those years, I also
met several others among the accused who were
in anguish and who seemed quite penitent about
their deeds.
As a Christian, I struggled with the use of
force, the perpetual hostility, and the intense anger
that often flared in that loud and smelly jail. I also
began slowly to question the practice of capital
punishment. Although this job probably contributed to a cynical attitude on my part toward
people and the way things are in the world, I could
not bring myself to embrace the enmity of some of
my coworkers who expressed their desire to work
as an executioner at the state prison in Starke,
Florida, where "Old Sparky," the nickname of the
electric chair, was located. While I could not articulate it at the time, perhaps I subconsciously anticipated an observation by Glen H . Stassen that I
would read years later: "Christians who remember
their Lord was unjustly and cruelly given the
death penalty have a hard time being enthusiastic
about imposing the death penalty on others."
Many Christian ethicists-myself included-are

for a number of theological reasons opposed to
capital punishment (reasons that I hopefully
address will in a future column). Here I wish to
focus on the question of how we respond to the
reality that capital punishment is continuing to be
imposed on innocent persons today, just as it was
imposed on the Innocent One on the cross two
millennia ago.
According to the Death Penalty Information
Center, the number of executions in the United
States has waned in recent years, and citizen
support for capital punishment also is diminishing. (See their informative website at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org). One major
reason for this trend is increasing concern about
the possibility that innocent persons are being
sentenced to death. Since 1973, 123 people (at the
time I write this) in twenty-five states have been
exonerated and released from death row because
of evidence of their innocence. As such cases
have received media coverage, more Americans
have come to question the institution of capital
punishment. In contrast to Caiaphas's method for
ethical reasoning, a longstanding saying in
American criminal justice is that it is "better that
ten guilty men go free than that one innocent
man be punished."
The execution of innocent persons is the focus
of Sister Helen Prejean's latest book, The Death of
Innocents: An Eyewitness Account of Wrongful
Executions (Random House, 2005). Nominated for
the Nobel Peace Prize numerous times, Sr. Prejean
is known for her bestselling book, Dead Man
Walking: An Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty
in the United States (Random House, 1993), upon
which Tim Robbins's successful motion picture,
Dead Man Walking, with Susan Sarandon playing
the part of Sister Helen, was based in 1996. As in
the first book, Prejean provides a moving account
of her experiences accompanying two men to their
deaths at the hand of the state. However, unlike
Dead Man Walking, in which the two men were
guilty of their crimes, The Death of Innocents provides disquieting details related to the conviction
and execution of two possibly innocent men.
To be sure, this is one of the main reasons why
in recent years several states, such as Illinois, have
placed a moratorium on the death penalty. These
states are putting executions on hold until solid

assurance can be given that no mistakes and no
injustices are being made. In addition to these
concerns about the possibility of executing innocent persons, there are also statistics that call into
question the fairness of the practice of capital
punishment-such as racial bias, incompetent
legal representation, bias against the poor, and
geographic disparities. The jury is also out on
whether capital punishment truly serves as a
deterrent against violent crime. One wonders if
the criminal justice system, a human institution,
ever can get to the point where it will not make
such mistakes or be fraught with such injustices.
After all, as Prejean noted in her initial book,
"Anything that human beings do can go wrong."
We and our institutions are finite and often err. I
readily admit that I saw and made mistakes when
I wore a uniform. Of course, nearly every inmate I
met attempted to assure me of his innocence. Most
were proven guilty at trial, yet some were found
innocent. Mistakes are also made during trials,
leading to the conviction of innocent persons.
Even more disturbing, as Prejean points out, is that
some mistakes may not be quite so accidental or
unintentional on the part of law enforcement or
prosecutors. As Reinhold Niebuhr was so adept at
reminding us, we and our institutions are both
finite and prone to sin.
Niebuhr's observation should encourage
humility on our part as we pass judgment on the
accused. Of course, a capital case is not the occasion for private vengeance by the victims or their
loved ones. It is the state's duty to punish justly on
behalf of society. However, just as individuals
need to "do justice ... and to walk humbly" (Micah
6:8), so too ought we to expect societal institutions,
such as the criminal justice system, to carry out
justice humbly and cautiously. In his An
Interpretation of Christian Ethics, Niebuhr wrote,
"Society must punish criminals, or at least quarantine them, even if the executors of judgment are
self-righteous sinners who do not realize to what
degree they are involved in the sins they seek to
suppress." I think the "executors of judgment"
indeed ought to realize the possibility that "they
are involved in the sins they seek to suppress."
Such a realization should give us pause when
it comes to capital crimes, especially since we live
in a society where violence is often glorified in

film, in video games, and in everyday conflict situations-in a "culture of death" of which Pope
John Paul II warned. Niebuhr himself appears to
imply that imprisonment ("quarantine them")
would be the more appropriate response to crime.
Indeed, later in the same book he observed that
capital punishment is "probably ineffective as a
deterrent of murder." However, it should be
noted that Niebuhr refused to invoke the principle of the sanctity of life as a reason for abolishing
capital punishment. This, he thought, "would
result in an ironical preference of the life of the
guilty to that of the innocent." Here is where
Niebuhr and Prejean part ways.
Although, like Niebuhr, Prejean raises concerns about the mistakes and sinfulness of society
and its institutions, she nevertheless advocates the
abolition of the death penalty based on the principle of the sanctity of life and based on her attempts
to answer the question of how to embody God's
love both for perpetrator and victim, as well as the
families of both. She regards each person, regardless of their guilt or innocence, as imago Dei, the
image of God, and as thereby possessing sanctity
of life. This is a theological claim not rooted in
whether a person deserves or earns God's favor or
our respect. It is a dignity that has been given
graciously to each human being by the Creator.
This is why the late Pope John Paul II wrote in his
1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of
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Life), "[W]hoever attacks human life, in some way
attacks God himself." Echoing Genesis 9:6, the
pope views the murder of an innocent human
being as a violation of his or her sanctity of life as
the image of God. Like Prejean, he also believes,
"Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity."
Although Prejean in her most recent book
rightly opposes capital punishment based on the
possibility that innocent persons have been executed or remain on death row awaiting execution,
her overall stance against the death penalty actually is based on much more than this. This is why
she is opposed also to the execution of guilty persons. Of course, this does not mean that Prejean
rejects punishment itself as implemented by the
state. Indeed, she supports life imprisonment
without parole for the worst violent offenders.
Obviously this does not make up for the loss
of the innocent victim's life, but does even the execution of the guilty perpetrator accomplish this? If
not, and if the practice of capital punishment continues to remain fraught with possible human
mistakes, such as the execution of innocent persons wrongly convicted, then perhaps instead of
having more "dead men walking" we should have
the "death penalty walking." f

Tobias Winright teaches Christian ethics at Saint
Louis University.

world
the Muhammad cartoon spectacle
john von Heyking

T

H E GERMAN WORD " S CHA USPIEL" USUALLY

means a theater play, but in political
debate it can refer to the act of engaging in
theatrics and making a spectacle of oneself,
instead of engaging in serious debate. The
Danish cartoon controversy has all the elements
of a Schauspiel in the latter sense and reveals
something important about the debate over truth
in our globalized world.
In September 2005, the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten published several cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. A group of Muslim
imams in Denmark complained to the Danish
government, which ignored them on the reasonable basis that governments do not tell newspapers what and what not to publish. Several imams
lobbied Middle Eastern governments, including
Egypt, which lobbied the Danish government to
prosecute the newspaper. It again refused on
grounds of freedom of speech. In a response
owing more to geopolitics and their own domestic legitimacy crisis, the Egyptian government disseminated the cartoons throughout the Middle
East which resulted in numerous riots and consumer boycotts of Danish products. The rioters,
along with peaceful protesters, claimed they were
upset with typically Western, neocolonialist
insensitivities toward their religion.
Western response largely was twofold:
numerous journalists dug in their heels and
declared their commitment to free expression;
and various news organizations and government
officials avowed cultural "sensitivity" in opposition to republishing the cartoons. The second type
of response confirmed the assertion by Robert
Wright of the New America Foundation, writing
recently in the New York Times, that what appears
in the "mainstream media" is censored by a sort of
self-restraint. Americans "let each group decide
what it finds most offensive, so long as the
implied taboo isn't too onerous. We ask only that

the offended group in turn respect the verdicts of
other groups about what they find most offensive." The role of "mainstream media" is to publish what is granted "legitimacy by nations and
peoples," not, strictly speaking to publish "truth."
While liberal democrats might defend the cartoons' publication as upholding some version of
"truth," those opposed to publication can call for
"civility," a quasi-virtue recognizing that society
needs to be greased by falsehoods.
Even so, one misunderstands this Schauspiel if
one views it as a conflict between freedom of
speech ("restrained" by civility) and religious
piety, between Western Enlightenment and socalled medieval Islam. Such a dichotomy ignores
the character of both post-Enlightenment liberalism and contemporary Islam in the globalized
world. Clarification requires examining each side
more closely.
While many liberal democrats wanted the
cartoons published in the name of freedom of
expression, numerous Muslims complained that
the mantle of freedom of expression merely
veiled anti-Muslim prejudice. They pointed to
laws in the West prohibiting certain kinds of
"hate speech." For example, while these protests
were occurring, Austria sentenced polemicist
David Irving to three years in prison for denying
the existence of the Holocaust. The Saskatoon StarPhoenix newspaper recently was fined for running an advertisement comprised of two males
holding hands superimposed with the universal
symbol of a red circle and a diagonal bar.
Muslims argue that since Western democracies
have their own forms of sacrilege against Jews,
women, and homosexuals, the refusal to recognize Muslim piety proves Western prejudice
against them.
One might say that these forms of liberal
democratic piety are tenets of the democratic faith
in equality that Western democracies hold. As

Alexis de Tocqueville warned in his magisterial
Democracy in America, in a nation of widespread
social equality the force of public opinion creates
a "tyranny of the majority" that tolerates no difference. Liberal democrats are willing to sacrifice
freedoms and enhance state power to secure
equality by protecting certain kinds of opinions
they deem most vulnerable to hostility from
majority public opinion. Tocqueville considered
perfect equality unattainable, and regarded
enhancing state power in its name a recipe for
despotism. Even so, when Muslims see hypocrisy
and complain about the liberal democrats' selective defense of freedom, what they are seeing is
this tension between freedom and equality and
the manner in which that tension is borne.
The manner in which Western journalists and
academics defend free speech is even more problematic. Though wearing the mantle of John Stuart
Mill's defense of liberty, many forgot that Mill
regarded freedom of speech as a means to an end.
He argued that speech needs freedom to enable
truth to emerge and to enable geniuses (like himself) to defend their distinctiveness against cultural, intellectual, and moral levelling (Mill was
influenced by Tocqueville on this). However, ever
since World War I, the liberal democrats have
become increasingly skeptical of grand narratives
that postulate "the truth" as emerging from historical progress. Liberal democrats are more skeptical
than Mill that truth can win out over demagoguery
and falsity. Liberal democrats are perhaps more
skeptical that there exists such a thing as "truth,"
especially one that grounds a master narrative for
a society or civilization.
Such skepticism weakened the arguments
made in favor of publishing the cartoons. They
favored free expression, but few if anyone
explained the purpose of free expression. The most
common reason was "to get the truth out there."
But what kind of truth? For what purpose? Without
any clear purpose, the cartoon's publication
becomes an end in itself. The circularity of the argument for publication reflects a crisis in articulating
public meaning for post-Enlightenment liberal
democracies. It is difficult to defend free speech if
one is unclear on the purpose of speech. As a result,
the argument's effectual truth is simply to "get the
truth out there" -to create a Schauspiel. As a result,
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freedom's defender is no longer John Stuart Mill,
with his means-ends defense, but Machiavelli, the
master counsellor of "effectual truth."
Some might find this claim for Machiavelli as
the spokesman for liberal democrats excessive
and argue that it ignores the fact that the cartoons
were meant to ridicule and not necessarily to
engage in cross-cultural dialogue. But ridicule, as
practiced by the great comedians including
Aristophanes, Jonathan Swift, and even The
Simpsons, ridicules the high from the perspective
of the low, or the noble from the perspective of the
vulgar, but it never loses sight of what is genuinely high. Even Voltaire's crude ridicule was
meant to further the goals of the philosophical
Enlightenment. This is one reason comedy often is
regarded as closer to philosophy than is tragedy.
Comedy is not simply self-expression and getting
the truth "out there." We may not have a right not
to be ridiculed, as Ronald Dworkin claims, but
ridicule needs a purpose. With images of
Muhammad, that purpose would have to be that
Muslims have a false idea of the nature of divine
being or, like Voltaire, that we should be skeptical
toward claims to any knowledge of divine being.
Given these were cartoons with limited ability to
communicate nuanced thought, it is difficult to
tell whether to demand skepticism is in fact to
demand atheism.
hat the Schauspiel reveals about contemporary Muslims is more difficult to
gauge. It is well known that many of
the riots were organized with the help of Arab
governments whose long-standing practice is to
whip up anti-Western hatred in order to deflect
their own crises of legitimacy. In the case of Egypt,
its government is concerned by recent electoral
gains by the Muslim Brotherhood, so it wanted to
be seen as defending the interests of Islam.
Also complicating the picture is the influence
that Wahhabism, Islam's hyper-Puritanical sect
and Saudi Arabia's other chief export, has over
Muslims. While Islamic history has seen periods
when Muhammad has been pictorially represented, one of Wahhabism's main tenets is the
absolute prohibition against pictorial representations of the divine and of the Prophet. In Arab
countries, cartoons are used primarily to mock,
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and on that basis any Muslim would object to a
cartoon of Muhammad.
Part of what makes the cartoon controversy a
Schauspiel is that it involves images rather than
words. Pictures might encourage debate, but they
just as easily can bypass reason and stir up the
passions, especially in a media world driven more
by the appearances of things than by what they
represent. Even so, for Muslims, the meaning of
the cartoons is quite clear. The pictorial representation of the divine directly challenges the foundations of the Muslim community's self-interpretation and its relation to the divine. Because images
do not speak for themselves, this challenge is easier to recognize if we consider the importance of
written representations and their relationship
with the Muslim community's self-interpretation.
For Muslims, the Qur'an is the unmediated
word of God, unlike the Jewish and Christian
Scriptures which are transmitted and mediated by
humans. While there are debates among Muslims
over the degree to which the Qur'an can be interpreted by humans, there is general agreement that
the Qur'an is written, by God, in perfect Arabic
dialect. Viewing it in this manner hinders the
examination of the Qur'an using historical methodologies, as has been done to Jewish and Christian
scriptures since at least the nineteenth-century.
Today, the most controversial historical study
of the Qur'an is being conducted by Christoph
Luxenberg, a pseudonym for a scholar who
argues that parts of the Qur'an are based on writings by Syriac Christians. His work has drawn the
attention of Newsweek and was considered at a
major conference held last year at the University
of Notre Dame. Among his findings is that the
term "Qur'an" derives from the Syriac qeryana, a
technical term in Eastern Christianity meaning
lectionary. He also finds that the seventy-two virgins (houris) some suicide bombers hope for are
actually a mistranslation of the word for raisins,
or more likely the dates one finds in a desert oasis.
The reasons for Luxenberg to maintain his
anonymity are obvious. His work would undermine the divine status of the Qur'an. Because the
Qur'an also provides a history of the community,
its res gestae, along with a historiography of the
meaning of that history, his work also would

undermine the Muslim community's self-interpretation as a community existing in time. The
Luxenberg thesis shows more clearly what is at
stake, from the Muslim side, in the Danish cartoon
Schauspiel. Since the Qur'an cannot be interpreted
as a text by Muslim scholars, Islamic self-understanding is particularly vulnerable to the fluid
images of the modem media, as demonstrated by
the media-savvy Osama bin Laden.
But a Schauspiel it remains, not only because of
the circular "arguments" of both sides, but also
because this was not so much a debate as it was
performance art consisting in the disclosure of
images. Liberal democracies in their postEnlightenment condition find that they lack a
common narrative. Among the numerous symbols, words, and slogans that become meaningless,
visual images take priority because their fragmented "meaning" gets more quickly digested
when flashed before us. This is why books titled
Blink outsell War and Peace. This is why the television show "Baywatch," with its ample images, is
popular across the globe. The primacy of images is
one reason Christoph Luxenberg so far has been
able to hide behind his pseudonym while conducting his obscure but revolutionary work.
In the end, though, the cartoon Schauspiel
reflects a chasm between the dogmatic positions
of liberal democrats and Islamists. Among
Muslims there are Islamists who desire others to
submit to their totalitarian worldview, and
among liberal democrats there are journalists,
academics, and other elites who assert freedom of
speech but have forgotten its purpose in finding
truth. The counselors of civility seem to have
given up entirely on truth and complacently live
out their little white lies that keep society
greased. The fragmented, globalized public
space in which they transmit their images, each
performing in isolation on one's own soapbox,
only aggravates the divisions.
One wishes the cartoon Schauspiel were a
joke, but, like real comedy, it points to serious
issues. Maybe comedy is closer to tragedy
than we think. f
John von Heyking is Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Lethbridge.

nation
love and the law
Jeanne M. Heffernan

A

MONG CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS'S SEARING

criticisms of the late Mother Teresa was
his contention that she helped perpetuate
the grinding poverty she ostensibly wished to
alleviate. Hitchens argued that by forsaking political action and focusing instead on simple palliative care for the poorest of the poor, Mother
Teresa engaged in the worst form of religious
quietism. Christianity, as practiced by the outspoken sister from Calcutta, at least, was a pernicious
opiate. Now, although the particular criticisms of
this curmudgeonly critic seem implausible in
view of the manifest sanctity of his target, they
nevertheless raise an important question for the
followers of Christ: in what esteem should they
hold political action in comparison to acts of
Christian charity? The question is not new and
has numerous corollaries: What is the distinctive
competence of political versus churchly authority? What role should public law play in moral
formation beyond religious catechesis? Should
Christians enter the political forum or confine
themselves to the realm of culture?
Some light recently has been shed on these
questions from a rather unlikely source: a papal
encyclical on, of all things, love. Deus Caritas Est
debuted earlier this year and marked an ambitious
undertaking, an attempt by Benedict XVI to elucidate the mystery of the nature of God. Taking his
bearings from John the Evangelist's astonishing
declaration, "God is love" (1 John 4:16), the pope
argues that God expresses both agape and eros. His
is a fully comprehensive love, metaphorically
revealed in the images of the suffering servant and
the ardent bridegroom alike. He both makes a
radical gift of himself to man in the sacrifice of
Christ and eagerly seeks ecstatic union with his
beloved Church. Made in the image of this God
who is love, man fully exhibits the divine image,
according to Benedict, only when he likewise
makes a gift of himself to another and receives the
62 163 The Cresset Easter I 2006

other in tum. As Jesus expresses in the Great
Commandment, the movement of love for the
Christian must be a vertical and horizontal "exodus out of the closed inward-looking self towards
its liberation through self-giving" (6). Loved first
by the transcendent God, the disciple loves God in
return and out of this relationship is equipped to
love his neighbor.
The truth of the faith that God is love thus
has direct social implications, which are definitive for the Church's self-understanding. "The
entire activity of the Church," Benedict insists, "is
an expression of a love that seeks the integral
good of man" (19), body, and soul. She attends to
his spiritual hunger for Word and Sacrament and
his manifold material needs. Hence the Church,
as a corporate body and as individuals, must
practice neighbor-love through both spiritual and
corporal works of mercy. Only when she is faithful to each of these tasks is she expressing her
"deepest nature" as revealed in the Church's
"three-fold responsibility: of proclaiming the
word of God (kerygma-martyria) , celebrating the
sacraments (leitourgia), and exercising the ministry of charity (diakonia)" (25).
But where, a Christopher Hitchens might
question, is justice in this picture? Do acts of charity render it irrelevant? Is the Church not concerned about political and economic structures?
As if to anticipate this criticism, Benedict quickly
appeals to the tradition of Catholic social
thought-the central task of which is to reflect on
and proclaim the requirements of a just social
order in light of the Gospel. In this vein, the pope
distinguishes between what is properly the task of
politics, namely, the actual legal ordering of the
community according to justice, and that of the
Church, namely, evangelization, worship, the
ministry of charity, and the advance of justice
through the instruction of the faithful and the provision of spiritual resources. "A just society," he

observes, "must be the achievement of politics, not
of the Church. Yet the promotion of justice through
efforts to bring about openness of mind and will to
the demands of the common good is something
which concerns the Church deeply" (28).
While the Church qua Church, in Benedict's
estimation, does not wield political power
directly, her lay members do. Indeed, he considers it a direct duty of the lay faithful to work for
justice in the political sphere. Yet, the pope contends that even in a just society, charity-the
personal expression of Christian love-would
nevertheless be necessary. "There will always be
suffering which cries out for consolation and
help. There will always be loneliness. There will
always be situations of material need where help
in the form of concrete love of neighbor is indispensable" (28). The most enlightened political
authority in the most well-ordered state cannot
substitute for "the very thing which the suffering
person-every person-needs: namely, loving
personal concern" (28b).
This quality of intimate care offered against
the horizon of transcendence can never be rendered by an organ of the state or communicated
by even a perfectly just law. What a Mother Teresa
can offer differs in kind from the noblest work of
a social reformer or progressive legislator. And
the difference does not detract from the value of
the latter. Great Christian thinkers with a high
view of politics recognized this instinctively.
Thomas Aquinas, for instance, held the purpose of
law in terrific esteem. He took it to be an indispensable aid for achieving human flourishing,
and he accorded it a lofty function: to habituate
men in virtue-the sine qua non of a happy life.
But even Aquinas recognized that law is limited.
By its nature, it attends to external action. It cannot penetrate the heart, cannot reveal the person.
Though the product of intelligence, it is not an
animate standard and cannot of itself treat the
particularities of a life.
But this is precisely what is needful in a situation of distress. The sufferer cries out to be
addressed by name, touched, held, called back to
what is true. If the sufferer's dignity has been vio-

lated or, worse, if he has inflicted an indignity, he
needs to hear a word of forgiveness and hope
that can come only from a transcendent source.
As Benedict's predecessor, John Paul II, reminded
his listeners, "Man is called to a fullness of life
which far exceeds the dimensions of his earthly
existence, because it consists in sharing the very
life of God. The loftiness of this supernatural
vocation reveals the greatness and the inestimable
value of human life even in its temporal phase."
Though our life on earth is only a penultimate
reality, John Paul insisted, "it remains a sacred
reality entrusted to us, to be preserved with a
sense of responsibility and brought to perfection
in love and in the gift of ourselves to God and to
our brothers and sisters" (Evangelium Vitae, 2).
The truth of the indispensability of both justice and charity in light of our supernatural destiny was brought home to me three years ago
while doing prison ministry at a juvenile detention facility in Los Angeles. In the girls I encountered, I found much that bespoke a social order in
need of reform: poverty, intergenerational incarceration, drug addiction, an impersonal and
densely bureaucratic justice system, and so on.
This context required political action. But the
deeper human needs there would not have found
political remedy. These were the needs emerging
from loneliness, abandonment, abuse, and violence-suffered and delivered. Only the Gospel
could touch them. I never will forget an
encounter with a particular young woman of
fourteen or fifteen. A quick-witted, tough, streetwise gang member, she sat stone-faced and distant for most of our sessions until one afternoon
when she asked me and Doug Yoder, the leader
of our outreach program, how God reacted when
a little girl is raped. Out of his deep humanity
and mature friendship with God, Doug simply
said, "It breaks his heart." And tears welled up in
her eyes. She had asked a question that could be
answered only in the language of love. 'f
Jeanne Heffernan teaches in the Department of
Humanities and Augustinian Traditions at Villanova
University.
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my choice
Peter Meilaender

EGINNING LAST OCTOBER AND CONTINUING

B

until late December, I began receiving for
the second year in a row flyers in the mail
urging me to "Voice My Choice." They came not
from NARAL, or NOW, or any of the suspects the
slogan might suggest, but rather from RG&ERochester Gas & Electric, my energy utilitywhich was dutifully notifying me of my new right
to take my business elsewhere. "Voice Your
Choice" is the tagline for New York State's attempt
to introduce competition into the energy market.
When I received the first batch of flyers, a year
earlier, I initially paid them little attention. Since
they were neither bills nor refund checks, they
appeared to be the sort of thing one safely could
ignore. Eventually I learned from a neighbor that
this was actually an opportunity for me to save
money, and I made a mental note to investigate.
Still, I procrastinated, and before I knew it the
December 31 deadline had snuck up on me.
Thus, on New Year's Eve, while others were
waiting for the ball to drop, I sat, virtuously, alone
before the computer, trying to figure out how to
Voice My Choice. My energy bill, I learned, consists
of two separate fees-one for the actual distribution of the electricity through the cables to my
house, the other for the initial supply of energy at
its source. The distribution fee is fixed, and RG&E
assured me that they would continue to be my
energy distributor. But New York State was now
giving customers the opportunity-imagine my
excitement-to select from among a number of
competing energy suppliers, creating a potential
savings on that portion of the bill if I chose wisely.
This much was not too difficult to grasp, but
the choice itself would require a comparison of the
various independent suppliers. And so I
descended into a world of arcana such as kilowatthours, for which even an advanced degree in political philosophy had left me woefully unprepared.
RG&E kindly provided a worksheet to assist me in
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my comparison. It was, unfortunately, unintelligible, at least to me. I bounced from one supplier's
website to another's, searching vainly for potentially useful scraps of information. Finally, I
thought I had discovered a supplier that would
save me money-call them ACME Energy. I filled
out their online application form and received the
glad tidings: ''We are sorry, but ACME Energy is no
longer accepting new applications this year."
I was overcome by a wave of indignation.
Nosed out by my fellow Voice-Your-Choicers! Or
deceived by New York's fraudulent promise that
the enrollment period was open until the end of the
year! But by now the fever was upon me. After so
much effort, I simply had to Voice My Choice. I
returned to a few of the other suppliers and found
another candidate. Another hasty application.
Another rejection. And so it went. Desperately, I
raced through the remaining suppliers. At this
point, I probably would have bought my energy
from a Boy Scout rubbing two sticks together, if
only I could have the privilege of Voicing My
Choice. But the result was always the same: No
more new applications being processed this year.
Finally, I accepted inevitable defeat. I was
doomed to the default option: RG&E would continue to be my supplier as well as my distributor.
As the new year rolled around, I stumbled to bed,
battered and worn.
I SIMPLIFIED THE PROCESS
considerably. Having once endured the
agony of comparing energy suppliers, I was
now a confirmed RG&E man. My only remaining
choice was between a variable monthly rate for my
energy supply or a fixed rate that would protect
me against unexpected swings in the energy markets. This choice I regarded as easy. (The Cresset no
doubt will receive numerous letters from irate
economists lambasting my economic ignorance.)
RG&E, I figured, is unlikely to offer me a fixed rate
HIS PAST FALL
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at which they expect to lose money. They could, of
course, guess wrong. But-since they devote considerable time to thinking about energy prices,
whereas I, as you may have gathered, do not-they
are probably less likely to guess wrong than I am.
So it's the variable rate for me. Over the long haul,
at least, I ought to do better than by pitting my
energy price predictions against theirs. Or, to shine
the bright light of day upon my choice: I intend to
be a free rider, enjoying the benefits of whatever
competition those other Voice-Your-Chokers are
able to induce. Let them drive down RG&E's prices
for me. I just don't want to think about it.
All of which does raise a question: Is it really
desirable to encourage innocent citizens to devote
their time to studying energy prices?
A silly question, I know. But I found myself
thinking of my energy supply nightmare in reflecting upon an important recent trend in several policy areas, namely, the attempt to control costs
through the introduction of competitive markets.
The clearest parallel to my "Voice Your Choice"
story is surely the new Medicare prescription drug
benefit introduced this year. President Bush and the
Republican Congress, bowing to mounting public
pressure, designed a drug benefit that permits
insurance companies to offer different, competing
plans, among which seniors can choose. Obviously,
this incorporation of competition into the plan is
intended to hold down prices. Since the plan's
introduction, the media has treated us to countless
tales of seniors' frantic efforts to sort through the
array of new choices opened up to them. We should
certainly weigh reports of the program's travails
against the predictable media glee at signs that a
Bush initiative might fail; however, there are clearly
a lot of seniors out there who are no more enthusiastic about comparing drug benefit plans than I am
about comparing energy suppliers. And, given the
unremitting tedium of health insurance-my own
pet theory for why we have not yet addressed our
health care crisis is that it simply is too boring to
think about for very long-who can blame them?
Competition plays a key role in other recent
initiatives. The President has advocated the
expanded use of Health Savings Accounts. HSAs
permit individuals to purchase low-cost, highdeductible health insurance policies, covering
mainly preventive care and high-cost items, while

saving money in special tax-free accounts in order
to cover their medical expenses. Here, again, the
goal is to control costs through the introduction of
competition and choice. The same idea, of course,
was at the heart of the President's proposal to
reform Social Security by permitting individuals to
put a small percentage of their benefits into personal retirement accounts that would invest in
stocks and bonds and thus earn a higher rate of
return. The hope, again: that markets, competition,
and choice will provide a higher bang for our retirement bucks. Policy iniatives such as these-and we
could list others, such as environmental proposals
for systems of tradable emissions credits-suggest
that what New York has done with my energy supply mirrors a broad trend in how we think about
the role of markets in government policy.
I ought to admit that I support this trend. A
fuller appreciation of the virtues of markets will, if
nothing else, help us achieve our policy goals more
cheaply and effectively. Nevertheless, competition
can control costs only if people actually spend time
exploring their options and comparing prices. Even
though others may not share my own deep distaste
for Voicing My Choice, we can reasonably ask to
what extent public policy should encourage us to
spend our time this way. In fact, the question is
more important with respect to others than to me. I,
after all, spend my working days reading Aristotle
and Hobbes-spending a bit of time thinking about
my energy bill won't do me any harm. But what
about people who already spend their days calculating costs and effects, trying to make their businesses more efficient, comparing prices, trying to
save on overhead, and making all the financial decisions that go into running a business successfully?
Should policy require that they spend more of their
leisure time on the same things?

N

EARLY TWO HUNDRED YEARS AGO, ALEXIS DE

Tocqueville argued that people in a democratic age were likely to be dominated
by a desire for material possessions. Neither
extremely poor nor extremely rich, these roughly
equal citizens would have enough wealth to
develop a taste for material goods and the realistic
expectation of acquiring them, but not so much to
be free from the fear of falling back into poverty.
Life would become a ceaseless chase after modest

new creature comforts. "The love of well-being" in
a democracy, he wrote,
proves to be a tenacious, exclusive, universal, but contained passion. It is not a question of building vast palaces, of conquering or fooling nature, of exhausting the
universe in order to better satisfy the passions of one man; it is a question of adding
some land to one's fields, of planting an
orchard, of enlarging a house, of always
making life easier and more convenient, of
averting trouble and satisfying the slightest needs without effort and almost without cost. These objects are small, but the
soul attaches itself to them: it thinks about
them every day and from very close up;
they end up obscuring the rest of the
world from it, and they sometimes come to
be placed between it and God.
In this respect, as in so many others,
Tocqueville was remarkably prescient. As I was
receiving those RG&E flyers last December, I was
also reading the annual newspaper reports about
·unfortunate Christmas shoppers trampled to death
by hordes of parents frantic for the newest video
game console. David Brooks's Bobos in Paradise
superbly describes a contemporary America that
perfectly matches Tocqueville's description of citizens whose souls are too often attached to the
slightest needs and conveniences.
Tocqueville's response, however, was not to
denounce these democratic citizens as hopelessly
bourgeois materialists. For one thing, he recognized that the material progress made in a democratic society enables vast numbers of people to
lead far better lives than ever before. Furthermore,
he believed that other aspects of American society,
religion in particular, had in fact prevented
Americans from becoming thoroughly materialistic. Tocqueville's response, rather, was to suggest
that public policy needed to take account of this
democratic tendency and to counteract it, by seeking to encourage countervailing norms whenever
possible, directing people's attention to noble or
long-term goals and reminding them that there is
more to life than the pursuit of material comfort.
"The whole art of the legislator consists of correctly
discerning in advance these natural inclinations of
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human societies in order to know where it is necessary to aid the effort of the citizens and where it is
necessary instead to slow it down." Policy should
balance and correct the tendencies toward which
citizens are otherwise prone.
Which brings me back to my original question.
From both necessity and inclination, most of us
already devote much of our lives to calculations of
cost and benefit. Should public policy encourage
us to spend our leisure in the same way? Do we
want people spending more time comparing
energy suppliers, insurance policies, and mutual
funds, when they could be reading the newspaper,
puttering around in the garden, watching a ball
game, or playing with their kids?
At this point, I suppose I ought to conclude,
"No, we don't." Having confessed my own sympathy for the market approach, however, I can't do
that very persuasively. So I will opt for a less coherent but more Tocquevillian conclusion instead.
Policies that take advantage of the strengths of free
markets probably can lower my energy bill, help
restrain health insurance costs, and increase our
retirement savings. We should not reject those
advantages simply out of fear of materialism or a
narrowly utilitarian approach to life. We should,
however, seek to balance those effects by seeking
opportunities, in public as well as private life, to
remind each other that man does not live by bread
alone. We do not lack for such opportunities, in
policy disputes from bioethics to marriage to education. "It is therefore necessary"- Tocqueville
again-"that the legislators of democracies and all
decent and enlightened men that live in them try
continuously to lift up the souls in democracies
and keep them raised toward Heaven."
And indeed, as I cite those words from
Tocqueville, I notice that their context- Democracy
in America, part two, chapter 15, "How Religious
Beliefs Sometimes Tum the Soul of Americans
Toward Spiritual Pleasures"-suggests an unexpectedly elegant combination of policies for resolving my dilemma: Voice Your Choice, health savings
accounts, partially privatized social security... and
Sunday closing laws. Perhaps salvation lies in keeping the Sabbath after all. Imagine that. f
Peter Meilaender is Assistant Professor of Political
Science at Houghton College.
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Marilyn J. Salmon. Preaching without Contempt:
Overcoming Unintended Anti-Judaism. Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2006.
n October 28, 1965, the Roman Catholic
bishops gathered at the Second Vatican
Council promulgated the Declaration on the
Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions
(Nostra Aetate). Paragraph four effectively reversed
the "teaching of contempt'' for Jews and Judaism
that had characterized Christian proclamation for
nearly two millennia. In the past four decades,
Nostra Aetate has spurred many Catholic and
Protestant clergy and scholars to reflect critically on
the proper presentation of Jews and Judaism in
Christian preaching. Marilyn J. Salmon's new book
represents a significant contribution to the
churches' continuing efforts to eliminate homiletical hostility toward Judaism and its adherents.
As her title suggests, Salmon intends her book
for preachers who think they need no help in eradicating anti-Jewish sentiment from their sermons.
"Even the most conscientious preachers unknowingly rely on stereotypes of Judaism" (ix). Her primary purpose, then, is to raise awareness of the
negative images of Jews and Judaism that commonly crop up in preaching, to teach preachers to
recognize them, and to provide strategies for avoiding them. Secondarily, Salmon seeks to teach her
reader how to proclaim the Christian gospel without depending on an inferior "other." As a very
effective means toward these ends, Salmon, herself
an Episcopal priest and assistant professor of New
Testament theology at United Theological
Seminary of the Twin Cities, provides numerous
examples from sermons (many of them her own)
that both unwittingly incorporate and intentionally
overcome negative portrayals of Jews.
The Gospels are the focus of Preaching without
Contempt both because most sermons are based on
these biblical books and because the most pervasive
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type of unintended anti-Judaism is that which contrasts Jesus with his Jewish contemporaries and
their customs. After setting the Gospels squarely
within their first-century Jewish context (chapter 1),
Salmon treats four potential pitfalls, namely: supersessionism, the conviction that Christians have
replaced Jews as God's chosen people (chapter 2),
the Pharisees and the Law (chapter 3), the Gospel
of John (chapter 4), and the Passion narrative
(chapter 5). In her opening chapter, Salmon demonstrates that the Gospels belong within the context of
the diversity of early Judaism. As such, their criticisms of Jewish groups must be understood as part
of an internal Jewish debate over the identity and
future of Israel rather than as the interreligious
polemic of Christians against Jews. Realizing that
the controversies recounted in the Gospels are
intra-Jewish rather than anti-Jewish can preserve
the preacher from inadvertent prejudices.
This is an important book that makes significant contributions to ongoing Christian efforts to
proclaim the good news in ways that eliminate the
bad news for Jews. Every Christian preacher can
benefit from Salmon's contextualization and careful
consideration of the Gospels within first-century
Judaism. Many of Salmon's examples demonstrate
the kind of creative, insightful, and bold exegesis
and proclamation that the Christian conquest of the
traditional "teaching of contempt" demands.
Yet, because the intended readership of
Preaching without Contempt consists of preachers
unaware of their need for such a book, Salmon
could have demonstrated more clearly the urgency
of her work by providing an overview of how
Gospel texts have been used to promote antiJudaism throughout history. Far too few Christian
preachers are aware, for example, that the traditional interpretations of the Passion narratives gave
rise to the anti-Jewish charges of deicide, blood
libel, and host desecration; that they inspired
Christian soldiers to slaughter thousands of Jews in

the Rhineland during the First Crusade (1096); that
they encouraged the bishops at the Fourth Lateran
Council (1215) to decree that Jews should not
appear in public during Holy Week; and that they
enabled Adolf Hitler to declare, "The task which
Christ began but did not finish I will complete"
(speech in Munich, December 1926).
As an historian of Christianity who is deeply
committed to Jewish-Christian relations, I sympathize with Salmon's goal of presenting the Christian
message in a way that promotes positive inter-religious dialogue. My major concern with Salmon's
book, however, is that it seems at times to advocate
proclaiming a gospel that loses its Christian distinctiveness. Amy-Jill Levine, a Jewish scholar of the
New Testament to whom Salmon refers several
times, rightly points out that "the church should not
sacrifice its own theology on the altar of interfaith
dialogue" (Amy-Jill Levine, "A Particular Problem:
Jewish Perspectives on Christian Bible Study," in
Theology and Sacred Scripture, 2002, 17). Indeed,
interfaith dialogue, by definition, presupposes two
distinct religious faiths.
Although Jews and Christians share some
scriptural books (i.e., the Tanakh and the Old
Testament), the respective arrangements of these
books in the two canons tell stories that are different in important ways. Thus, whereas Salmon
argues for replacing the traditional "Old
Testament"/"New Testament" nomenclature with
"Older Testament" and "Newer Testament," I
would retain the term "Old Testament" to reference
that peculiarly Christian grouping of sacred texts
and the story it aims to tell. Furthermore, in my
estimation, Salmon's suggested "Older Testament"/
"Newer Testament" nomenclature exacerbates
rather than eliminates implied supersessionism.
Even if we grant that the term "old" implies "new"
(which, of course, is not necessarily so), afortiori the
comparative adjective "older" requires something
''newer." Again, Levine provides a helpful corrective when she affirms that "the problem arises not
because of the term 'old' but because of the treatment the material receives in lectionaries, homilies,
[and] liturgical practice" ("A Particular Problem,"
17), a point that reinforces Salmon's recommendation for more sermons on the Old Testament.
Another example of Salmon's sacrificing
Christian particularity is her view that the entire
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Bible should be read and preached from a theacentric rather than a Christocentric perspective.
Over against the traditional Christian understanding that both Old and New Testaments reveal Jesus,
Salmon maintains that all of Scripture tells the story
of the God of Israel in covenantal relationship with
God's people. In her view, the primary subject of
even the New Testament is not Jesus Christ but
rather the God of Israel. Quite apart from the question of Christian theological distinctiveness, my
impression is that many Jews would find such an
understanding offensive and in violation of their
sense of the particularity of the Tanakh and Judaism.
As a result, Salmon's sincere attempt to diminish
anti-Judaism could be perceived as compounding it.
A third and final example is Salmon's suggestion that hoi Ioudaioi in the Gospel of John be rendered not as "the Jews" (which may sound antiJewish to modem church-goers) but rather in a
"more nuanced" way that conveys the intrareligious competition of late-first-century Judaism
such as "the crowd," "the people," or "all of our
people" (120). Such translations would be both less
accurate and less nuanced insofar as they completely conflate Jesus' followers or the Johannine
community with other Jews, giving the reader or
hearer little sense of existing intra-religious
distinctions. I would recommend that the preacher
read hoi Ioudaioi literally as "the Jews" and then
carefully explain what group the Gospel writer
might intend in this particular pericope (e.g., the
people of Judea; the synagogue leadership; chief
priests, scribes, and Pharisees; or even friends or
followers of Jesus). This approach would enable
the preacher to remain faithful to the text while
also affording a twofold pedagogical opportunity:
to educate parishioners both about the antiJudaism in the Johannine text, which they may or
may not hear, and about the anti-Judaism in the
church's long history of exegesis, belief, and practice, about which they might not have heard.
In spite of these limitations, Preaching without
Contempt is a thoroughly useful book that I recommend to Christian preachers, scholars, and teachers and to all Christians who are interested in
building a better future with our Jewish brothers
and sisters. And there is no time more appropriate
for careful reflection on these issues than during
Holy Week and the Easter Season.

t

the attic
the heart of history
(first published April 1939)

0. P. Kretzmann
GOOD FRIDAY. ... The most
important day in the history of
man .. . . Let a man say what he
believes about the six hours
from nine until three and we
shall know, as surely as we can
in the time of Good Fridays, the
eternal fate of his soul. . . .
Strange things happened on the
little hill nineteen hundred
years ago, but none more
strange than the fact that the
hands of God pressed the story
of man into six hours. . . .
Nineteen centuries of birth and
death, of pomp and circumstance, of crashing empires and
falling sparrows, have not
given men a new way to see the
Cross and its meaning for those
who pass by. . . . The Roman
governor still walks the streets
of the world, touched but not
persuaded, glimpsing heaven
and choosing hell, the twentiethcentury man- proud, careful,
cynical, afraid in his bravery of
the greatest courage in life, the
courage of faith . .. . All the others are here too-the mob blind
to everything but blood-the
blind leaders of the blind who
fear that the power of heaven
will take away their power on
earth-the unseeing who make
a holiday of hate out of the suffering of God. . . . For six
hours- for nineteen hundred
years-it goes on, the traffic
along the road beside the Cross,

where men and women pass
and linger and look, or hurry
by; and every man's life is
changed by the look he gives
the stricken figure upon it. . . .
This is all he can know, or
needs to know, here and hereafter. . . . Whatever else may
grow dim, or be broken and
lost, the darkness of the Cross
lights up his way homeless and
alone without it, a shining light
across the dark. ... The mystery
of mysteries . ... A limp, torn
body hangs upon a Cross, but
in it, above it, beyond it, is the
Light that never was on land or
sea....
All great events of history
have been misunderstood. . . .
The Cross is no exception. . . .
Why has this pouring of the
world's sorrow on one Head
held men these many years? ...
Is it because suffering is a language that all men can understand? .. . Is it the terrible fascination of the triumph of
evil? . . . Is it a momentary
glimpse into the hidden heroism of the soul of man which,
embodied in its best and fairest,
can reach heights of unselfishness unconquered by those
whose only destiny is the dust?
... Men have said these things
and have lost the fullness of the
Cross in its splinters . . . . There
is no need to explain the
Cross. . . . God has explained

it. .. . Over and over again so
that no one might misunderstand, but perhaps most clearly
and finally in the twenty-five
words which we know as John
3:16.... The Cross is eternally
silent unless it speaks, now and
for all time, of the reality of sin,
the sureness of judgment, and
the conquering love which forgives sin and removes judgment by the atoning death of
Him Who became the everlasting chalice for all the tenderness of God and all the broken
hopes of men. . . . This men
must mean when they say "I
believe in Jesus Christ," or they
may as well say "I believe in
Stephen" or "in Joan of
Arc" ...
Six hours and nineteen
hundred years. . . . We hear
again the loud voices saying
that His day is done . . .. So men
heard them during those six
hours, and in every generation
since. . . . But reiteration has
never made a thing true ... A
cross still towers above the
thrones that men build for their
idols, and a crown of thorns is
still greater than all the crowns
of gold the world has known
and will know. . . . 33 AD to
1939 AD .. . The heart of history-the heart of God-and
here and there the believing
heart of man. . . . This is all of
Good Friday. . . . f
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The Wind's in the North, a painting by Frank V. Dudley in the Brauer Museum of Art's permanent collection, is a work
that manages remarkably to capture in a static image the look of a breeze softly blowing across the landscape,
perhaps the slightly brisk breeze one feels while standing by the shore at the Indiana Dunes in early spring. The
subdued palette of blues, tans, greens, and lavenders reminds one of the pastel tones associated with the Easter
season, as colors slowly emerge after their winter slumber.
Born in Wisconsin and a long-time Chicago resident, Frank V. Dudley discovered during his adult travels the magical
landscape of the Indiana Dunes, a place that inspired him to visit and paint for the rest of his career and a landscape
that he worked to have preserved in state and national parks. His dunes paintings capture the quiet grandeur of their
setting. Lake Michigan, stretching into the distance, looks and feels like a vast ocean, while the various grasses and
trees stand tall in the sunlight.
A retrospective exhibition of Dudley's work will be on display at the Brauer Museum from I 5 August to 30
November, 2006. This major show of many of Dudley's finest creations (which will include The Wind's in the North)
will be accompanied by a catalogue published by the University of Illinois Press and intended to be the definitive
publication on the artist. Essays by esteemed scholars James Dabbert, William Gerdts, Wendy Greenhouse, J. Ronald
Engel, and Joan Engel will illuminate the life and legacy of this legendary figure in American art history.
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serves as Associate Professor of English at Purdue University.
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teaches English at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa.
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teaches literature and creative writing at Fordham University in New York City. Her poems have appeared
in a number of journals including America, First Things, Runes: A Review of Poetry, and Windhover.
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is a Canadian poet. His poems have appeared in Canadian Literature, Christianity & Literature, and
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